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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the logic of resilience as a prevailing mode of national security. Struck
more by its familiarity than its novelty, I turn my attention to public health as a way of better
understanding what resilience does and how it works. Using interpretive methods to read resilience
theoretically as a function of complex systems and concretely as a set of homeland security policy
practices in the United States, I situate the emergence and implementation of resilience as a
redeployment of long-standing motifs and modes of “containment,” recast as an immune system.
Specifically, I claim: 1) containment is a spatial strategy of controlling contagion embedded in
geopolitical and biological views of order and disorder; 2) this strategy shares a logic of national defence
and public health; and 3) resilience represents a tactical shift in practices of containment in order to
integrate expanding layers of the population into detection and control practices, both real-time and
automated.
I pursue this argument through an anatomy of containment that examines both its structure and
its parts. Section One follows the confluence of military and public health interventions to contain
contagion through shifting images of the body politic, starting with quarantine and immunity-as-defence
before turning to resilience as an immune system approach to body perceived as fluid and vulnerable.
Section Two explores how containment functions. This includes surveillance to detect outbreaks of
disease and disorder, hygiene measures to control responses to an outbreak and limit its spread, and
how this process is animated by the promotion of subjective identities in order to close the gap between
individual bodies and a collective Self.
In many ways, we are still trying to practice quarantine. There are flaws in this strategy. While
my analysis points to containment as a coherent strategy, it is continually fraught with tension between
the geopolitical system and biological parts. This tension implies limitations on the ability to contain
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contagion and raises political and ethical questions about which bodies are protected, and the
consequences of failure, which are obscured by the drive toward an automated and an increasingly
uncontested vision of security.
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INTRODUCTION—An Anatomy of Containment
What is important is inhibiting, preventing, and fighting the spread of contagion wherever it presents
itself, using whatever means necessary.1
Unmasking Resilience
Resilience is seductive. Broadly understood today by the public and scholars alike as the ability
to cope with danger and limit damage from disruption, resilience is a touchstone of contemporary life
that may seem new but at the same time evokes familiar and comforting images of the classic British
mantra, “Keep calm and carry on.” From terror attacks to natural disasters and the perils of trick-ortreating, the message is clear: “Don’t be scared, be prepared.”2 A central concept in national security
doctrines, resilience reassures us of our ability to confront the dangers of a world marked by
“contradictions, ambiguity, and uncertainty.”3 A seeming “superhero,” it promises “a universal solution
to a set of complex challenges.”4 Its political significance is indisputable. Aided by the ease by which it
metaphorically traverses multiple scientific and intuitive meanings,5 resilience courses through the
political lexicon. Scholars have described it as a “pervasive idiom of global governance.”6 As Mark
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Roberto Esposito, Terms of the Political: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics (New York: Fordham University Press,
2013), 60.
2
M. Neocleous, “‘Don’t Be Scared, Be Prepared’: Trauma-Anxiety-Resilience,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political
37, no. 3 (June 13, 2012): 188–98, https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375412449789; Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Public Health Matters Blog (blog), October 26, 2016,
https://blogs.cdc.gov/publichealthmatters/2016/10/dont-be-scared-be-prepared/.
3
James N. Rosenau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs,” in Complexity,
Global Politics, and National Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washington, DC: National
Defense University, 1997), 77.
4
Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Mareile Kaufmann, and Kristian Søby Kristensen, “Resilience and (In)security: Practices,
Subjects, Temporalities,” Security Dialogue 46, no. 1 (February 2015): 3,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614559637.
5
Fridolin Simon Brand and Kurt Jax, “Focusing the Meaning(s) of Resilience,” Ecology and Society, 2007,
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art23/; Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, Politics of
Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 49.
6
J. Walker and M. Cooper, “Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis
Adaptation,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 2 (May 9, 2011): 144, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611399616.
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Neocleous puts it, resilience has become an “obsession” that is “subsuming and surpassing the logic of
security.”7
What, then, is the logic of resilience? What does it do, how does it work, and is it really new?
These are the main questions that I grapple with in this dissertation. Using interpretive methods to read
resilience theoretically as a function of complex systems and concretely as a set of policy practices in the
United States, I am struck more by its familiarity than by its novelty. This familiarity has deep roots. It
evokes fears of contagious threats associated with plague and panic, and images of layered defences
associated with quarantine and civil defence. In making sense of this familiarity, I situate resilience in the
context of discourses and strategies of “containment.” Looking both to national security and public
health, I expand containment to mean “defence against the spread of disease and disorder inherent in
contagion.” My definition merges understandings of defence that are geopolitical, biological, and
centered on spatial representations of order and disorder associated with the body and fluidity.
I argue that resilience as understood today represents an immune system approach to
containment. This is a shift in form, not function, and it is part of an ongoing spatial evolution from
quarantine to immunity-as-defence that pushes containment farther into the bodies of the body politic.
It expresses an enduring, strategic symbiosis between national defence and public health that is based in
a persistent drive to control contagion.8 Despite the appearance of innovation, there is much more
continuity than change in how security is being conceived and implemented—and precious little
appreciation of its limitations. In many ways, we are still trying to practice quarantine. There are flaws in
this strategy.

7

Mark Neocleous, “Resisting Resilience,” Radical Philosophy, no. 178 (April 2013),
http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/resisting-resilience.
8
The concept of a strategic symbiosis is borrowed from Alison Howell, “The Global Politics of Medicine: Beyond
Global Health, against Securitisation Theory,” Review of International Studies 40, no. 5 (December 2014): 961–87,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000369.
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Advocates of resilience refer to it as the logic of safety. In contrast to the focus on anticipation
and prevention of harm that drives “security,” Aaron Wildavsky describes “safety” as the capacity to
cope with unanticipated dangers.9 This description echoes earlier literature on resilience as a means to
contain the potentially dangerous effects of complex systems.10 The idea of safety recalls efforts by C.S.
Holling—a central figure in the recent resurgence of resilience—to redefine it away from the mechanical
and engineering values of “efficiency, constancy, and predictability” and to emphasize living, ecological
capacities to meet change and unpredictability with persistence.11 Thomas Homer-Dixon alludes to this
as an attribute of the “prospective mind” that accepts how little we understand, how little we control,
and how unlikely we are to prevent all dangers.12 This is called “resilience thinking”—a response to the
limits of traditional “command-and-control” management that produce a “paradox of efficiency and
optimization” in seeking an “unattainable, yet widely pursued goal” based on asserting control even to
the point of system failure.13 From a national security perspective, Emilian Kavalski thus describes
resilience as a radical, postmodern shift from traditional command-and-control practices in favour of an
“ability to cope with vulnerabilities, defy adversity and construct a new proficiency in response to the
uncertainty, cognitive challenges, complex unbounded risks and the need for continuing adaptation
prompted by the alterations in global life.”14 It is an alluring promise but, as I will show, possibly an
empty one.

9

Aaron B. Wildavsky, Searching for Safety (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 77.
Amory Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins, Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security (Andover, MA: Brick
House Publishing Co., 1982); Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1984); Scott D. Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons
(Princeton University Press, 1995).
11
C.S. Holling, “Engineering Resilience versus Ecological Resilience,” in Engineering within Ecological Constraints,
ed. Peter C. Schulze (Washington, DC: National Academy of Engineering, 1996), 33.
12
Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity and the Renewal of Civilization (Toronto:
Vintage Canada, 2007), 30.
13
Brian Walker and David Salt, Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing World
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2006).
14
Emilian Kavalski, “The Complexity of Global Security Governance: An Analytical Overview,” Global Society 22, no.
4 (October 2008): 423, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820802366391.
10
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Pessimistically, other analysts call the abandonment of prevention and control in favour of
resilience the “politics of catastrophe.”15 It is marked by what David Chandler argues is an inward focus
on self-regulation rather than on external causes, a move that he sees as a radical, post-liberal turn in
governance practices.16 Julian Reid and Brad Evans likewise depict the rise of resilience as a political
move beyond liberalism that encourages us to live well in a world that is insecure by design and where
the very possibility of security is relinquished.17 Despite its nostalgic ring, resilience thus seems to be a
decidedly different way of doing security that is particular to the contemporary world, whether good or
bad. Indeed, we are warned that resilience today is not the same as the resilience of yesterday, and that
the defiant “stiff upper lip” associated with the Blitz is inappropriate in our world of constant change.18
Reinforcing assertions that resilience marks a break with the security logic of the past,19 Chris Zebrowski
argues that it reflects a fundamental shift in the very value and meaning of security, asserting that it has
displaced stability as the primary goal of governance.20
Such assertions of novelty and change are misleading. There is much to suggest that resilience
marks not a departure from, but a continuation of, the logic and processes associated with “security.” I
am not alone in this assessment. Notably, Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper trace the confluence of

15

Aradau and Munster, Politics of Catastrophe; Brad Evans and Julian Reid, “Exhausted by Resilience: Response to
the Commentaries,” Resilience 3, no. 2 (May 4, 2015): 154–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2015.1022991.
Mark Duffield refers to it as abandonment. Mark Duffield, “Environmental Terror: Uncertainty, Resilience and the
Bunker” (Global Insecurities Centre, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol,
2011).
16
D. Chandler, “Resilience and Human Security: The Post-Interventionist Paradigm,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 3
(June 8, 2012): 213–29, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010612444151; David Chandler, “Resilience and the
Autotelic Subject: Toward a Critique of the Societalization of Security,” International Political Sociology 7, no. 2
(June 2013): 210–26, https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12018; David Chandler, “Beyond Neoliberalism: Resilience, the
New Art of Governing Complexity,” Resilience 2, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 47–63,
https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2013.878544.
17
Brad Evans and Julian Reid, Resilient Life: The Art of Living Dangerously (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), 2.
18
Rachel Briggs, “Social Resilience and National Security—A British Perspective” (Demos, April 2008), 6.
19
James Brassett, Stuart Croft, and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Introduction: An Agenda for Resilience Research in
Politics and International Relations,” Politics 33, no. 4 (December 2013): 223, https://doi.org/10.1111/14679256.12032; Neocleous, “Resisting Resilience.”
20
Chris Zebrowski, The Value of Resilience: Securing Life in the Twenty-First Century (London; New York:
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 7, 14.
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resilience thinking with neoliberalism and risk management through the writings of liberal economist
Frederick Hayek and the ideas of complexity science.21 The modes by which resilience reinforces
neoliberal approaches to governance, including “responsibilization,” anticipation, preparedness, and the
production of fear, are well explored.22 However, an emphasis on neoliberalism obscures the fact that
resilience-based practices reflect a significant evolution of governance23 as well as deeper threads of
continuity.
I turn my attention to public health as a way of better understanding resilience as a logic of
security. I identity this logic as “containment,” the effort to control the spatial spread of disease and
disorder associated with contagion. Expanding theoretical views of containment aligned with the
geopolitical competition of the Cold War, I maintain that it reveals an enduring strategic logic that
weaves together national defence and public health. My argument keeps company with work on
bioterrorism and the view that warfare and public health are strategically indifferent.24 But here too
there is a sense of novelty. Indeed, the merging of health and security, medicine, and warfare is said to
mark a “microbial turn in security policy,”25 or what a RAND study refers to as a “new paradigm.”26 It is

21

Walker and Cooper, “Genealogies of Resilience.”
Michael Dillon, “Governing through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance,” Political Geography
26, no. 1 (January 2007): 41–47, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.08.003; Neocleous, “Don’t Be Scared, Be
Prepared”; Pat O’Malley, “Resilient Subjects: Uncertainty, Warfare and Liberalism,” Economy and Society 39, no. 4
(November 2010): 488–509, https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2010.510681; Philippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose,
“Governing Insecurity: Contingency Planning, Protection, Resilience,” Economy and Society 38, no. 2 (2009): 230–
54; Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War : Killing to Make Life Live (London; New York: Routledge,
2009).
23
Alison Howell, “Resilience as Enhancement: Governmentality and Political Economy beyond ‘Responsibilisation’:
Special Forum: Resilience Revisited,” Politics 35, no. 1 (February 2015): 67–71, https://doi.org/10.1111/14679256.12080.
24
M. Cooper, “Pre-Empting Emergence: The Biological Turn in the War on Terror,” Theory, Culture & Society 23,
no. 4 (July 1, 2006): 113, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276406065121.
25
Stefan Elbe, Anne Roemer-Mahler, and Christopher Long, “Medical Countermeasures for National Security: A
New Government Role in the Pharmaceuticalization of Society,” Social Science & Medicine 131 (April 2015): 264,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.04.035.
26
Gary Cecchine and Melinda Moore, Infectious Disease and National Security: Strategic Information Needs (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 1.
22
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likewise linked to a sense of lost control marked by notions of contagion and of “life itself as complex.”27
Additionally, it reflects a sense of spatial transformation linked to the molecular revolution in biology
that sees life as constantly changing and “emergent.”28 The fear is that this emergent life “may spiral out
of control.”29 As Melinda Cooper argues, the state thus seeks to pre-emptively contain its virulent
nature.30
My argument aims to unmask the claims of novelty and fundamental change in the logic and
discourse of security, including the claim that resilience embraces instability or eschews control. Neither
the notion of life as contagious nor the strategic marriage of warfare and health is new. As Alison Howell
makes clear in her a call for a Global Politics of Medicine, there is a long-standing “homologous”
relationship between warfare and medicine.31 I explore this relationship further with a focus on the
body as a space of order and control, specifically the geopolitical body of the state and the biological
bodies within it. Tracing its roots to the image of the fortress body inherent in the military-medical
scheme of quarantine, I sketch an anatomy of containment, following its contours through shifting
metaphors of the body and its defences including the molecular immunity of civil defence and resilience.
Examining the role of resilience in scientific theories of complexity and the rise and application of
resilience as a national security concept under the US Department of Homeland Defense (DHS), I
contend that resilience maintains the spatial and biological logic of containment, now recast as an

27

Chandler, “Beyond Neoliberalism,” 47.
Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, “Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction,” Review of
International Studies 34, no. 2 (April 2008): 265, 270, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210508008024; Cooper, “PreEmpting Emergence”; Cathy Waldby, AIDS and the Body Politic: Biomedicine and Sexual Difference, Writing
Corporealities (London; New York: Routledge, 1996).
29
Kevin Grove, “Agency, Affect, and the Immunological Politics of Disaster Resilience,” Environment and Planning
D: Society and Space 32, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 4, https://doi.org/10.1068/d4813.
30
Cooper, “Pre-Empting Emergence.”
31
Howell, “The Global Politics of Medicine.” Note that while Howell uses the terms “warfare” and “medicine” in
reference to overlapping techniques of “killing” and “curing,” my focus is on strategy, particularly defensive
strategy, and as such I use the broader terms associated with security, namely “national defense” and “public
health.”
28

6

immune system. It works by integrating individual bodies into the defence mechanisms of the state: a
shift of tactics rather than strategy.
Conceptually, “resilience” is notoriously ambiguous, seamlessly spreading across a range of
scientific fields and public policies. Described in social ecological literature as a “boundary concept,”32 it
has scientific and intuitive meanings open to shifting interpretations.33 In short, “resilience” is a
metaphor, which some analysts see as posing a limit to its public policy applicability.34 Resilience is
described as “fleet, adaptive, pragmatic” but also “profoundly hollow.”35 Critical scholars have been
accused of complicity in tolerating the opacity of “resilience” by stressing the commonalities among its
many incarnations more than the differences and thereby creating a “purified, ideal type” that never
exists in practice.36 Some critics contend that we must resist taking resilience as a monolithic,
monochromatic concept and instead uncover its plurality of meanings, temporalities, practices, and
subjectivities.37
While I am sympathetic to this critique, I am also intrigued by resilience as a ubiquitous
touchstone of public policy today. I am equally intrigued by its function as metaphor. Metaphors are
strategic: they inform both how we think about and how we practice politics.38 More practically, they

32

Brand and Jax, “Focusing the Meaning(s) of Resilience.” This resembles what Jane Jenson calls a “polysemic
concept.”
33
Jane Jenson, “Diffusing Ideas for After Neoliberalism: The Social Investment Perspective in Europe and Latin
America,” Global Social Policy 10, no. 1 (2010): 59–84. Aradau and Munster, Politics of Catastrophe, 49.
34
Brand and Jax, “Focusing the Meaning(s) of Resilience”; Steve Carpenter et al., “From Metaphor to
Measurement: Resilience of What to What?,” Ecosystems 4, no. 8 (December 1, 2001): 765–81,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10021-001-0045-9; United States, “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report”
(Washington, DC: DHS, 2010), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf.
35
Parul Sehgal, “The Profound Emptiness of ‘Resilience,’” The New York Times, December 1, 2015, sec. Magazine,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/magazine/the-profound-emptiness-of-resilience.html.
36
Ben Anderson, “What Kind of Thing Is Resilience?: Special Forum: Resilience Revisited,” Politics 35, no. 1
(February 2015): 61, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12079.
37
Dunn Cavelty, Kaufmann, and Søby Kristensen, “Resilience and (In)security.”
38
Paul A. Chilton, Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House, Conflict and
Consciousness, vol. 2 (New York: P. Lang, 1996), 13.
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point to how we see a problem and the necessary responses.39 Changes in metaphors reflect changes in
thinking and strategy,40 but they can also reveal underlying continuities, particularly when understood
within a wider conceptual landscape. Containment is such a landscape.
As a strategy of defence, containment is alive and well. Epitomizing its continued role in both
global health security and national defence, the 2017 US National Security Strategy prioritizes efforts to
“detect and contain biothreats at their source” and to “promote American resilience” at home. Perhaps
no other initiative symbolizes the continued obsession with containment quite like the promise of
President Trump to build a “big, beautiful wall” along the US southern border. America is not alone: like
the global passion for resilience, the desire for walls is proliferating. The two are entwined, both aiming
to control entry and circulation of contagious flows into the body.
Linguist Paul Chilton argues that containment as an element of national security served as “an
over-all strategic concept” for post-War America and its allies, providing a theoretical framework for
national security in an uncertain and chaotic era.41 He situates containment in the prevailing
spatialization of politics that contrasted the idea of contained space with a hydraulic image of power.42 It
is seen in a geopolitical context as the “spatial exclusion of threats” by the construction of “spatial,
political, and cultural boundaries” that separate a safe inside from a threatening outside.43 Emphasis on
spatial exclusion is echoed within biopolitical understandings of politics, particularly the concept of
“immunity,” which Roberto Esposito situates as the lynchpin of biology and politics.44 As a paradigm of

39

Paul H. Thibodeau and Lera Boroditsky, “Metaphors We Think with: The Role of Metaphor in Reasoning,” PloS
One 6, no. 2 (2011): e16782.
40
Ed Cohen, A Body Worth Defending: Immunity, Biopolitics, and the Apotheosis of the Modern Body (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2009), 34; Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. Hesse, The Construction of Reality (Cambridge, UK;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
41
Chilton, Security Metaphors, 160, 196.
42
Ibid., 132, 160.
43
Simon Dalby, “American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics,” Political Geography Quarterly 9, no.
2 (April 1990): 173, 176.
44
Roberto Esposito, Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy, Posthumanities Series, v. 4 (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2008), 45.
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governing, “What is important,” he writes, “is inhibiting, preventing, and fighting the spread of
contagion wherever it presents itself, using whatever means necessary.”45 Indeed, beyond metaphor
containment is also a central strategy of public health to limit the spatial spread of infection by an
integrated, layered approach to control disease outbreaks.46 Originally rooted in quarantine, this logic of
disease control continues today with a focus on “containing the effect of infectious disease rather than
tackling its root causes.”47 This resonance with “resilience” is not coincidental.
I argue that containment is strategically situated on views of order and contagious disorder
associated with a system of spatial and biological metaphors of the body and fluidity. This broader
understanding of the concept points to a blending of theoretical views of security as geopolitical and
biopolitical. This is where I situate resilience, namely as a metaphor for containment. Through this
argument I contribute a picture of stability if not stagnation in how we think and practice security.
Containment is a fundamental logic of defence. It has longstanding roots in both national defence and
public health, and prioritizes order and control more than protection and well-being. It’s not nefarious,
but it is certainly not the superhero that resilience is dressed up to be. Overall this is a cautionary tale
about the limits of security. I caution the limits of resilience, and by extension containment, as a mode
of defence. I caution the limits of language and critique to invoke change in the fundamental logic of this
defence. I caution the political implications of adopting resilience as a mode of protecting the weak and
vulnerable. And I caution our ability to cope with existential threats. We’re still trying to contain
contagion. But the barriers are leaky. And it’s not enough.
My argument that resilience utilizes metaphors and modes of containment reinterpreted as an
immune system combines three claims: 1) containment is a spatial strategy of controlling contagion
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embedded in geopolitical and biological views of order and disorder; 2) this strategy shares a logic of
national defence and public health; and 3) resilience represents a tactical shift in practices of
containment in order to integrate expanding layers of the population into detection and control
practices, both real-time and automated. Following Nikolas Rose, my overall approach is less a
genealogical effort to destabilize the present than a “cartography” of it that stresses “continuities as
much as change.” 48 By situating resilience as a strategic metaphor within the context of containment, I
employ an interpretive view of politics that sees theory and practice as conjoined.49 How we think about
a problem is related to how we address it. Hence, my research has two prongs: the discursive language
and imagery used to construct containment as a spatial response to contagion, and the techniques and
political interventions used to implement it. Drawing on critical discourse and policy analysis, I situate
the emergence and implementation of resilience as a redeployment of long-standing motifs and modes
of containment. This duality reflects an understanding of governmentality that stresses techniques and
practices of governing populations,50 and that has elsewhere proved useful for analyzing practices that
bring together distinct approaches associated with geopolitics and biopolitics.51
In advancing my argument I consider the theoretical underpinnings of containment as a mode of
national defence rooted in geopolitics as well as a mode of public health rooted in biopolitical
approaches to governing populations. Building on work by scholars such as Susan Sontag and Colleen
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Bell,52 I locate this confluence on the body—both biological and imagined—as a spatial representation of
order and the site of strategies to contain contagion and its “fluidity.” Following the lead of scholars who
argue that this association extends beyond metaphor to strategy,53 I find its origins in the medicalmilitary scheme of quarantine and the image of the “fortress” body. In doing so, I extend a similar
argument by Ed Cohen.54 As a defence against plague, quarantine and the cordone sanitaire mapped
layers of defence onto the state’s territorial body to restrict the flow of biological bodies, disease, and
disorder. This schema remains relevant but has evolved over time, deepening in response to internal
tensions and ongoing gaps between the state body and biological bodies as the space of contagion. I
follow it through conceptions of the body as porous and military views of immunity as a mode of civil
defence,55 demonstrating parallel shifts in national defence and health approaches, and outlining their
confluence in American approaches to defence.
Examining resilience as a revived mode of civil defence under DHS, I look at three subcases:
infrastructure resilience with its focus on cyber security, community resilience to disasters, and civic
resilience in the face of domestic terrorism and radicalization.56 This examination recognizes the
importance of national context in formulating domestic and foreign policies,57 and allows for exploring
resilience as an overarching strategic concept and for identifying nuances in its application across
subsets of the population. Moreover, the subcases reveal resilience to be part of a system of “active
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layered defenses.”58 Additionally, they reflect varying degrees of what Catherine Waldby describes as
“pathology” within the population,59 a factor that stimulates my consideration of particularities under
the metaphorical surface.
In conducting my research, I attended to national policy documents that establish the broad
framework for resilience as an approach to homeland security. I supplemented a narrow reading of
resilience60 by following the implementation of resilience through each subcase. The relevant discourse
includes a range of government statements, policy documents, hearings, websites, training courses,
media coverage and press releases, and government materials for public distribution. This deeper
reading provided an intertextual understanding of resilience.61 My search for materials involved probing
the depths of departmental websites. Because government policy has become ever more ephemeral
and digital, Internet searches and media coverage proved to be a way to identify specific programs and
interventions. Materials identified were analyzed inductively: I first read them for broad themes and
representations, and then for specific policy responses. I used this reading to piece together the
techniques through which resilience is implemented. The result is a narrative of resilience as an immune
system.
Within American policy, I identify the origins of resilience as an approach to homeland security
in the 1996 Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and the subsequent Presidential Decision
Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection. These documents, which predate the establishment of
DHS, point to a new vision of internal contagion and disorder, and a focus on integrating the private
sector into national defence capabilities through trust and engagement. I borrow the immune system
analogy directly from policy documents on cyber security and resilience that are inspired by the model
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of a biological system that is both autonomous and automated. These documents are imbued with
notions of health. Their vision derives directly from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and is mirrored in global public health. While motivated by the model of cyber resilience, this
vision is amplified in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. I identity these same processes and patterns
across other layers of resilience that are part of the American homeland security enterprise. I show that
while this vision possesses a coherent logic and promotes resilience, it is not new: it replicates military
and medical methods of defence that have co-evolved and reach ever deeper into the body politic.
Finally, my analysis of the technical means of containment demonstrates its overall coherence
and continuity, both of which speak to its endurance as a strategic logic. I argue that resilience expresses
a change in spatial tactics stressing integration of the body politic into the state’s containment practices,
with a sharper focus on real-time and automated responses to detect and contain contagion. This
deepening is reflected in the continuation of established interventions such as surveillance and
detection, hygiene, and a subjective identity of Self. I consider each of these techniques in their
historical and contemporary contexts, weaving together the threads of national defence and public
health as they evolve through quarantine, civil defence, and resilience to extend command and control
over bodies. An extended temporal view clarifies how resilience has been forged politically within the
national body62 and its continued evolution toward an “‘informational immune body.”63
I proceed with my argument in two sections, which together form an anatomy of containment
that examines both its structure and its parts. Section One establishes an expanded view of
“containment” as a spatial strategy of defence against contagion based in the control of bodies. I follow
the confluence of military and public health interventions to contain contagion through shifting images
of the body politic, starting with quarantine and immunity-as-defence in the first chapter, and their
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relevance to American national defence. The second chapter examines the rise of resilience in the
context of complexity, the limits of immunity, and conceptions of the body as fluid and vulnerable, a
vector of contagion. Here I contend that resilience resembles an immune system approach to
containment, in seeking to solidify and integrate vulnerable elements of the body into defence
mechanisms created and controlled by trust and engagement.
Section Two explores these defence mechanisms in detail. In three chapters I trace the
unfolding of containment measures deeper into the body politic and explain their co-evolution as
defensive techniques based in national defence and public health. The first chapter examines
surveillance to detect outbreaks of disease and disorder, which I identify with the clinical practice of
looking and listening for signs of illness. The second chapter deals with control of milieu—the internal
space of circulation and contagion within the body—mainly by hygiene measures to control responses
to an outbreak and limit its spread. The third chapter looks at how this process is animated by the
promotion of subjective identities in order to close the gap between individual bodies and a collective
Self, an initiative aimed to motivate compliance and to signal bodies that must be contained. While we
might be doing security better technically, the mechanics remain the same.
Although this anatomy points to containment as a coherent strategy, it also suggests that
containment is not stable. Instead, it is best viewed as “an abstract schema whose concrete
implementation has been continually fraught with internal tension.”64 The core tension is between the
geopolitical body and biological bodies; macro and micro levels; the system and its parts; and seduction
and coercion. This tension may be elided by the metaphorical functioning of “containment” and the
universal appeal of “resilience,”65 but it nevertheless persists. It becomes more acute as resilience
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extends further into the body politic and grapples with perceived otherness and pathology. Civic
resilience to terrorism proves to be the most fraught area.
The tension is most evident in the long timeframe by which I analyse the implementation of
resilience policies in the United States. Reflecting the inspirational model of the immune system, this
direction is seen most notably in the drive toward automation and in resurgent efforts to design-in
security for some parts of the body politic. Together, the tension, the effort to overwrite it through
automation, and the resurgence of barriers to it raise questions about political effects and policy
effectiveness. I consider a number of these questions in the final chapter, where I summarize my
explorations, think through the usefulness and limitations of resilience as a mode of containment, and
reflect on what it means for security as both a political and academic endeavour.
From a policy perspective, such tension implies limitations on the ability to contain contagion,
and raises additional political and ethical questions about the relationship between the body as a system
and its parts. I identify two serious limitations: the potential for catastrophe and the problem of internal
control. Both hinder the effectiveness of the immune system-like responses envisioned by resilience.
Given these limitations, I suggest that resilience is best suited for the state as a means of coping with
smaller scale disturbances, reflected in what I call the “politics of disturbance.” In other words, as a logic
of security, resilience is not enough.
These limits raise additional political and ethical questions that require thinking through the
relationship between the parts of the body and the whole, which Catherine Waldby argues is a problem
common to biology and political philosophy.66 Containment, including resilience, is about macro stability
and order: it leverages the parts to defend the system. Aaron Wildavsky calls this the “rule of
sacrifice.”67 And yet this sacrifice is rarely questioned.68 This is in part because of the strong

66

Waldby, AIDS and the Body Politic, 58.
Wildavsky, Searching for Safety, 5.
68
An exception is found in Evans and Reid, Resilient Life.
67

15

metaphorical appeal of resilience and its seemingly universal applicability; its seduction. For those who
struggle to recast the protective values of security over the bodies of the weak and vulnerable, resilience
may be not only insufficient, but ineffective.
The persistence of containment as a way of thinking about and implementing security suggests
that the concept of security has eluded attempts to reclaim or revise the dominant mechanisms and
aims that animated the field after the Cold War. Not only does the metaphorical functioning of
resilience obscure questions about which bodies are being protected, it blurs the distinction between
threats and referents by treating the public as both the object of security and part of the problem.69
Important distinctions become further obscured under automation, suggesting a drive towards an
uncontested version of security.
Writing on the nature of contemporary political order in what he describes as a “world adrift,”
Chester Crocker questions whether it is “possible or desirable to have a coherent, grand strategy, or
even a central strategic concept such as ‘containment.’”70 My analysis of resilience indicates that it is not
only possible, but it exists. Its limitations and political costs, which hide behind a metaphorical mask,
suggest that it might not be desirable. Finding alternative approaches, however, may necessitate looking
beyond the confines of security and the central concept and strategy of containment.
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CHAPTER ONE—Defending the Body: Containment—from Quarantine to Immunity
A virus lies in wait, ready to breach the most elaborate hygienic, physical, intellectual,
and moral defenses of sovereign states and sovereign individuals.1

Rethinking Containment
Containment is an odd, or at least malleable, concept. For people familiar with the Cold War
standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, it resurrects images of red ink bleeding across
maps of the world, met with black lines in the sand. Containment is also the apt name for a 2015 British
thriller in which citizens are told repeatedly to remain calm in the face of a deadly epidemic outbreak
raging out of control.2 Both of these associations make a good starting point for discussing containment
as a strategy, a logic of security that I identify as spatial control over the movement and spread of
disease and disorder associated with biological images of the body, contagion, and fluidity. This logic
weaves together mutual objectives and strategies of national defence and public health in a relationship
that is as old as the plague—and as new as resilience, a key concept in my discussion.
In this chapter I outline the theoretical, metaphorical, and historical context for understanding
containment as a strategy of spatial and biological defence. It begins and ends with the body.
Theoretically, I locate the body of the state and the biological human body as the mutual terrain where
geopolitical understandings of the defence of the state and biopolitical understandings of the defence of
the population meet to negate threats. The body also links these objectives metaphorically, symbolizing
spaces of social and political order and control, and the unity of bodies in the body politic. Contagion,
the enemy of the body, belies this order, control, and unity. It speaks not only to disease and disorder,
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but also to their movement and spread into and through the body. Like the body, contagion is itself
biological and spatial, and is represented by the topology of “fluid space.”3
Containment involves defending the body against contagion. The logic of containment has
informed approaches to national defence and public health. As a strategy, it is neither static nor
seamless. Instead, containment has shifted over time alongside changing images of the body and
understandings of its biological modes of defence. Mapping containment strategy onto two prominent
images—quarantine and the “fortress” body, and the molecular body of “immunity”—I discuss the
progress of intervention into individual, biological bodies as the site of order and control. These broad
approaches provide context for the evolving modes of containment in American national defence policy
and Cold War strategy. Beneath a narrative of deepening bodily defence lies the failure of containment
and the limit of control over contagion. This failure and limit offer a prologue to the rise of resilience as
a paradigm of defence rooted in auto-immunity and the image of a body turning against itself,
disintegrating, and becoming fluid; of quarantine recast as an immune system.
The Body in Geopolitics and Biopolitics
How should we understand resilience as a strategy of containment? The first step is to rethink
containment. I am particularly interested in the similarities between the objectives and strategies for
containing threats as a mode of national defence and public health and their respective roots in
geopolitical and biopolitical understandings of security. Geopolitics is a persistent, dominant approach
to the security of states based on the “spatial exclusion of threats”4 generally rooted in military
defence.5 It echoes containment as a strategy of public health, where it is aimed at limiting the spatial
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spread of infection.6 This resonance is not coincidental. It reflects the strategic entanglement of spatial
and biological views of defence that are fixed on the notion of the body.7 The body is both a metaphor
of political philosophy and an individual, biological form of life. The two are intricately related and
provide the theoretical terrain for examining the origins and evolution of containment as a defensive
strategy against the contagion of disease and disorder.
Traditionally, national security and public health are regarded as two distinct realms of policy
tasked with the external security of the state and the well-being of the population, and broadly reflect
geopolitical and biopolitical theories of security and state perspectives.8 However, while they emphasize
different referents and processes of order and governing, the two theoretical orientations are related.
Writing about this relationship, Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero assert that there is “no
geopolitics that does not imply a correlate biopolitics, and no biopolitics without its corresponding
geopolitics.”9 Further, the divide between the respective lines of logic is shrinking. As proof, these
authors refer to “a general biologisation of security discourses” that incorporates health and medical
analogies in strategic military thinking.10 Additionally, Colleen Bell describes as “infectious” the
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quarantine, vaccination, and treatment within counter-insurgency doctrines.11 Taking this point further,
Alison Howell argues that the tools of warfare and medicine associated with national defence and public
health are entwined in a common strategy and scientific understanding of population defence.12 Like the
description of the biologisation of security, this argument resonates, particularly with a view of the
population as a key source of state power—the power of life—within theories of biopolitics.13 But if
warfare and medicine are woven together in defence of population, what happens if we narrow our
gaze to the body? This is where I have discovered mutual strategies of containing contagion.14 It
provides a different nexus from which to view the symbiotic relationship between national security and
public health and contributes insights into the tensions and limitations of these strategies stemming
from flaws in the notion of the body as an organic whole.
The biological body represents the anatomical pole of Michel Foucault’s concept of biopower.
Rather than enhancing the biological productivity of the species—"making life live”—the anatomical
pole disciplines and controls individual bodies.15 Discipline is associated with military techniques, with
“command and control” of the body as a machine.16 While there is a sense within the study of
biopolitics—reflected in the trajectory of Foucault’s work—of a temporal passing from societies of
discipline and control to regulation of citizens associated with governmentality,17 one does not replace
the other. Instead, they are techniques associated with different but related problems: life as productive
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and life as contagious. Matthew Coleman and Kevin Grove use the example of endemic and epidemic
disease: conditions that are routine to the population are regulated and modulated, while outbreaks of
contagious disease are contained and controlled in individual bodies.18 Containment, then, is about the
body. This is true not only of biopolitics but of geopolitics, where the spatial exclusion of threats follows
the contours of the state as an imagined political body. Both bodies are spaces to be ordered and
controlled, and both are threatened by the spatial and biological flow of contagion.

The Body as Order
Both geopolitical and biopolitical theories of security have an anatomical focus on the body as a
space of order and control, including the metaphor of the state-as-body.19 Bernadette Wegenstein notes
that the “spatially imagined body . . . was the most common vehicle for the making of social and cosmic
metaphors in early modern Europe.”20 These bodies overlap, and both are conceived of as biological and
spatial. Geopolitically, states are seen as “organic entities with quasi-biological functioning,”21 a
geopolitical act of speciation.22 Biopolitically, the biological body is viewed as inherently political and
geographically inseparable from the state, a creation of sovereign power. 23 States-as-bodies and bodiesas-states are thus irrevocably bound together spatially and biologically in the pursuit of political order.
This relationship is evident in the original image of a “body politic,” a medieval metaphor that
regards the king’s two bodies, one mortal and the other divine, presiding over the social order of the
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state24 and replicating the image of the Christian church as a single, organic body. It is this merging of
bodies that Thomas Hobbes later used to describe the underpinnings of sovereignty and the social
contract—the joining of the natural body of the individual with the man-made body of the state in the
interest of security.25 Roberto Esposito describes this merger as the replacement of individual immunity
with the artificial immunity of the state.26 Both descriptions suggest the creation of a wholeness from
parts—a unified political body composed of individual biological bodies, a process that Hobbes links to
the containment of internal disorder and warfare.27 This purpose is reflected in earlier writings on biopolitics that Esposito traces in the background of Foucault’s work, such as the 1920 publication
Anatomy, Physiology, and Pathology of the State, which discusses the harmonic, biological configuration
of a state body.28 This sense of unity remains consistent in contemporary ideas of the organic body.29
The association of the body with political order extends to the role of medicine in the social
order. In her analysis of the war on AIDS, Catherine Waldby explains that public health is imbued with
the maintenance of social order, noting that epidemiology “conceptualises social order as analogous to
organic order” and “provides the conditions for its maintenance as, or restoration to, a singular, clean,
and unified organic system."30 Deborah Lupton echoes this sentiment, writing that “public health has
been directed at attempts to police body boundaries, to guard the integrity of the public body against
the disorder threatened by dirt.”31 In public health literature, the place outside the social order of the
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body is associated with “outcasts, danger and pollution.”32 This depiction recalls geopolitical notions of
control through ordering and “Othering” as the “ideological process of constructing spatial, political and
cultural boundaries to demarcate the domestic space as separate from the threatening Other: to
exclude Otherness and simultaneously to discipline and control the domestic political sphere.”33
The body exists both metaphorically and biologically to maintain the order and identity of the
organism, including the boundaries between inside and outside, Self and Other. As well, the idea of the
organic unity of the state as a coherent body politic continues largely unquestioned.34 But it is an image
fraught with tensions. The making of the state-as-body and its incorporation of individual bodies is
always incomplete; fragments remain to be purified, gaps to be filled.35 This is the work of containment.
Containing Contagion
Geopolitics and biopolitics converge strategically, not only on the terrain of the body but also in
the joint objective of containing contagion. Contagion speaks to the confluence of spatial and biological
threats.
It describes a spatial phenomenon that is fluid, threats flowing through time and space and
always bypassing the boundaries of borders.36 It is also a biological process unfolding within the body as
the space of origin and distribution of disease. 37 Contagion is thus a threat to both borders and bodies,
and to the body as border: it represents the intersection of the geopolitics of order and the biopolitics of
life. It is about disease and disorder, and their movement through the bodies of the politic.
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Disease and Disorder
The boundary functions required to maintain spaces of order distinct from spaces of the Other
(such as representing the foreigner as barbarian) are referred to as discourses of danger.38 Such images
are often woven into notions of disease and disorder as a threat to the integrity of the body.39 Susan
Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor details myriad militarized metaphors of disease40 that are further explored
by Colleen Bell.41 Cancer, for example, is described as “out of control” and a “barbarian within;”42 it is
invasive, colonizing, and radical; it requires defences, scans, and treatments to bombard and kill it.43 The
domestic presence of foreign bodies has long been associated with tropes of disease, including cankers
and plagues.44 Disease as a confluence of biological and military threats to the body-as-state is evident
in metaphors linked to the war on AIDS, where the state’s healthy body is threatened by a foreign
infection.45 This link extends beyond metaphor. In contemporary health governance literature, disease is
named a threat “to the power and cohesion of the state” that destabilizes state-society relations and
ultimately erodes that cohesion.46 Contagion “contains the seeds” of transformation, destruction, and
“catastrophic disruptions” that inflict profound changes on social, economic, and political order. The
fear associated with AIDS was partly linked to concerns for social disintegration and civil war.47 Disease
thus represents not only invasion of, but disorder within, the body. Foucault describes plague as a
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metaphor for “all forms of confusion and disorder,”48 and in Madness in International Relations, Alison
Howell details how sources of disorder have in turn been pathologized.49
Contagion thus involves concepts of both disease and disorder. However, it equally refers to a
more virulent threat of spatial transmission from one body to another, and the spatial transgression of
disease from outside to inside the body—a loss of control. While the body has an identifiable form and
shape, with boundaries and identity, contagion marks their violation; it adopts the shape, identity, and
movement of fluid spaces.
While everyone intuitively grasps the spatial concept of flows in everyday language, my
understanding of “fluid” space draws on Annemarie Mol and John Law, who have theorized the
disordering effect of fluid social spaces through the analogy of blood, which “disturbs the spatial
securities of anatomy.”50 Flowing through the body, blood ignores internal boundaries and is not
confined to the network of vessels and arteries. Blood instead seeps through them, filling in surrounding
spaces.51 Through processes of mixing, diffusion, and cascades, fluids threaten the order, identity, and
spatial integrity of controlled spaces defined by stable borders and networked relations.52 Unlike spaces
of gaseous evaporation, fluid spaces remain intimately connected to these spaces, circulating around
and within them, yet not separated from them and staying tied to the body. For example, Philippe
Fontaine’s exploration of Richard Titmuss’s work on social cohesion notes that blood is linked to both
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the disease and integrity of the body, with the potential to circulate both life and death.53 Fluid spaces
are thus ambiguous, lacking clear boundaries and identities, blurring inside and outside, similarity and
difference, and allowing leakage into ordered spaces.54 They are the conduit of disease and disorder,
and reveal the internal vulnerabilities of the body. This is evident in Sontag’s argument that disease
represents a “pathology of space” that is topographical: it is said to spread, proliferate, and diffuse.55 In
contrast to diseases such as cancer, which can be isolated, controlled, and killed, infectious disease is
often associated with fluid spaces. Tuberculosis, for example, is a “disease of liquids”: it not only flows
across bodies but also contributes to disintegration of the body as it turns to “phlegm and mucus and
sputum and, finally, blood.”56
Fluidity speaks to the spatial insecurity of the unified, organic body—to its fractures,
vulnerabilities, and permeability. For example, in public health literature, women's bodies are often
viewed as highly risky and contagious because they receive and emit fluids that are potentially “dirty”
and threaten the integrity of the body.57 Such fluids evince the body’s vulnerability and permeability to
disorder and to its “uncontrollable secretions.”58 The notion of secretions resonates with Judith Butler’s
work that identifies the body’s “unregulated permeability” as “a site of pollution and endangerment.”59
Indeed, more than dirt and disease itself, the body struggles against what it represents, the violation of
systems of identity and order that “does not respect borders, positions, rules, the in between, the
ambiguous, the composite.”60 The body seeks to defend itself from the contagion and disorder of fluid
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space, and from the individual bodies believed to have weak or permeable boundaries and identities,
forming “contagious circuits within the body politic, to act as weak points in its corporeal matrix which
enables the propagation of the virus.”61
This capacity for flow and circulation is the focus of strategies of control and containment.62
John Law calls it “hydraulic engineering”: social and technical efforts to control, delineate, and hold
stable the flows from rivers to disease.63 The link between the body-as-state and biological bodies as
conduits of disease means that individual biological bodies are a key target of this intervention.64 The
dual emphasis on spatial and biological intervention implies that the state-as-body combines geography
and medicine to manage its parts and its confines.65 This is what I define as containment.
From Quarantine to Immunity
Command and Control
As we have seen, containment is a logic of spatial and biological control aimed at controlling the
contagion of disease and disorder, and at maintaining the order and integrity of the political body
through the control of individual bodies. Such strategy is the hallmark of contagionist approaches to
disease that originated in the medieval machinery of quarantine.66 Quarantine remains a tool of
domestic disease control today and is embedded in international strategy.67 Since these approaches are
neither static nor seamless, I will trace the evolution of practices of containment from quarantine to
modes of immunity that follow a trajectory of deeper intervention into the individual bodies of the
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state. Dillon and Lobo-Guerroro argue that these medical approaches to disease represent different
strategies of security.68 However, there is also a logic of spatial continuity across various regimes of
containment that reflects a continuing effort to control the spaces of contagion. 69 In particular, there is
much resonance between the layered rings of the cordone sanitaire of past centuries with
contemporary descriptions of medical containment as an integrated, layered approach “to prevent,
control and eliminate disease outbreaks”70 and the concept of “defense-in-depth,” the Cold War civil
defence efforts in the United States recently resurrected under the banner of resilience.71 I argue that
shifting modes of containment are linked to changing images of the body and biological understandings
of its defences, and to the related modes of military command and control. The result is a penetration of
defence efforts farther into the bodies of the state that reveals the limits of control—the failures and
leakages of containment strategies—and the gaps and tensions between geopolitical and biopolitical
bodies.
Quarantine and the Fortress Body
Containment as a spatial strategy to control contagion is rooted in quarantine. Considered the
oldest public health measure, quarantine reflects conceptions of contagion through spatial transmission
and aims at disrupting the flow of disease and disorder by restricting the movement of bodies.72 This
mode of defence was originally associated with isolation, particularly the expulsion and spatial exclusion
of lepers in Biblical times.73 Medieval approaches to quarantine evolved more elaborate and extreme
measures of spatial control to deal with the contagious flow of plague.74 Rather than expelling and
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isolating the ill, quarantine now involved spatial control by means of boundaries intended to stop the
flow of people and disease from the outside into the contained space of the state.
As a spatial approach to defence, quarantine is equally rooted in the image of the body politic as
an armed fortress. This image combines military and medical notions of invasion and defence.75 Disease
is seen as flowing from the outside-in, notably on the bodies of foreigners, who represent the “public
health ‘other.’”76 Aimed primarily at travelling people, goods, and ships, quarantine reflects geopolitical
views of danger as external and other.77 Like the bodily barrier of skin, quarantine tries to demarcate the
spaces of inside and outside, self and Other in a way reflecting a strategic embrace of disease and
defence. Specific deployments of quarantine, the cordone sanitaire, often included three or four levels
of containment that were military in nature. In Italian city-states, for instance, this cordone comprised
an outer ring of armed sailing boats, an inner ring of forts and observation towers, and a deeper ring of
land-based cavalry.78 Similarly, the Hapsburg Empire’s military frontier served as a disease cordone
against the East, manned by peasants fortified by soldiers, upon word of the plague.79 Although the last
great plague struck Vienna in 1679, the Empire kept up until 1881 a line of civilian and military outposts
as a buffer against both military incursions and the flow of disease.80 The buffer protected the king’s
body, figuratively and literally, in Vienna, and maintained stability between the Austrian and Ottoman
empires.
Although ostensibly aimed at the flow of foreign disease, the defensive mode of quarantine and
the cordone were used to maintain geopolitical order. By the 19th century, quarantine emerged as an
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international standard. Almost all states had adopted some form of it.81 Quarantine formed the
“cornerstone of a coordinated disease-control strategy” that included “regulation of groups of persons
who were believed to be responsible for spreading the infection” established through a series of
International Sanitary Conferences.82 Quarantine was further replicated internationally by the
establishment of International Health Regulations and the World Health Organization.83 Reflecting the
strategic interdependence of health and security, the creation of a cordone sanitaire to stop the spread
of communism was invoked by French Prime Minister George Clemenceau in 1919.84 Translating this
idea into English, American President Woodrow Wilson called for protection from communism by
“quarantine,”85 a plea echoed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1937.86 Nevertheless, quarantine
was always an imperfect approach to containing disease and disorder, and its layers of control
relentlessly pushed into the body of the state.
The Porous Body
The perpetual presence of disease and foreign bodies within the state revealed cracks and leaks
in the body’s barriers: the fortress body was not impermeable but porous. Domestically, internal rings of
containment created small units of defensible space deep with the social body. Maps of medieval Italy
indicate that these units were enforced by military force and armed guards.87 Similarly, descriptions of
plague in France detail an emergency plan for enforcing spatial control and cleansing of infected towns,
which were divided into sectors and marked by military and police patrol and surveillance.88 Internal
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quarantine targeted groups of bodies associated with contagion—the poor, minorities, prostitutes,
beggars, and foreign travelers—seeking to restrict their movement into cities.89 The stigma of contagion
transformed such individuals into a dangerous other, an enemy of the state.90 It reflected a deeper logic
of public order and literal defence of the king’s body from the spatial spread of disease.91 Even when its
failures were recognized, quarantine continued to be imposed as a means of preventing and containing
chaos and disorder.92
Panic itself was viewed as contagious. Rooted in the theory of miasma—the belief that disease
was caused by “bad air” that “lodged in bodies, wood, fabrics, clothing and merchandise and could be
absorbed through the skin or by inhalation and could therefore pass from person to person”93—panic
reinforced a sense of the body’s permeability. Efforts to control panic through civil defence were initially
modeled on mob control efforts first developed in India,94 as a way to combat a “moral contagion”
flowing through the “porous body.”95 Such defence was accentuated by the perceived fluidity and
contagion of the mass labour strike and its ability to circulate through an interconnected network of
trades and industries.96 Rosa Luxemburg, for example, described such unrest as something that flows
“now like a broad billow over the whole kingdom, and now divides into a gigantic network of narrow
streams; now it bubbles forth from under the ground like a fresh spring and now is completely lost
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under the earth.”97 Like panic, a labor strike was a “disease” prone to contagion and violence.98 And like
the military model of quarantine, efforts to prevent civil disorder were based on the “perfect army”
composed “of the disciplined mass, of the docile, useful troop.”99
Combining health and military notions of defence, quarantine informed both domestic and
international strategies of order and control. As a strategy aimed at spatial control of territory and
bodies, it erected a broad barrier, not against the sick but against the ambiguous population of those at
risk of becoming sick, the potential carriers of disease and disorder. It was as coercive as it was
ineffective. Reflecting military connotations of disciplined bodies, the British government depicted
quarantine in terms of a “disciplined public in times of ‘collective calamity.’”100 Its success was plagued
by evasion, panic, and social stigma,101 growing resistance to restrictions on circulation,102 and the
continual emergence of disease103 apparently emanating from secretions within the body itself. While its
success suffered in part because causes of diseases such as the plague were poorly understood,104 its
failures also point to the limits of control measures that require conscripting the public into service and
coercing compliance. Led by Britain, disease control would gradually evolve from physical quarantine to
behavioural and voluntary public health approaches buttressed by “vigorous containment measures.”105
A change of idiom rather than logic,106 disease control remained rooted in experience with the plague107
and continued to target marginalized bodies of the population.108 The key difference was not coercion
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but the extent of state intervention. Voluntary measures required greater effort by the state to maintain
command and control of its bodies.109
The continuity marking domestic responses to the limitations of quarantine and the rise of
contemporary public health measures at the end of the 19th century is important if we are to grasp the
continuity marking defensive modes of containment. The “molecular” body and the discovery of
biological immunity are crucial to this account.
The molecular body
The impermeable “fortress” body that blocked flows of disease and disorder was inevitably
porous. Quarantine was thus always fraught with failure, and eventually gave way to biological and
political views of the body as circulatory and molecular. Within medicine, anatomy and biology opened
up the body through an “ongoing and accelerated process of fragmentation and decomposition into
smaller and more controllable units,” as the skin gave up its “quality of a human border or natural
frontier.”110 This biological turn coincided with the growth of global movement bringing the outside
world into the domestic space of the state, exemplified by the expansion of railroads in the 19th
century, which further disrupted the notion of the state as a fortified territorial space.111 New networks
of transportation and communication were frequently conceptualized in biological terms. For example,
the creation of the road system in Paris was based on the analogy of blood circulating through arteries,
which would later give way to today’s image of the electronic network.112 A similar understanding of
spatial and biological flows is reflected in Foucault’s description of the town as a space of circulation
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that “had to have the form of a heart that ensures the circulation of blood,” and his conceptualization of
security as the freedom and regulation of circulation.113
However, these flows could be good or bad, and some were described as bringing an “influx” of
a “floating population of beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, thieves, murderers, and so on.”114
Flows brought both prosperity and contagion. Unsurprisingly, contagionist views of disease underlying
quarantine thus continued to prevail. Formalized in the late 19th century, germ theory not only
reinforced the idea of the spatial transmission of disease and disorder into the body, but featured tropes
of disease in a “quasi-militaristic paradigm” invoking a “defensive struggle” against “invaders.”115 Robert
Koch is particularly noted for applying the invasion focus of geopolitics to the individual body,116 and
Louis Pasteur introduced the germ concept as simultaneously biological and political.117 The concept of
germs saw foreign bodies as agents of disease.118 Bodies were still vectors of disease. The dirt, disease,
and disorder associated with the poor were translated into “microbes”’ breeding disease.119 Germ
theory accompanied a dramatically shifting image of the biological body and its defences as molecular:
individual components were now capable of individual action.
This shift was mirrored in the image of the body politic from the singular, fortified body of the
king to a molecular view of the state as a collection of bodies.120 Nonetheless, the concern was still the
unity of the body, and the now molecular body was taken as both individualizing and binding.121 The
molecular body is composed of smaller units capable of individual responses that together form a whole
and a unity of purpose.
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Immunity
By the turn of the 20th century, this purpose was identified by the concept of “biological
immunity” as a mode of bodily defence. First articulated by Elie Metchnikoff in 1881, immunity
described the process by which cells “mobilize” themselves “in the defense of the organism against
intruders.”122 Just as germs were linked to military metaphors of foreign invaders, immunity was imbued
with biological and political connotations of defence, and the parallels between defence of the
individual body and defence of the national body kept their usefulness. For example, both Esposito and
Ed Cohen note the influence of German thinkers such as Morely Roberts, who wrote that “The simplest
way to think of immunity is to look on the human body as a complex social organism, and the national
organism as a simpler functional individual, or ‘person’, both of which are exposed to dangers of
innumerable kinds for which they must continually provide. This provision is immunity in action.”123
From a defence perspective, the shift was thus primarily spatial, in that it relocated containment
of disease and political disorder from the body’s exterior to its interior.124 The rise of germ theory turned
the fortress body image inward to individual bodies, from which emerged a form of mobilizing the
population for national defence.125 Writing on the evolution of disease containment in Europe, Peter
Baldwin contends that it moderated and broadened the logic of quarantine, such that “the entire nation
turned into a lazaretto without walls.”126 This “immunity-as-defense” disciplines life within the body as a
resource for warfare.127 Biological immunity involves the parts in defence of the whole, aiming to
maintain the identity of the organism and regulating relations between inside and outside, self and
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other.128 More important, the process can be manipulated through intervention to mobilize the defence,
namely by inoculation.129 Described by Foucault as a mode of artificial intervention aimed at viral
circulation, 130 inoculation emerged as a way to control contagious circulation, both biological and
political, and as a means to differentiate and separate good flows from bad flows.131 Militarily, it
resembles the organizational approach of centralized command and decentralized control.132
Domestically, it is reflected in the model of civil defence that originated in Britain during WW II, the shift
noted earlier from mob control to active engagement of the population to control panic.133
Containing contagion through quarantine, with the challenges posed by the porous body, and
through immunity, reflects broad paradigms and evolving strategies of national defence, public health,
and the relationship of the state-as-body and individual bodies. In the following section I will map these
paradigms onto the evolution of containment as a mutual approach to national defence and public
health in the United States. I will also seek to provide context to clarify this approach’s origins and
limitations, and to account for the eventual rise of resilience as an immune system approach to
containing contagion.
Containment in the United States
National defence and public health policy in the United Sates have been jointly influenced by
contagionist perspectives and reflect shifting modes of containment. Both took shape in the shadow of
“South American” yellow fever and “Asiatic” cholera in the 19th century, which were met with strict
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quarantine measures.134 Quarantine and its association with the idea of the state as a contained fortress
body became entangled in medical and military approaches to defence. The parallel prominence of
germ theory reinforced a defence strategy rooted in the control of bodies.135
Disease control was originally a function of the military.136 It was ruled a matter of national
defence in 1905, with the state granted power to enforce compulsory measures, such as vaccination and
quarantine, primarily targeting and restricting the flow of foreign and travelling bodies.137 Military and
medical defence were embedded in an isolationist approach aided by the relative geographic isolation
of the United States, which was viewed as an “invulnerable, impermeable sanctuary” and fortress.138
Foreign bodies were equated with danger and disease, and bodies attempting to enter were subject to
intense controls. Inspection and quarantine at Ellis Island exemplify a belief in the nation as a contained
space and a conflation of foreign bodies with danger and disease.139
Geography allowed the United States to cling to the image of the fortress body far longer than
its European counterparts. The prevalent belief in contagion as a function of the body meant that
quarantine, particularly of immigrant communities, remained a domestically deployed mode of disease
containment well into the 20th century.140 However, the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941
marked the collapse of the fortress, and strategic bombers and nuclear weapons would render the
nation permanently permeable. Secretary of War Henry Stimson ruminated that America’s “basic theory
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of defence and reliance upon that fortress” was too static.141 This context of spatial vulnerability, says
linguistics scholar Paul Chilton, accounts for the rise of containment as a metaphor of US security policy.
He contends that it was created alongside the concept of national security, both of which were rooted in
the image of the container.142 Yet rather than revolutionizing national defence, the formal
conceptualization of containment only shifted the space of bodily defence outward and inward, and still
reflected efforts to control contagion.
The outward expansion of quarantine-as-containment is marked by its aim to restrict the growth
of Soviet power and influence.143 The approach was made famous by George F. Kennan’s 1947 “ArticleX” calling for “patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”144 Chilton
argues that it involved “an ambitious restructuring of geopolitical space.”145 However, from a defence
perspective, containment still reflected spatial conceptions of contagion rooted in the cordone sanitaire
and quarantine invoked by Wilson and Roosevelt years before. Indeed, the conflation of fluidity, disease,
and disorder was central to the rise of containment as a strategic metaphor, part of a “hydraulic image
schema” that included “container-path-fluid imagery.”146 Soviet power was viewed as a “fluid stream”
that “moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal” to “make sure that it has
every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power.”147 It too was viewed as contagious.
Although the need for geographical containment would become known as the “domino” theory,148 then
Secretary of State Dean Acheson—chief writer of the Truman doctrine—originally described the
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vulnerability posed by the 1946-49 Greek Civil War with a different metaphor: “like apples in a barrel
infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also
carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and Europe through Italy and France.”149
Contagion in turn was imbued with fluidity: political ideas were likened to a “natural epidemiological
process that threatens to diffuse like a disease into hitherto unaffected regions.”150 In this sense
Acheson was echoing a 1943 memo to President Roosevelt arguing that upon the collapse of Germany,
the US had to prevent “the flow of the red amoeba into Europe.”151
If the spatial image of the container helped to recreate the sense of a fortress body, it also
acknowledged a new sense of internal vulnerability that could no longer be protected by the accident of
geography.152 Inside, the state was vulnerable to multiple modes of contagion, including the porous
body, the germ, and viral circulations. These various interpretations overlapped, but all spoke to the
body’s vulnerability to disease and disorder. Communism was an infectious enemy within:153 an
“ideological disease, where ideas can be understood as pathogens that use vectors to infect their
hosts.”154 This “invisible,” “insidious,” and “clandestine” enemy “threatened to disintegrate the society
from within.”155 Immigrants and the poor were especially vulnerable. Public housing projects were
singled out as a particular “breeding ground for Communists” that would contribute to “increased panic,
plague and urban vulnerability” in cities. 156 Immigrants were “focal points of infection” for civil
unrest.157 This fear of the insidious germ and vulnerable bodies mingled together with miasmic
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understandings of contagion and the body as porous, including depictions of panic as contagious.158 In
the event of a nuclear attack, it was feared that chaos would spread as people fled cities.159 There was
fear of uncontainable violence, riots, and breakdown of social control.160 Nuclear attack threatened not
only the life of the US, but also its control, integrity, and political identity.
Post-atomic America also produced a new sense of spatial vulnerability that saw the state in
bodily terms as a network of “vital and vulnerable targets,”161 reflecting the growing influence of
cybernetics and biological analogies to the central nervous system.162 Centralized industrial and urban
centers were believed to be targets of Soviet aggression. In turn, “the very systems that had been
developed to support modern urban life were now sources of vulnerability.”163 Like panic, the effects of
this vulnerability were regarded as contagious; infrastructural targets were “all interlinked by such
essential arteries as telephone exchanges, railways, canals, and bridges.”164 A single strike could knock
out an entire industrial web.165
Like the rings of quarantine, containment policy aimed inward as well as outward to control the
flows of contagion. Andrew Ross argues Cold War concepts of containment referred to both a threat
outside the social body that must be excluded, isolated, and quarantined, and a need to neutralize and
absorb internal threats to the host body.166 The fortress body had given way to the molecular, self-
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defending body invoked by the concept of immunity. Likewise, the study of immunology flourished in
medical practice in the 1960s.167 Immunology was embedded in “Cold War paranoia” toward the body
as both the cause and cure of disease, and was credited with “shifting dominant metaphors of disease
from offense to civil defense.”168 Indeed, medical and military approaches to civil defence were
entwined. For example, malaria eradication campaigns aimed at the control of bodies were embedded
in civil defence under the Malaria Control in War Areas military organization.169 This organization
subsequently became the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in 1946. Its mandate included “mobilizing
citizens to alleviate and control infectious diseases” such as malaria,170 an aim mirrored in postwar civil
defence.
Like biological immunization initiatives, civil defence involved mobilizing the population to
protect the national body, described in terms of continuity of government.171 This included protection of
key organs and arteries, namely “critical infrastructure (including the executive chain of command, key
industries, and the living bodies who power the machines of production and destruction)”172 for the
“survivability of the system.”173 Known as “defense in depth,” civil defence emphasized political support
for war engrained in a home-front preparedness program.174 The concept invoked the layered rings of
quarantine. Civil defence was not about protecting individual cells of the body but rather about
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mobilizing them for defence through “psychological self-management, civic responsibility, and
ultimately, governance.”175 It was a blunt instrument to convince the public to support external
containment and deterrence—and to pay the unimaginable price if it failed.176
Civil defence focused on the dual challenge of mobilization and control of bodies. Mirroring
military strategies, planners sought to meet this challenge through a new approach to command and
control, namely emergency federalism, which distributed responsibility for civil defence to individuals,
families, and local governments.177 Paul Collier and Andrew Lakoff label it “distributed preparedness.”178
It was designed to be simultaneously decentralized and centralized, and was “overtly administered” and
directed by the central government, and described as mobilizing and penetrating society.179 Though
officially separated from military functions, its early deployment included a system of community police
wardens to link local communities with the central government.180
Mobilizing participation to orchestrate this depth of defence was another major challenge.181
Preparedness was key. Publications such as Fallout Protection called for the participation of every citizen
“to bring into being a sound measure of national preparedness.”182 Guidance issued to local
preparedness organizations provided strategies for mobilizing community resources, including an
“audience strategy” to gain “local support and legitimacy.”183 Preparedness was not limited to civil
society, and included industry as another way of eliciting voluntary participation.184 The concept was
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likewise applied to disease control, said to require “constant preparedness . . . in order to be able to
respond to the unexpected quickly and appropriately.”185 While Collier and Lakoff argue that
preparedness thinking migrated from civil defence to public health,186 it is more accurate to see
preparedness as one way that health and military strategy were intimately linked in a logic of containing
contagion.187 Certainly, natural and man-made biological threats were now seen as synonymous, both
mobilized against pathogenic microbes.188
Although ostensibly linked to individual survival, preparedness enabled the state to inoculate
the public against panic and to control and restrict infectious flows. Practice drills were used to mobilize
the public for civil defence and to direct behaviour.189 The goal was to “predict, manage and spatially
limit panic” in a “natural and organic“ form of “social self-immunization.”190 The message was
communicated through government films such as “Survival Under Nuclear Attack” and “Cities Must
Fight,” which linked preparations for attack to the prevention of panic.191 An emphasis on preventing
uncontrollable flows of people is also reflected in a shift from evacuation to sheltering.192 And despite
stress on the voluntary nature of civil defence, in the event that cooperation failed—that panic spread—
auxiliary police were trained to use force to maintain law and order.193 Quarantine’s logic of spatially
containing and controlling contagion thus remained intact. Indeed, included in Kennan’s conception of
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containment was the idea that subversive elements of the population—believed to be concentrated in
cities as the primary targets of a nuclear strike—could be geographically contained, “placed against and
outside of a patriotic ‘heartland geography.’”194 Coercive strategies against suspected homosexuals and
lesbians meant they were increasingly subject to arrest, surveillance, and entrapment, often on the
pretense of unearthing “pinko” traitors and spies.195
As with quarantine, the immunity approach had limits. Beyond the absurd premise of national
survival against thermonuclear weapons, its most notable failure lies in public apathy.196 Civil defence
has thus been described as “a portrait of the politics of futility.”197 Its failure has also been attributed to
a growing public mistrust of government,198 in turn linked to a loss of social control.199 Most significantly,
the spatial and biological approach to immunity—the ability to maintain central control over the
molecular body—proved illusory.
The Uncontrolled Body
Nowhere is the design logic of immunity more evident than the creation of the Internet.
Envisioned biologically as a central nervous system,200 the original ARPANET designed in the late 1960s
functioned as a mode of communication to facilitate centralized command and control in the event of a
catastrophic nuclear strike. Its decentralized design would isolate damage and prevent contagious
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failure from spreading through the system.201 However, the potential to lose control over the system
was foreshadowed in a 1967 study commissioned by the US Defense Science Board, which claimed that
the Internet posed an increasingly complex security challenge related to its growing use and geographic
spread, which could not be physically isolated or protected in an open environment.202 The study
warned of a “tunnel of vulnerability previously unrealized in the history of conflict.”203 As the network
became increasingly complex, it became the Achilles heel of national security. A series of exercises
conducted by RAND on behalf of the Department of Defense in 1995 demonstrated the ability of foreign
forces to disrupt critical infrastructure within the US.204 As well, a no-notice exercise launched from
within the National Security Agency against civilian and military government agencies and private sector
operators in June 1997 startled the government, in regard not only to the vulnerability of the system but
to the extreme lack of coordinated response.205 The Internet, which had deliberately been designed to
distribute vulnerabilities and maintain central control, had itself become a threat to national security.
Echoing the sense of spatial vulnerability felt after Pearl Harbor, RAND’s report concluded that “the US
homeland may no longer provide a sanctuary from outside attack.”206 The state had lost control over its
central nervous system. This new sense of spatial vulnerability and loss of control was paralleled
medically by the renewed threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious disease, including AIDS. The
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spread of new infectious disease reflected not just the failure of vaccines to control infectious flow but
the very mutiny of the body against itself, challenging “reassuring dogmas of the quarantine state”207
and raising the medical and political profile of auto-immunity.

In the next chapter I will explain the rise of resilience in the context of this renewed sense of
spatial vulnerability. Intuitively understood as the ability to recover quickly from damage, adversity, or
illness, I will continue the narrative of containment as combining geopolitical and biopolitical
approaches to national defence and public health. More specifically, I argue that as a paradigm of
national security, resilience takes an immune system approach to re-asserting control over the body in a
way that resembles military concepts of ‘focus and convergence.’ It echoes the biological and spatial
images of the body as order and the association between contagious disease and disorder with fluid
space. What changes is the spatial scale and speed of flows—their reach into the body, which itself
becomes fluid—and the depth and pace of responses in the effort to contain and control them. We are
still trying to quarantine our modern-day plagues, but the barriers remain leaky, and the unity of bodies
fraught with tension.
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CHAPTER TWO—The Vulnerable Body: Fluidity, Resilience, and the Immune System
We are deeply immersed in an epochal transformation sustained by a new world view about the
essential nature of human affairs, a new way of thinking about how global politics unfold. At the center
of the emergent world view lies an understanding that the order which sustains families, communities,
countries, and the world through time rests on contradictions, ambiguities and uncertainties. 1

Contagion and a New Geography of Vulnerability
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolized the end of Cold War containment strategies.
Heralding a new era of globalization, it marked an opening up of the world to flows of money, flows of
goods, flows of people, and flows of ideas. In academic circles, the idea of ‘complex interdependence’
among states gained currency. The flows were facilitated by the success of immunology and the
separation of good flows from bad. The war with germs had been won: through vaccines, infectious
disease could not only be controlled but eradicated.2 However, it was a false promise. In 1994 journalistturned-immunologist Laurie Garret published The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World
out of Balance,3 in which she depicted the failure of immunology and new dangers posed by emerging
infectious disease.
This concern over a new vulnerability is expressed in the 1996 Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CCIP). Launched by President Bill Clinton after network breaches revealed
intense cyber vulnerabilities, it claimed that threats from global cyber connectivity had changed the very
geography of the United States: borders were irrelevant and distances meaningless in a world whose
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“major topographical features are technology and change.”4 Alluding to the previous dangers of the Cold
War era, the Commission stressed that “In the networked world of today, the effects of such physical
attacks could spread far beyond the radius of a bomb blast.”5 The Internet, designed as an open and
fluid system, was vulnerable not only to viruses but to cascading contagion.
These two stories are linked. Together, they provide context for the rise of resilience as a mode
of containment: a strategy of spatial order and control over the spread of disease and disorder
associated with fluid spaces. In the previous chapter I located this strategy on the body as the point of
intersection between geopolitical and biopolitical approaches to order and identity. There I sought to
show how containment initiatives combined military and public health approaches to defence, and how
methods of control penetrated deeper alongside shifting images of the biological body and the body
politic. Here I will outline the role of resilience and the influence of scientific understandings of
complexity. Focused on complex networks, envisioned as living in biological and ecological terms,
complexity draws attention to fluidity as the source of order and disorder, and dissolves delineations
between system and environment, Self and Other. Complexity views contagion as an internal process of
diffusion and cascades, and points to the body itself as fluid.
Although fluidity speaks to the limits of spatial control and containment, it does not abandon
the effort but pushes it deeper through a layering of more complex methods.6 This can be seen in the
shifting understanding of the immune system as networked. This understanding is similar to theoretical
explanations of resilience in complex networks, which aims at absorbing disturbances to maintain the
system’s core functions and identity. As a strategy of containment, it symbolizes a shift in spatial logic
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from distribution and isolation to integration. As a method of control, it mirrors evolving military
approaches to focus and convergence, represented in public health by trust and engagement. The goal is
to leverage the parts in defence of the system, the body.
I will trace this spatial shift in the rise of resilience as a post-Cold War approach to civil defence.
Returning to the picture of fluid vulnerability depicted by the 1996 Commission, I will argue that the
roots of resilience as containment are evident in the subsequent Presidential Decision Directive 63:
Protecting Critical Infrastructures (PDD-63) that called for re-engaging with the private sector and
citizens in a more intimate cooperation, modeled partly on the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). 7 This cooperation is later described in terms of the human body’s immune system
that uses “layered defenses and countermeasures that work in tandem,”8 and forms the basis of
approaches to Homeland Security, galvanized in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina under the mantra of
resilience.
Tracing this strategy through three applications—cyber resilience, community resilience, and
civic resilience—I will show how resilience stills grapples with tensions and contradictions between the
body as an organic whole and individual, biological bodies. It does so by replicating public health and
military approaches to trust, engagement, and convergence in trying to incorporate layers of the private
sector and vulnerable communities into the state’s containment practices. It’s a design that recalls the
rings of quarantine. And as with quarantine and immunity-as-defence, this control is not seamless.
Indeed, a continued chasm and friction between the state-as-body and biological bodies continues to
plague resilience, which is further explored in subsequent chapters. Efforts to close this gap point to
continued evolution in the conception of the body and its defences, towards forms rooted in
information and automation. But questions about efficacy and effects remain.
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Complexity and the Body as Fluid
Contemporary descriptions of disease and disorder are marked by the persistent, familiar theme
of fluidity. For instance, David Campbell describes the transition from the stability of the Cold War’s
defined threats and identities as a time of “floating indetermination.”9 Zygmunt Bauman refers to a shift
from solid to liquid order, in which social structures “decompose and melt faster than the time it takes
to cast them.”10 The theme is echoed by Chester Crocker’s account of a world drifting amid a disorderly
mix of turbulence and diffusion.11 An influential thinker on social change and globalization, Manuel
Castells, attributes this fluidity to “spaces of flow” linking the world through new information and
communications technologies.12 Flows are commonly viewed as contagious. For example, citing Castell’s
concept, William Coleman and his co-authors describe the spread of SARS in 2003 as a result of the “the
complex intersections of globalization, time, and diseases.”13 Like resilience, the metaphor of contagion
is undergoing “unprecedented proliferation” as a trope for globalization.14 Together, these metaphors
course along a shifting spatial and scientific landscape of complexity.
Science shapes how we try to impose order on chaos.15 Our current scientific paradigm rests on
the concept of complexity, which views the world through the lens of systems and the connections and
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relationships within them.16 Although focused on the dynamics of complex networks, complexity speaks
to a different kind of space than the traditional network, namely a space that is fluid. Traditional
networks are relational, exhibiting stable connections, persistent identities, and predicable patterns
across time and space.17 They invoke images of orderly circulation, as we have seen.18 In contrast,
complex networks are messy, unpredictable, and unstable. They reflect Annemarie Mol and John Law’s
description of blood not only circulating but seeping, mixing, and diffusing through the body’s spaces.19
John Urry argues that fluids have become a critical category of analysis: “while fluids undoubtedly
involve networks, such a notion does not do justice to the uneven, emergent and unpredictable shapes
that such fluids may take.”20
The Internet is the epitome of complexity. Urry describes it as
a metaphor for social life that is fluid, involving thousands of networks, of people, machines,
programmes, texts and images in which quasi-subjects and quasi-objects mix together in new
hybrid forms. Ever-new computer networks and links proliferate mostly in unplanned and mixed
patterns. Such a fluid space is a world of mixtures. Messages 'find their way,’ rather like blood
through multiple capillaries. Fluid can get around absences. Such computer networks are not
solid or stable and are contingent.21
This fluidity challenges the stability of ordered spaces and identities rooted in the image of the organic
body. As a “a world of porosity, flow and rhizomatic, fibrous connectivities,” it is “deeply at odds with
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the imaginative geographies of exclusion and their moral cartography.”22 Eroding divisions between
inside and outside, such networks are limitless, occupying a space of “perpetual inclusion.”23 Complexity
thus reflects a qualitative change in the conception of geopolitical space. It challenges the “ethical
power of segregation” made through spatial and temporal delineations that take dangers to originate
from a distant place.24 In short, the image of the state as a contained body is deteriorating. The state is
now imagined as part of an “exogenous risk environment” defined as a “potentially borderless socioecological terrain shaped by the emergent properties of radically interconnected contingent events.”25
For Gerard Toal, postmodern geopolitics is rooted in deterritorialization.26 In biological terms, Roberto
Esposito refers to the blending of domestic and foreign space as a “unified body of a world without
exterior.”27
The biological body is likewise being reimagined. Take, for instance, Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari, who describe the body as an assemblage of multiplicities.28 Bernadette Wegenstein connects
their image of a ‘body-without-organs’ to a state of radical and virtual disorganization linked to the
concept of immanence,29 a transcending of boundaries. This philosophical understanding is paralleled in
microbiology, which views the body as not only molecular but composed of a cellular ecology that is
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constantly evolving and becoming.30 Echoing geopolitical implications, Audrone Zukauskaite argues that
“becoming” destroys any metaphysical notion of essence, identity, or individual body and creates an
existence that is fluid.31 This fluidity is captured by the concept of emergence.
Emergence spins together sources of order, disorder, and identity that are central to
containment and contagion. Its emphasis on continual change and becoming is central to the idea of an
underlying spontaneous order within complex systems that belies the appearance of chaos.32 It reflects
an understanding of life itself—emergent, molecular, flowing—as self-ordering.33 However, the same
conditions giving rise to order also create the potential for “collapse into pervasive disorder.”34 Charles
Perrow describes the cascading failures associated with collapse as “normal accidents,” a natural
outcome of fast, complex flows that create unpredictable, uncontrollable consequences.35 This
description is echoed in Joseph Tainter’s stories of collapsing societies.36 Writing from the perspective of
theoretical biology, Stuart Kauffman describes order within complex systems as fluid, a state between
solid rigidity and gaseous chaos.37 Such order is tenuous. It points to the limits of control and the
ambiguity of identity.
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Emergence makes the boundary between Self and Other elusive; now “every single body can be
seen as a battlefield where different cellular populations compete with each other.”38 This blurring is
reflected in descriptions of enmity as dissolving or defacing, terms associated with complex flows.39 For
instance, Ben Anderson argues that counter-insurgency doctrine views target populations as inherently
unstable, ambiguous, becoming; they are actual and potential friends and enemies.40 In public health,
this ambiguity is called vulnerability. It dissolves the distinction between healthy and unhealthy,
replacing it with an “endless parade of ‘at risk’ populations.” 41 Reflecting on contemporary disaster
research, Frank Furedi describes vulnerability as a new paradigm viewed as the natural state of being.42
Identity becomes defined in terms of gradients: using the example of blood, Mol and Law note how it is
possible to have a little bit of anemia, what Catherine Waldby refers to as ‘hierarchies of pathology.’43 As
declared by Margaret Chan on behalf of the World Health Organization, “Vulnerability is universal.”44
And it is contagious.
Vulnerability and Contagious Flows
The vulnerability of the body as a space of contained order and identity—as fluid—is tied to
concepts of contagion. Indeed, the fluidity of complex networks is often referred to in terms of
infectious diseases spreading simultaneously across multiple networks.45 This spread combines two
processes of contagion linked with fluidity: diffusion and cascades. The infectious potential of diffusion
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is central to complex systems, described as unbounded, open, and interacting and co-evolving with their
environment.46 Diffusion points to the ability of disease and disorder to seep through cracks and barriers
deep within, infecting an entire system. Vulnerability is itself described as spreading through a system.47
It recalls descriptions of the plague by Albert Camus, in which the disease infects not only individual
bodies but the very space of a whole town.48 In contrast to the insidiousness of diffusion, cascades point
to the potential for a small disruption to destabilize the existing order.49 This is the central idea of both
normal accidents and collapse. Although a cascade is sometimes referred to as a forest fire ignited by a
spark,50 it is frequently described as a flood. This concept evokes not only contagion, but the generation
of contagion within the system itself. Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker write that “networks
cultivate the flood, but the flood is what can take down the network.”51 In theory, these two forms of
contagion reflect different vulnerabilities: too little connectedness and too much connectedness. In
practice, they are related. John Law alludes to this relation in his account of the global spread of foot
and mouth disease, where flows turned a leak into a flood.52
Together, diffusion and cascades focus attention inward, away from the exterior environment
toward weaknesses of the Self. Disease is no longer separate from the body. Disease is emergent and
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emerging, both inside and out, among friends and enemies, and constantly changing.53 Contagion
reflects a weakness of the immune system. This understanding is both medical and military. For
instance, Colleen Bell details counter-insurgency military doctrine as the narrative of a “virus or bacteria
that plagues the social body, whose immune system is already compromised.”54 AIDS is perhaps the
most extreme example of such failure. Significantly, the contemporary focus on contagion as a military
and medical threat emerged with AIDS, a disease understood to attack and ripple through the immune
system, causing collapse.55 This collapse has been interpreted philosophically as the body turned against
itself or “gone rogue.”56 The medical community views the immune system as a “field” whose
dysfunction contributes to all forms of disease and allergies.57 These dysfunctions are described as autoimmunity: the failure of the immune system not only to contain Other, but to recognize Self.
Philosophers Jacques Derrida and Roberto Esposito propose that radical contagion actually
opens the way for positive interactions with the Other, for a focus on community rather than
immunity—the potential to open up the Self to the Other.58 In response to the “implosion” of
immunized models of protection from contagious threats, Esposito calls for creating “relational filters
between inside and outside” to replace exclusionary barriers.59 This is a project of the Self.60 Resilience
has been linked to this idea, as an acceptance of the limitations of command and control,61 and as an

53

Cooper, “Pre-Empting Emergence,” 117; Žukauskaitė, “Immunity and Contagion as Two Modes of Biopolitics,”
252.
54
Colleen Bell, “Hybrid Warfare and Its Metaphors,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights,
Humanitarianism, and Development 3, no. 2 (2012): 233.
55
Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture from the Days of Polio to the Age of AIDS
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2003).
56
Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
57
Martin, Flexible Bodies.
58
Derrida, Rogues; Esposito, Bíos; Michael Lewis, “Of (Auto-)Immune Life: Derrida, Esposito, Agamben,” in
Medicine and Society, New Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, ed. Darian Meacham (Dordrecht: Springer
Netherlands, 2015), 213–31, http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-017-9870-9.
59
Esposito, Bíos, 2, 6.
60
Roberto Esposito, Terms of the Political: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics (New York: Fordham University Press,
2013), 42.
61
Brian Walker and David Salt, Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing World
(Washington: Island Press, 2006); Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down; Emilian Kavalski, “The Complexity of Global

56

embrace of change and instability.62 However, the old model is not yet surrendering. Containment
remains a strategy of global disease control. AIDS was met with a contain and control strategy
reminiscent of quarantine,63 and the story of SARS is one of “successful global containment.”64 Now,
however, containment aims deeper, at the time and source of an initial outbreak.65 Geopolitically, states
resist the bleeding of inside and outside, domestic and international spaces. Divisions and identities are
not wiped clean but maintained through more complex measures,66 and scholars describe the growing
presence of novel and non-territorial borders.67 Containment is changing. Alongside shifting images of
the body as complex and fluid is a new understanding of the body’s internal defences as networked, and
a view of resilience that aligns with complexity science.
Containment Redux: Resilience as an Immune System
Biological interpretations of immunity have evolved since the early days of germ theory and
Metchnikoff’s model of immunity-as-defence. Bodily defence is no longer conceived as individual cells
fighting off invaders but as concerted efforts of an immune system. The immune system is the epitome
of complex adaptive organization; it utilizes multiple layers of defences starting with exterior barriers to
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form “an interacting collection of entities or agents.”68 Its purpose continues to reflect the bio-political
logic of containment: protecting the body in a way that “minimizes harm to the body and ensures its
continued functioning"69 (italics added). Aaron Wildavsky draws parallels between the immune system
and resilience.70 C.S. (Buzz) Holling, considered the “father” of resilience, describes it as persistence: a
system’s ability to balance the forces of stability and change, order and chaos, while maintaining its key
functions and identity.71 Elsewhere he refers to it as the ability to absorb disturbances and avoid
cascading failures.72 It is a process using the interaction of the parts to steady the system. Writing about
“panarchy”—the idea of nested systems—Holling notes that resilience functions best when the top of
the system can stabilize change and movement at the bottom, avoiding drastic change and collapse.73 It
works through containing system contagion. Moreover, resilience replicates the tension between the
state body and biological bodies, the system and the parts. Wildavsky terms this “the rule of sacrifice.”74
This view of the system is critical. While political interpretations of both the immune system and
resilience may value flexibility and adaptation,75 this applies to the parts and not the system. Ultimately,
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resilience is not about change but rather preserving the system and protecting the status quo76 through
internal self-regulation and self-affirmation. 77
Emphasis on the Self is critical. The notion of networked immunity reflects concerns with autoimmunity and the fluid relationship between the body and it external environment, and stresses
recognizing self more than recognizing other. Neel Ahuja explains that
since antibodies (immune cells) can themselves be coded as antigens (potential threats) that
provoke other antibodies to respond and engulf them, the immune system does not only attack
externalized threats like infectious viruses or toxins, but engages in a complex play of attraction
and engulfment of itself.78
The immune system “does not so much recognize an already-formed self in opposition to outside
threats” but instead undertakes an “iterative process of self-recognition” to reproduce itself.79
Networked immunity is therefore not about producing barriers and stable identities but a “regulated
permeability” that recognizes the body’s porosity, takes identity as provisional and partial, and remakes
boundaries as they shift and break down.80 It introduces a complexity to relations between self and nonself, particularly when the non-self is “already inside the social or the corporeal body.”81 As a project of
the self, it makes the Other more like the self through deeper intervention and integration.
This spatial shift in bodily defence parallels geopolitical changes in containment to “a policy of
integration, whereby states are encouraged, through a range of measures, to mesh with attitudes and
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perspectives on the world” to cope with the dangers posed by disconnectedness, which American
military geostrategist Thomas Barnett labels a “cancer.”82 Containment is no longer considered a matter
of us-versus-them but a matter of with us— a mode of enthusiastic support operating alongside,
together, and shoulder-to-shoulder.83 This connotation of containment is different but not novel. It
echoes an understanding of practice under Franklin Roosevelt, “containment by integration,” whose
goal was to stabilize the international order by “offering Moscow a place in it.”84 Domestically, US
national defence has moved towards a focus on homeland security, whereby the US ensures its security
from within as much as from without.85 Its layered defences resemble the structure of the immune
system. In turn, the biological function of the immune system is also a form of homeland security.86 Both
are reminiscent of spatial defence embedded in the rings of the cordone sanitaire and the concept of
defence-in-depth linked to the civil defence model of immunity.
Like quarantine and immunity-as-defence, networked immunity merges biological and military
modes of defence, as well as command and control. While some commentators describe the immune
system as an orchestral rather than a military model, it nonetheless retains a “commanding
conductor.”87 Others argue that conceptions of the immune system removed defence from the control
of an army in favour of a “highly interactive family of bodily tissues.”88 Both images reflect similar
changes in the mode of military organization and command that have been influenced by complexity
science. Antoine Bousquet describes it as “chaoplexic warfare.”89 Networked immunity replaces
command and control with focus and convergence, and seeks to create collaboration and self-

82

Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: G.P.
Putnam’s Sons, 2004); Bialasiewicz et al., “Performing Security.”
83
Bialasiewicz et al., “Performing Security,” 415.
84
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the
Cold War, Rev. and expanded ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 9.
85
Bialasiewicz et al., “Performing Security,” 416.
86
Cohen, A Body Worth Defending, 28.
87
Waldby, AIDS and the Body Politic, 56.
88
Polly Matzinger quoted in Cohen, A Body Worth Defending, 29.
89
Bousquet, “Chaoplexic Warfare.”

60

synchronization across a collection of entities. Also called “power to the edge,”90 it bespeaks an effort to
close the gap between the organic political body and its parts. Nevertheless, the harmonies remain
problematic.91 This difficulty is reflected in the rise of resilience as a central principle of homeland
defence in the United States.
Resilience and Homeland Defence in the United States
It is appropriate here to examine the rise of resilience as a principle of American national
security policy. I argue that this rise manifests an immune system approach to defence against the
internal vulnerabilities to the contagious flows that swelled after Hurricane Katrina. The emphasis is on
“rise”: I affirm Chris Zebrowski’s assertion that resilience was not fortuitously discovered and adopted
from science but was politically forged on the body politic.92 And yet I do not claim that resilience marks
a break with the past. Instead, it represents an evolution in controlling and containing spaces of
contagious flow. Like models of containment already discussed—quarantine and immunity—the rise of
resilience tracks shifting spatial understandings of the body, contagion, and networked immunity.
Resilience still reflects containment as a shared strategy of national defence and public health. As a
project of the Self, integrating vulnerable elements into containment responses, it aims deeper and is
more inclusive than previous modes. Nonetheless, like those modes, it faces gaps and challenges.
Cascading Threats: From Cyber Vulnerabilities to Katrina
In the previous chapter I pointed to a spatial shift in American national defence policy after Pearl
Harbor and the arrival of long-range strategic bombers. Defence moved from isolating a fortress body to
outward containment of flows, and to the inward mobilization of individuals and infrastructure for civil
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defence and national immunity. A similar deepening of defence into the body politic is evident with the
rise of resilience as a reincarnation of civil defence efforts. However, it emerged from a flood, not a
nuclear strike. As well, its reach is wider: its aim is not to isolate vulnerabilities but to stabilize them by
integration into the body’s defences. Resembling depictions of immunity as networked, resilience
stresses internal processes of contagion and seeks to leverage the body’s connective tissues to contain
them.
The 1996 Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CCIP) marked a new sense of
geopolitical vulnerability characterized by the diffusion of space between inside and outside, and the
potential for cyber intrusions to have cascading effects. Because the Internet was designed to facilitate
centralized command through a decentralized network—creating a central nervous system immune to
attack—this new vision of vulnerability was stark. In addition, it coincided with the medical failings of
immunity and a growing awareness of the body’s auto-immune responses. This awareness was blinded
by the terrorist attacks on 9 September 2001 (9/11), a contemporary Pearl Harbor.
The response to 9/11 resurrected notions of bodily defence from external invaders rooted in
immunity and quarantine. Drawing parallels between the global reach of terrorism and the long-range
bombers of World War 2, proponents revived perspectives of the state-body as a cartography of targets
vulnerable to “destruction by design.” 93 The American population was seen as vulnerable to terrorists
hiding in their midst.94 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2002 in part to
defend against the “330 million” non-citizens entering America each year like germs entering the body.95
Its initial mandate focused on a single, potentially catastrophic event: terrorism.96 Civil defence was
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revived. In a landmark speech on 20 September 2001, George W. Bush sought to rally the nation behind
a global war against terror, calling on Americans to exhibit calm, tolerance, generosity, and patience in
the face of new public vulnerabilities.97 Efforts to protect critical infrastructure were redoubled. The
pendulum swung away from cyber vulnerabilities toward physical protection of critical assets.98 The
response was described as “decisive steps to protect America—from hardening cockpits and stockpiling
vaccines to tightening our borders.”99 Quarantine and immunity were reborn. However, they failed
catastrophically to contain the devastation of Hurricane Katrina.
One of the deadliest hurricanes to hit the United Sates, Katrina landed on New Orleans on the
morning of 29 August 2005. For a variety of reasons, large swaths of the population, particularly within
the African American community, did not cooperate with evacuation orders.100 Storm surges breached
the system of levees and floodwalls defending the city in 50 places, including the infamous Lower Ninth
Ward.101 As water rushed in, containment shifted to the bodies of trapped residents. The National Guard
was called in to control the masses stranded in the bowels of the Superdome (approximately 10,000
people).102 People seeking escape across a bridge between Now Orleans and neighbouring Gretna were
blocked by police.103 Preparedness proved a myth within local communities and across all levels of
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government. A Select Bipartisan Committee would describe the aftermath of Katrina as an “institutional
cascade of failure” in regard to the “common welfare” at every level, “individual, corporate,
philanthropic, and governmental.”104 The logic of central coordination and local responsibility was
overwhelmed in the face of catastrophe, and the state proved unable to exercise control over chaos.
Katrina also revealed the effects of vulnerability on a city steeped in poverty. Katrina directly killed over
1,500 people in Louisiana (of whom 40 percent drowned) and displaced more than 1-million New
Orleans residents alone.105 It demonstrated the physical limitations of hydraulic engineering, and of the
command and control of vulnerable bodies.
Katrina revived the same sense of contagious vulnerability highlighted in the 1996 Commission’s
findings on cyberspace. The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), tasked with providing
independent advice, reported that the hurricane demonstrated the cascading effects of infrastructure
failure that “can exponentially amplify otherwise difficult but manageable consequences.”106 A similar
concern was raised at a hearing on cyber security by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs. Pointing to the challenge posed by cascading, fluid threats, Committee Chairman
George Forseman stated that “We know we must be ready for the cyber version of Hurricane
Katrina.”107 Concerns were not limited to disasters and cyber space. Perspectives on terrorism also
began to change. No longer limited to a tactical threat by a foreign enemy, terrorism began to be viewed
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as an internal contagion, as homegrown. In 2006, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Robert Mueller drew attention to homegrown plots in London, Madrid, and Toronto. He pointed to
evidence of recruitment and training in the US, focusing on spaces of mixing such as universities,
prisons, and the Internet. Asking how an extremist becomes a terrorist, he asserted that “radicalization
is fluid; it does not follow a set formula or timetable.” Terrorism evolved from a tactic of warfare to the
circulation of an ideology depicted as fluid, complex, and dynamic,108 and contagious. American
diplomat Richard Hass told the Council on Foreign Relations that fighting terrorism was “akin to fighting
a virus in that we can accomplish a great deal but not eradicate the problem."109
Like conceptions of the biological body, the American political body was now recast as fluid, a
body of unstable mixtures and cascading flows, mired in contagion and turning against itself. It was a
body in need of new defences, which would be found in resilience. This conceptual shift likewise recast
civil defence as an immune system, taking inspiration from the biological body and public health.
The Rise of Resilience: Building an Immune System
In response to the 1996 Commission’s emphasis on the challenges of contagion and the limits of
containment, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure
Protection (PDD-63), which projected a vision for rebuilding the state’s internal system of defence. It
calls for re-engaging with the private sector and citizens in a new form of cooperation that “implies a
more intimate level of mutual communication, accommodation, and support than has characterized
public-private sector relations in the past.”110 This recalls the idea of mobilizing the nation for immunity
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under civil defence. However, this is not about inoculation or an antivirus. Instead, it is a more ambitious
effort that involves integrating society into a network of defences to contain internal contagion and to
protect the state’s stability and integrity. PDD-63 took inspiration from the networked model of
cooperation used by the CDC.111 This cooperation is later described in terms of the human body’s
immune system that uses “layered defenses and countermeasures that work in tandem,”112 and it forms
the basis of resilience approaches to homeland security emerging after Katrina.
If Katrina symbolized the failings of America’s domestic defences to disturbances, resilience
emerged as a way to contain the exposed vulnerabilities. The concept appears briefly in the 2006
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) by DHS, which highlights the threat posed by system
distribution because the “vast and diverse aggregation of highly interconnected assets, systems, and
networks” leads to cascading failures.113 Stressing system defence and continuity, it links resilience to
protection as “the capability of an asset, system, or network to maintain its function during or to recover
from a terrorist attack or other incident.”114 Efforts to expand this approach beyond protection to
include greater cooperation with the private sector are evident in both the Senate hearing on cyber
security and the HSAC study of resilience.115 Specifically, HSAC argued that resilience functions by
converging public and private sector interests, and by creating “cascading goals” across “disparate
stakeholder communities.”116 In other words, through integration and harmonization.
Other voices sought to extend resilience beyond infrastructure and the private sector.
Borrowing from Yossi Sheffi’s The Resilient Enterprise: Overcoming Vulnerability for Competitive
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Advantage, Stephen Flynn, an academic with influential ties to the government, called for societal
resilience, an all-hazards approach to preventing and responding to catastrophic events.117 He linked it
to an “informed, inspired, and mobilized public.”118 Similarly, in 2006 the Reform Institute hosted a
national symposium titled “Building a Resilient Nation: Enhancing Security, Ensuring a Strong Economy.”
Its final report called for developing “a national mindset of resilience” to absorb blows and mitigate
cascading adverse effects.119 As well, in a 2008 hearing of the House Homeland Security Committee,
Chairman Bennie Thompson called for resilience to extend into civil society as a revival of civil
defence.120
Nevertheless, resilience does not simply revive civil defence. Nor is it a corporate trope. Rather,
it is a reaction to the limits of immunity that seeks to solidify the body as a fluid environment and build
an integrated immune system. It also reflects biological and public health views of containment. For
example, in 2005 IBM launched a white paper, “Global Movement Management: Securing the Global
economy,” 121 influenced by chaos theory. It drew attention to vulnerabilities to terrorism, natural
disasters, and disease that can “ripple through the system” and cause small local disruptions to cascade
through tightly connected systems.122 The paper called for “building resiliency into the system.” 123 This
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was recast in 2007 as “intelligent immunity.” Imbued with biological references to flows as the
economy’s lifeblood, IBM linked resilience to engaging and integrating society—building “connective
tissue”—in order to isolate disturbances and avoid overreacting to disruptions.124
These themes of fluid, bodily processes of contagion, and internal containment through an
immune system offer an insightful way to read formal policy expressions of resilience and national
defence. Highlighting challenges posed by “the very fluidity of the international system,” President
Barak Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy called for “the development of prepared, vigilant, and
engaged communities” at the “heart of a resilient country.”125 Coinciding with this debut, the 2010
Quadrennial Review of Homeland Security replaced “security” with the tripartite “safety, security, and
resilience.”126 Here, ensuring resilience to disasters is defined as “individual, community, and system
robustness, adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery.”127 It has since been updated as the ability to
adapt to, withstand, and recover from change and disruptions.128 It redeploys notions of containment—
but not on the old outside-in model. Now containment pertains to controlling the internal effects of
contagion. It is thus both old and new.
Resilience builds on the immunity-as-defence model that sees “national preparedness” as a
“shared responsibility of all levels of government, the private and non-profit sectors, and individual
citizens.”129 It continues the spatial logic of quarantine and defence-in-depth, revived as a system of
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“active, layered defense.”130 DHS describes the vision as “one team, one mission.”131 Resilience is
situated as a redeployment of civil defence tactics and strategies that “if not by name, were
nevertheless entirely about resilience” and faced the same challenges, “including how to foster a
decentralized approach to security, and how to best meet the challenge of helping our citizens prepare
psychologically and materially for attacks and disasters that do occur.”132 Yet it is different. Resilience
calls for a strategy shift, from top-down to bottom-up engagement of individuals, families, and
communities.133 It changes the emphasis from “homeland” to “enterprise” and seeks to reconcile
“diverse needs and priorities, while focusing on our shared interests and responsibilities.”134
“Enterprise” speaks to the integration of parts into the defence of the system, that is, networked
immunity. This image is reinforced in the 2011 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)—8: National
Preparedness, aimed at creating a comprehensive, integrated, layered approach to preparedness.135
The emergence of resilience as a principle of American domestic defence stresses internal
vulnerabilities as vectors of contagious circulation and disorder. It envisions a layered, active system of
defence, and represents both continuity and change in the politics of containment. Resilience prioritizes
defence of the system and continuity of government, the body politic. It does so through the control of
biological bodies. However, while it replicates previous elements of civil defence, it also represents a
spatial shift, a deepening of intervention to integrate society into the state’s defences. Resilience does
not replace the spatial logic of containment but inverses and disperses it “through more diffuse and
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complex methods.”136 Echoing new command and control strategies derived from images of the
immune system as an orchestra and military notions of focus and convergence, resilience seeks to
mobilize and harmonize these layers by engagement and building trust.
Harmonizing the Immune System: Engagement and Trust
Quarantine relied on military notions of discipline; immunity-as-defence replicated centralized
command and decentralized strategies. Keeping pace with evolving biological and military notions of
defence, resilience utilizes newer notions of networked control. Conceiving cyber resilience as an
immune system makes this link explicit in asserting that defence in “complex and uncertain networked
environments . . . suggests the need for a new view of command and control, one that emphasizes
agility, focus, and convergence.”137 Attempts to create focus and convergence stress engagement and
trust. The point is to control vulnerable elements of the body politic by integrating them into systems of
defence, and this reflects the ongoing amalgamation of national defence and public health approaches
to containment.
Control of bodies remains a key component of disease containment. As noted during a 2001
simulation of a smallpox bioterrorist event, “The federal government has to have the cooperation of the
American people. There is no federal force out there that can require 300,000 people to take steps that
they don’t want to take.”138 Policies therefore stress collaboration, engagement, and empowerment in
attempting to integrate people into public health processes.139 These concepts have broad appeal.
Public health scholars claim that they are capable of mobilizing popular support while remaining tied to
state objectives.140 Engagement is used to mobilize the public, trust accentuates underlying control. For
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example, US Health and Human Services (HHS) stresses the importance of trust to secure public
cooperation in a pandemic.141 Echoing bottom-up control in complex systems, this approach is described
in public health literature as “health from below.” At the same time, it is deemed a “vexed
relationship.”142
Resilience strategies of homeland defence replicate the bottom-up approach and its challenges.
Beyond engagement and integration, trust is the “glue” that binds society together.143 This vision is
articulated in the 2008 DHS Strategic Plan, which underscores trust, collaboration, and partnerships
among all levels of government, the private sector, and the public in order to build “active layered
defenses and national resilience.”144 The vision implies a spatial expansion of containment strategy into
the body politic. In effect, resilience is a more inclusive approach to containment. It involves
considerable interventions by the state, not to regulate, but to woo. It’s a strategy of seduction. And yet,
examining strategies to enhance public engagement and trust to build cyber resilience, community
resilience, and civic resilience, it is evident that tensions remain.
Cyber Resilience: Building Voluntary Partnerships
Infrastructure resilience is characterized by attempts to persuade the private sector to
participate in state-based security. This focus goes back to the findings of the 1996 Commission, which
announced that “owners and operators of our critical infrastructures are now on the front lines of our
security effort. They are the ones most vulnerable to cyber attacks. And that vulnerability jeopardizes
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our national security.”145 The subsequent PDD-63 thus promoted a vision of deeper cooperation and
voluntary partnerships with the private sector, which still obtains under resilience. 146 Like preparedness
in civil defence, resilience is intended to appeal to the private sector by linking it to good corporate
practice.147 But resilience is more than a semantic exercise; it involves considerable intervention to
persuade private sector participation in state-based containment. Indeed, DHS officials describe an
active, ongoing process to engage, participate with, and collaborate with industry.148 This process is
reflected in policy. For example, the 2006 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) calls for early
engagement with industry in developing policies and initiatives related to implementation.149 The plan is
based on creating a system of “partnership structures” that includes Sector Coordinating Councils,
Government Coordinating Councils, and cross-sector partnership councils. All these structures are
designed to facilitate cooperation and foster trusting relationships to build resilience in a complex
environment.150
Trust is central to the partnership approach. The 2006 HSAC report on infrastructure resilience
asserted that the need for “unprecedented cooperation and collaboration among disparate stakeholder
communities” cannot occur “without trust within and among those communities.”151 Testifying at a
hearing on cybersecurity in 2006, Richard Schaeffer of the National Security Agency conceded that:
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Most of our relationships that are strong come from a one-on-one basis with the agency. We
participate. We collaborate with industry associations . . . but....it is a situation that takes a
tremendous amount of work with individual companies, then with industry or association
groups, and then in larger forums to build the trust and confidence. . . . It is something that we
work on every day. It takes that sort of attention and commitment.152
More recently, this system of trust and collaboration has been described as an immune system
approach to distributed security. The goal is a “healthy, resilient—and fundamentally more secure—
cyber ecosystem” based on near-real time coordination of people and devices that includes trusted
information exchanges.153
While this vision of real-time coordination is future oriented, the purpose of engagement and
trust-building under resilience is to bring the private sector into state-based security processes. This
includes creating an integrated, federal cyber incident response capability by “fostering
relationships with those who own and operate the communications infrastructure, members of the
emergency responder community, and Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.”154 This
capability is largely focused on the National Cybersecurity and Communications and Integration Center
(NCCIC), opened in 2009, which serves as a “central location where a diverse set of partners involved in
cybersecurity and communications protection coordinate and synchronize their efforts.” 155 The private
sector is to be “integrated both physically and virtually” into day-to-day operations and incident
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response capabilities.156 Participants are “encouraged to coordinate and communicate directly” with the
NCCIC.157 A 2011 “Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future” sees this approach as strengthening an
“ecosystem” that includes building “collaborative communities” as one way to drive “fundamental
change in the way people and devices work together to secure cyberspace.”158 Reflecting immune
system logic, the goal is to “leverage the distributed nature of cyberspace in its own protection.”159
DHS runs myriad programs beyond the NCCIC to gain private sector partnerships on cyber
security, such as an Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, a Cyber Information Sharing and
Collaboration Program, Sector Coordinating Councils, and an Automated Indicator Sharing Program.160
However, cooperation is disjointed. Anecdotal feedback from early reports and hearings points to the
elusiveness of trust,161 and this concern is ongoing. Recent indications suggest that while some major
computer and Internet companies are participating, reach is still limited. Echoing problems with
quarantine, industry participants complain of a free rider problem.162 Following new cyber intrusions, in
2013 President Obama issued an Executive Order, “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,”
again calling for stronger cooperation with owners and operators to build resilience.163 President Donald
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Trump has issued a similar call after the high-profile WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017, including the
potential for DHS to formalize cooperation with companies,164 to help close the gap between the system
and its parts.
A similar strategy for integrating the disparate American public into a cohesive, coordinated
emergency response capability through engagement and trust-building is evident in FEMA’s approach to
building community resilience. It includes leveraging resources and capabilities, and actively making
connections within civil society.
After Katrina: Integrating Vulnerable Communities into Preparedness
Lack of public trust and connectedness is a key source of the federal government’s inability to
maintain control over the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Large swaths of the population lay beyond the
reach of the state. In a subsequent study, the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) thus
recommended that DHS “engage existing associations and organizations” with “direct reach into various
communities” in a collaborative effort to develop resilience.165 It saw “mobilizing American
communities” as part of a shared responsibility for achieving national resilience.166 A report issued by
the White House draws a similar conclusion, noting that civil society and local community groups, a
critical resource for hurricane victims, were not adequately integrated into the response effort.167
Following Katrina, the updated 2008 National Response Framework stresses engaged partnerships
based on “developing shared goals and aligning capabilities.” 168 It also describes the creation of
“Layered, mutually supporting capabilities” for “responding together effectively in times of need.”169
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This vision is formalized in FEMA’s “whole community” approach to disaster management first released
in 2011. The whole community concept promotes an integrated, layered approach that includes
enhancing individual preparedness as well as engaging and integrating communities into national
processes.170 This approach was reinforced by Superstorm Sandy, which devastated areas marked by
poor cohesion and trust.171
As is the case with cyber resilience, building civic resilience through whole communities requires
engagement and trust. However, it involves a deeper level of intervention, not only to leverage
community resources but to build communities to contain the contagious effects of isolation. The
American Red Cross asserts that building community networks and connectedness is “what clearly
distinguishes ‘resilience’ from previous ‘preparedness’ activities.”172 This is reflected in FEMA’s
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 on planning for emergencies, which stresses that homeland
security operations must “start at the local level and expand” and underscores vertical integration from
individuals and families to the federal government, as well as unity of purpose and focus.173 Like Cold
War civil defence initiatives, FEMA uses community engagement to mobilize and integrate social
networks into the national resilience picture by targeting
businesses, neighborhood associations, community groups, faith-based and community-based
organizations, ethnic centers, and other civic-minded organizations that have routine, direct ties
and established trust with the individuals who live in their communities, and that can mobilize
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their networks to build community resilience and support local emergency management
needs.174
FEMA’s vision of resilience is based on strengthening “collective action, public engagement, and
neighborhood institutions.”175 The Citizen Corps is one of the most obvious and ambitious examples of
this vision. It seeks to engage people in making “their families, their homes, and their communities
safer.”176 Members of the Corps are in turn expected to help mobilize others, for example through the
Neighbors Helping Neighbors approach, which “empowers community leaders to involve and educate
individuals from their community about simple steps one can take to become more prepared.”177 Other
examples include renewed focus on such programs as Neighborhood Watch. Although self-organized in
theory, these organizations are prodded and encouraged by the state, which provides detailed
information about how to organize people around a common goal.178 In view here are both leveraging
existing social networks and building new ones.179 Disconnectedness is the enemy. Indeed, DHS has a
Faith-based & Neighborhood Partnerships Center mandated to engage certain groups through a Building
Resilience with Diverse Communities process intended to “’reach unreached’ populations in emergency
preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation.”180
Planning, which combines elements of engagement and trust-building, is the main tool in this
process. Plans are the basis of vertical integration to ensure a common focus for resilience measures.181
Planning is also linked to control; it “reinforces the expectation that the community members have a
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shared responsibility and strengthens the public motivation to conduct planning for themselves, their
families, and their organizations.”182 Vulnerable groups—immigrants, people with disabilities, seniors,
and children—are central to planning so that they become “more likely to accept and use the plan” and
“follow protective action measures during a crisis.”183 Thus a preparedness guide for seniors instructs
them to create a personal support network as part of their emergency plan.184 Citizen Corps Council
members are heavily involved in FEMA’s disaster planning, serving to “conduct localized outreach and
education to the public, offer training and participation in exercises, encourage volunteerism, and in the
event of a disaster, form an integral part of the response.”185
Beyond planning and engagement lies a deeper pre-occupation with trust. The White House
report on Hurricane Katrina directed DHS and other Federal agencies to focus better on developing
messages from trusted leaders.186 This is reinforced in FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, which views
trust as critical for mobilizing communities to self-organization.187 As well, it is embedded in the whole
community framework, which asserts that
Trust is a recurring theme that underpins healthy and strong communities. It acts as the glue
that holds different groups together. . . . Building social trust requires more than conventional
outreach focused on ‘trust issues’; it requires collaborating with communities in joint activities
design to address specific local problems.188
FEMA’s whole community approach aims to engender trust through participation and successful
collaboration with leaders over time. Staff try to participate in local activities such as Memorial Day
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projects.189 Other local programs include working with Interfaith ministries, refugee resettlement
agencies, and apartment complexes to develop “trusted relationships and ways to provide current
preparedness, response, and recovery information.”190
Similar to the cyber arena, integrating and leveraging communities for disaster preparedness
and response by engagement and trust remain blotchy. FEMA notes that “belief in large institutions,
including government, has been shifting to social networks and alternative sources of loyalty.”191
Planning documents acknowledge the difficulty of communicating with and directing the public, given
the myriad information sources now available.192 Ten years after Katrina, FEMA is still grappling with
trust issues in vulnerable populations.193 The problem is even greater with civic resilience, where the
public face of trust and engagement is the policing and intelligence arms of the state.
Civic Resilience: Between Engagement and Enforcement
The “resilient communities” approach to countering violent extremists (CVE) is formalized in the
2011 strategy Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, which
primarily targets Muslim communities.194 (It has many parallels to the Prevent program in the United
Kingdom, which I call “civic resilience.”195) It is embedded in the overarching US strategy of resilience
and homeland security. As with communities vulnerable to natural disasters, poor integration is the key
challenge. A 2011 investigative hearing by the House Homeland Security Committee revealed a lack of
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leadership, integration, and civic responsibility within Muslim communities in addressing vulnerabilities
to violent extremism.196 The 2010 QRHS points specifically to immigrant communities that fail to
integrate and puts the onus on them to become part of a more cohesive and resilient public.197 This
concern with integration is further evidenced by research conducted by the Behavioral Sciences Division
of the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) Science and Technology Directorate, which has a
Muslim Community Integration Project to assess the current state of Muslim communities.198 Like cyber
and community resilience, interventions to enhance integration within society and with the state must
emphasize engagement and trust.
When former FBI Director Robert Mueller first drew attention to the threat of homegrown
terrorism, he also made a case for “building relationships within the Muslim community to counter the
spread of extremist ideology.”199 This is echoed in the 2010 QHSR statement that “to stop the spread of
violent extremism . . . it is important that we actively engage communities across the United States.”200
The 2011 Counterterrorism Strategy refers to “connecting communities for collective resilience,”201
which is reiterated in a strategy calling on “communities—especially Muslim American communities
whose children, families and neighbors are being targeted for recruitment” by Al-Qaeida to help protect
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Americans from its “hateful ideology.”202 However, although described as community-led, in practice the
strategy focuses on gaining consent for, and cooperation with, state-led policing and intelligence. The
language reflects the overarching “Hometown Security” approach that stresses partnerships between
communities and law enforcement “to protect against the threats we face.” 203
Implementation requires building both trust and an understanding of policing and intelligence
practices in order to achieve participation and consent. The CVE strategy is based largely on the Building
Communities of Trust (BCoT) program linked to improving relationships between police, intelligence,
and local communities by providing education on the Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting
Initiative and on protection of civil rights and liberties.204 This model recognizes the need for public
consent and cooperation in order to gather community-based intelligence, and has been used to
overcome resistance to intelligence gathering in cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Portland.205 The FBI maintains Specialized Community Outreach Teams in each of its 56 field offices to
improve interaction with “communities that are particularly insular or where barriers of fear or
suspicion of law enforcement exist.”206 The rationale? “If the public understands the FBI’s mission and
views the FBI as cooperative and trustworthy, they are more likely to report a crime, return a telephone
call or respond positively to being approached by an FBI special agent.”207
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Further, the DHS, Department of Justice (DOJ), and FBI have all developed extensive community
outreach and engagement programs linked to civil rights and liberties. DHS holds events primarily
through the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties aimed at communities that have concerns or feel
targeted by counter-terrorism processes so that they “are, and feel, active participants in the homeland
security effort.”208 For more significant grievances, an incident communication coordination team brings
government officials and community leaders together to exchange information and resolve tensions.209
The FBI’s extensive outreach program aims to enhance public trust and confidence in the agency “by
fostering the FBI’s relationship with various communities.”210 Activities include teaching community
leaders about how the FBI operates through a Citizens Academy, a 10-session course that walks
participants through intelligence-gathering and crime fighting practices.211 Similar training is offered to
at-risk youth through schools.212 Where trust remains a significant obstacle, a more basic program—
CREST (Community Relations Executive Seminar Training)—is used to teach participants “about the FBI’s
“mission, goals, history, and internal workings.”213
Locally, a significant portion of DHS funding goes to training departments to better engage
targeted communities.214 The LAPD’s Public Trust Policing, described earlier as a “strategy of
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convergence,” is a model.215 It seeks to integrate police presence within the community by visiting
mosques during Friday Prayer and networking with local imams.216 It also exposes the blurred line
between vulnerability and suspicion. Indeed, its very purpose is to massage more intrusive, covert, and
coercive policing and intelligence-gathering within the community. The New York Times reports that the
strong personal ties between Muslim leaders and the LAPD have “helped overcome some bad patches,
such as when Muslims discovered that the FBI had placed informants in mosques on nonspecific
intelligence-gathering missions.”217 This is reinforced in a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report
that depicts community engagement as diffusing tensions and garnering support for more coercive
counter-terrorism activities.218 Given the fact of underlying coercion, some community leaders have
encouraged individuals not to cooperate. 219 Nonetheless, the approach rolls along, with renewed focus
on developing “terrorism prevention partnerships.”220
This detailed survey suggests that civic resilience best captures the ambiguity and vulnerability
of target communities. They exist in a void between Self and Other and between citizen and suspect, the
medium of contagion through which pathology circulates.221 Communities are caught between engaging
policing and intelligence services and being targets of enforcement. The seduction-by-engagement
strategy flirts with coercion, and it reveals the persistence of the internal tensions and contradictions
between bodies that I discussed in the previous chapters. Although less pronounced in the other
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varieties of resilience, this strained “harmony” is nonetheless present there as well. For example, a 2011
research plan to develop “trustworthy cyberspace” asserts that the environment is always suspect and
its trustworthiness “must be continuously monitored and analyzed.”222 Indeed, each layer of resilience
presented here points to the limitations—lapses in trust and cooperation—that gnaw at containment
efforts. In the following chapters I will trace these limitations, examining how resilience in the form of an
immune system functions to contain contagion. I will also describe attempts to automate these
functions, which are harbingers of an evolution toward an “‘informational immune body.”223
The Evolving Form of Containment
Resilience represents a continuation of medical and military strategies to contain contagion in
defence of the state-as body. Like models of quarantine and immunity-as-defence in times past,
resilience is rooted in a particular image of the body and military notions of control, in this case
influenced by scientific views of complexity, of the body as fluid, and of focus and convergence.
Resilience signals a persisting pre-occupation with contagion, but with the focus shifting internally—
namely to the harmful cascades flowing through the body’s vulnerabilities. As well, resilience points to a
spatial shift in the idea of containment itself, by adopting an approach that seeks to reach into the
bodies of the body politic and to integrate them into national defence activity. Reflecting the form of the
immune system as well as the role that resilience plays in theories of complexity, this approach
bespeaks the continued importance of the national body, which is to be defended by leveraging its
parts.
As a mode of American national defence within the framework of homeland security, the origins
of resilience are found in the 1997 Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and the subsequent
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PDD-63. Together, these documents point to a new vision of internal contagion and disorder, and stress
integrating the private sector into national defence capabilities through trust and engagement strategies
partly modeled on CDC approaches to disease control. This vision is amplified in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, and formalized under DHS, with resilience conceived of as a system of layered
defences within an immune system. In looking at building this system across three sub-cases—cyber
resilience, community resilience, and civic resilience—I contend that they follow a similar approach to
integration through state interventions aimed at engagement and building trust. However, disparities in
the cooperation of bodies remain. These disparities mark the key impediment to strategies of
containment exercised by the state that require the control and cooperation of bodies.
I will further explore the friction between bodies in the next chapters, setting out how resilience
as an immune system works to contain contagion. I will show that the immune system serves several
functions, including surveillance to detect signs of contagion, controlled responses and behaviour rooted
in hygiene, and the animation of Self identity. These functions echo the workings of the biological
immune system. In pointing to the ongoing imbrication of health and national defence, I will suggest
that they also resemble the “global health security” model of disease containment. That model aims at
outbreaks of disease that have not yet occurred but threaten critical functions, and it operates through
large-scale detection and alert systems that can trigger local response capabilities. All of this is tied to a
moral understanding of virtues and obligations connected to health.224 However, as I will show, these
functions have deep roots in historical iterations of containment, including quarantine and immunity.
Resilience as understood today thus points to a shift only in form, not in function. Finally, as will unfold
in the chapters to come, resilience points to an evolution in the drive to close the gap between the
state-as-body and biological bodies, suggested by a growing emphasis on the automated exchange of
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information225 that regards the body as “informational.”226 These continuities and progressions provide
context for understanding the lessons, limitations, and implications of resilience and the wider
governance framework of containment.
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CHAPTER THREE— Looking and Listening: Surveillance and the Detection of Contagion
…we need to think about seeing at every scale. It is in the seeing – of the animalcule, the
parts of the infected body, and the shared set of symptoms evidenced across maps of the city,
nation, and world that the unknown is made real, its public nature asserted.1

From Strategy to Tactics
As I am arguing throughout this dissertation, the goal of containment is to identify and control
the spread of contagion through the public body. Resilience—the internal ability of a system to limit
damage from disruption—maintains the spatial and biological logic of containment, now recast as an
immune system. The logic is both strategic and tactical. In the first two chapters I outlined the strategic
component: following the inward trajectory of medical-military quarantine and the cordone sanitaire,
resilience focuses on controlling the contagious flow of biological bodies, disease, and disorder.
Reaching ever deeper into the social and political body, resilience relies on engagement and trust to
integrate layers of defences, orchestrating a concerted melody of the body and the parts. What are the
notes of this melody? How do resilience and the immune system actually work? Answers to these
questions unveil the tactical component, which is the subject of the second section of this dissertation,
beginning with surveillance and detection.
Surveillance—the ability to know and detect where, when, and how much of a disease is
present—is central to disease containment strategies2 and is equally a core function of the immune
system. 3 In the previous chapter I identified these elements as inspirations for resilience in the context
of American homeland security. Surveillance and detection of emerging contagion are a raison d’être of
the trust-building and engagement exercises marking resilience as a mode of containment. A key feature
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of the seminal Presidential Decision Directive 63: Protecting Critical Infrastructures (PDD-63), the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) calls the “merging of information” a “new paradigm” for
national security.4 Similarly, the US DOD asserts that a layered approach to defence requires “superior
intelligence collection, fusion, and analysis.”5 Depth of defence is predicated on depth of detection. Not
really a new paradigm, this approach reflects a drive to look ever deeper into the body and the body
politic as a source of contagion.
In this chapter I will explore surveillance and detection as a mechanism of containment that
utilizes a clinical method of medical diagnosis, namely “looking and listening” for signs of disease. This
method depends on the cooperation of bodies and extends existing modes of containment, moving
from the physical inspections of quarantine and the cordone sanitaire to infiltration under civil defence
and the creation of complex networks of surveillance. In cyber resilience, community resilience, and
civic resilience these styles of detection are still evident. The shift is primarily spatial and temporal.
Reflecting the perception of the body itself as fluid, there is movement to create collaborative networks
for real-time surveillance and detection—a national defence version of both the CDC and an immune
system—to continually monitor the whole of the body. Yet integration blurs into infiltration, and
seduction into coercion. Moreover, detection remains hindered by the unreliable cooperation of bodies.
I therefore end with a discussion of the noticeable shift towards automating detection, which draws on
the power of big data to remove the need for express cooperation. While the overall approach seeks to
transcend the bodily limitations of clinical surveillance, it still espouses the original method of looking
and listening for signs of contagion.
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Surveillance: The Clinical Method of Detection
Surveillance to detect contagion is at the heart of resilience strategies for national defence.
Writing about national security in the United Kingdom, Sir David Omand argues that early detection is
key to preventing a cascade or “rising tide” of disturbance from becoming a crisis.6 This goal is similarly
pursued in public health, where early detection is crucial for rapid containment of disease outbreaks.7
Early detection is a function of “epidemic intelligence: the systematic collection, analysis and
communication of any information to detect, verify, assess and investigate events and health risks.”8
Jeremy Bentham’s all-seeing Panopticon, a design for a prison with a central watchtower, is
synonymous with surveillance.9 However, Stuart Elden argues that the modern hospital is an even more
powerful model.10 Rather than offering breadth of vision, hospital surveillance provides depth, by
monitoring the whole, by dividing space, and by carefully selecting and separating individuals to be
surveyed.11 This depth is reflected in clinical medicine and the search for disease. There is no single
vantage point for seeing disease within the body. Instead, detection utilizes clinical methods to identify
“symptoms and signs” by “listening and looking.”12 This method fixes its gaze on the body as a space of
disease, on identifying and locating indications of infection. A similar spatial and biological gaze is used
to detect contagion within the body politic. In this regard, Tom Koch claims that “we need to think about
seeing at every scale. It is in the seeing – of the animalcule, the parts of the infected body, and the
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shared set of symptoms evidenced across maps of the city, nation, and world that the unknown is made
real, its public nature asserted.”13 The immune system is likewise described in terms of depth of
detection; identifying harmful micro-organisms is not limited to a single component but occurs through
the coordination and cooperation of various elements operating at multiple scales within the body.14 In
short, the immune system is an interacting network of surveillance and detection.
The current model of resilience enshrines the clinical method of analysis. However, in expanding
its vision and reach, it begins to resemble the panoptic dream of the watchtower. Catherine Waldby
points to this development in the public health field, where blood tests to detect HIV allow medicine to
“’see’ infection in the population” and to merge clinical knowledge with the population view of
epidemiology.15 In military terms this is “full spectrum dominance.”16 However, the goal is not yet
achieved.17 While resilience seeks to look deeper within, to the molecular body, it still depends on the
cooperation of bodies. This harks back to the efforts to combat plague discussed earlier.
Surveillance and Inspection from the Cordone Sanitaire to Public Health
The plague of past centuries is instructive for understanding the role of surveillance and
detection in containing the fluid spread of contagion. The plague coursed through populations and was
visible only in the wake of bodies, which became the focus of detection. Quarantine was imposed partly
as a mode of medical surveillance to allow time for the emergence of visible symptoms.18 Likewise, the
military-medical cordone sanitaire was married with surveillance to detect the presence of foreign
bodies. For example, in medieval Italian cities the cordone included spies and protocols for sharing
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information between principalities.19 Coupled with military defence of territory, the approach created
boundaries that could be not only controlled but monitored.20 As we have seen, a similar mode of
surveillance and detection appears in the military frontier restricting the entry of diseased and foreign
bodies into the Hapsburg Empire.21 Detection mirrored the cordone’s layered depth of defence,
extending inward.22 Towns were subject to “a strict spatial partitioning, careful surveillance, detailed
inspection and order” that resemble the hospital mode of surveillance.23 This clinical approach to
disease detection inspected houses and bodies for signs and symptoms of illness, and surveilled
marginalized and foreign bodies harshly and intermittently.24 This information was fed into a central
hub, thus transferring data from the molecular body to the state body.
This method of looking and listening for symptoms of disease influenced public health
approaches to national defence in the United States. The history of controlling entry of foreigners
through disease surveillance (firmly rooted in germ theory) is revealing. From the 1800s well into the
twentieth century, immigrants arriving in steerage class were subjected to medical inspection designed
to restrict the entry of those “with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease or mental deficiency”
in what amounted to the “largest ever medical screening facility” on Ellis Island.25 This operation
mirrored the challenge of detecting the invisible flow of plague. While there was some awareness that
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“large numbers of people could be exposed to disease without being aware of it,”26 including
pneumonia and tuberculosis, detection continued to rely on visible symptoms evoked by diseases such
as trachoma (eyes) and favus (skin).27
The ability to monitor boundaries is central to both public health and national defence. In the
Cold War, it was amplified through the development of the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line), a
national radar system for monitoring airspace and detecting unusual activity that might indicate an
impending nuclear launch.28 This line-of-sight was augmented with satellites providing an eye-in-the-sky
view of the Earth below and enabling America to “overcome geography” to detect a Soviet launch.29
However, this view is exceptional. Most nets to capture contagion have been cast wider and deeper, not
in the skies but within the body politic. In public health, surveillance has become constant and more
intrusive.30 Early measures invaded the living situations of the lower classes, inspecting sanitary facilities
to detect and remove the causes of disease.31 This approach is paralleled in the American model of civil
defence, which evolved from inspection to infiltration.
Civil Defence: Detection-in-Depth
Like quarantine, surveillance and detection as a tool of containment under civil defence
extended from outside the body to deeply within. The Project East River report on non-military defence
recommended a “free flow of information” from bottom to top.32 Indeed, collecting and distributing
local information to the state was a key function of civil defence in the 1950s. However, rather than a
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free flow of information, it tilted toward infiltration as it increasingly saw the domestic population as a
source of contagion. For example, Block Wardens, who were responsible for organizing neighbourhood
civil defence efforts and containing panic in the event of a nuclear strike, were tasked with local
mapping and census activities.33 They also had to monitor and report on “dangerous public conditions”
as part of a wider network of neighbourhood informants reporting to civil defence control centers.34 The
Cold War also marked the creation of the FBI, CIA, and NSA, which included surveillance of the public
and operated partly through covert information networks.35
Inner cities—imagined spaces of viral circulation—were a particular target. The US government
developed Rumor Control Centers to detect early signs of uprisings in areas where the state’s
information networks were weak. These centers served as clearing-houses for circulating “incendiary
rumors,”36 with tips telephoned in by citizens instructed to report on social tensions. The centers were
integrated with local police and intelligence units.37 The whole system was described as a new DEW line:
a District Early Warning Line. 38 Military and civil defence agencies began working with local
governments to develop communications links to the inner cities.39 This approach obviously resembles
the CDC process of detecting disease and biological threats. Indeed, the CDC is emblematic of the
marriage of medical and military strategies of containment for national defence. Beyond its military
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roots described earlier, the CDC coupled public health and civil defence against biological warfare.40 In
1963, chief epidemiologist Dr. Alexander Langmuir described it as “continued watchfulness over the
distribution of trends of incidence through the systematic collection, consolidation and evaluation of
morbidity and mortality reports and other relevant data."41 Reflecting its role in containment, disease
surveillance “aimed to divorce the populations of pathogenic microbes from the population of the
nation.”42 As a function of civil defence, its goal was to “detect an epidemic emergency, direct
governmental response, and verify its successful conclusion” via a new Epidemic Intelligence Service.43
Containment of contagious disease paralleled Cold War civil defence strategies, especially the need for
“high quality intelligence (surveillance), in order to be able to respond to the unexpected quickly and
appropriately.”44 Over time, its purview expanded to monitor all sorts of disease, health, and safety
indicators from a broad range of sources,45 and its activities were replicated globally through the World
Health Organization (WHO).
The civil defence mode of surveillance resembles “surveillance medicine,” which seeks “to bring
everyone within its network of visibility” through the use of new screening tools aimed at the general
population.46 However, it faced the old limitations and “still confronted the localized lesion . . . within
the body and ignored the newly emerging mobile threats that were insinuated throughout the
community, constantly reforming into new dangers.” It “had to confront points of resistance,
particularly the unwillingness of many to participate in these new procedures.”47 The solution involved
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“giving responsibility for surveillance to patients themselves.”48 More recently, this has evolved into a
real-time capability to monitor the globe for signs of contagion.
Complex Networks of Global Health Monitoring
Disease surveillance and detection ramped up amid a resurgence of infectious diseases such as
SARS and renewed fears of bioterrorism.49 In 1995, WHO adopted the “world on alert” metaphor and
created a global monitoring network of surveillance and disease control.50 Like an immune system,
global disease surveillance now involves a “complex network of information gathering and processing
efforts combined together across a range of organizations and groups."51 The network extends beyond
state actors to public health officials and civil society.52 It includes the Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN), linking more than 100 laboratory and reporting networks, as well as
software that “actively gathers disease information from Web sites, news wires, newspapers, public
health e-mail services, and electronic discussion groups.”53 The focus is on real-time surveillance to
contain disease at its source,54 and not only covers confirmed cases but monitors events—or ‘rumors’—
that may indicate potential for disease.55 This approach is replicated domestically in the United States.
Together with concerns for contagion and critical infrastructure, in 1996 President Clinton issued
Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-7, establishing a “national policy and implementing actions to
address the threat of emerging infectious diseases by improving surveillance, prevention, and response
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measures.”56 The CDC, Department of Defense (DOD), and DHS each run similar, overlapping
surveillance and detection networks. As Sarah Davies notes, there is “nowhere to hide.”57 In national
defence, this is the vision and inspiration for detection under resilience as it seeks to integrate the
population into networks for real-time surveillance and detection based on public health and immune
system models.
Resilience and the Immune System: From Infiltration to Integration
Rather than infiltrating the bodies of the state, resilience is predicated on integrating them into
systems of surveillance and detection. It strives for greater cooperation of bodies and increased depth of
vision. Occupying the framework detailed in chapter 2, it entails leveraging relationships developed
through trust and engagement to integrate the private sector and civil society into the state’s
surveillance and detection capabilities. Although inspired by the CDC and the biological immune system,
it nevertheless faces limitations.
Detecting Cyber Threats: Replicating the CDC
Detection, a central weakness of cyber defence, starkly contrasts with the panoramic view of
external threats provided by Cold War radar and satellite technologies. This weakness stems from the
Internet’s spatial complexity, which restricts the state’s ability to monitor it for signs of contagious
circulation. Cyber connections comprise a patchwork that is “neither owned nor operated by any single
group” and offers no panoramic vantage point for viewing attacks. 58 There is no escaping this
geography. Accordingly, PDD-63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection called for a cyber threat clearinghouse, identifying the CDC as a model of early detection and system surveillance.59 This call included
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creating a National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) located in the FBI, which incorporated and
expanded its InfraGuard program, bringing together IT professionals and law enforcement to share
threat information and to disseminate alerts.60 Recalling the original vision of civil defence, the NIPC
would facilitate a two-way flow of information. Its Information Sharing and Analysis Center would serve
as “the mechanism for gathering, analyzing, appropriately sanitizing and disseminating private sector
information to both industry and the NIPC.”61 Although this vision was never fully realized, efforts to
build an integrated early detection network through “unprecedented partnerships between the
government and the private sector”62 are still deemed “necessary to achieve resilience.”63 The number
of initiatives undertaken is dizzying, as I will note below.
The 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace focused on a Cyber Warning and Information
Network to provide “early detection through information sharing to prevent threat cascade.”64 It called
for a “less formal, collaborative network of governmental and nongovernmental organizations” for the
sake of a National Cyberspace Security Response System.65 The goal was to develop “private sector
capability to share a synoptic view of the health of cyberspace.”66 This was facilitated by the Critical
Infrastructure Information Act, designed to facilitate and protect the sharing of sensitive information67
and specifically intended to provide DHS with better data.68 However, a 2006 cyber hearing noted that
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the US lacked “an early warning system to identify potential Internet attacks or determine if the
disruptions are spreading rapidly across critical systems.”69
In 2008 the Bush Administration launched the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
(CNCI), renewing the focus on shared situational awareness as the “front line of defense against today’s
immediate threats.”70 Yet again, a 2009 White House review declared cyberspace initiatives as neither
secure nor resilient, and called for the integration of information to achieve “a true common operating
picture.”71 The National Cybersecurity Communications and Integration Center (NCCIC) was established
in 2009 to serve as the main vehicle for this process. It aims to
operate at the intersection of the private sector, civilian, law enforcement, intelligence, and
defense communities, applying unique analytic perspectives, ensuring shared situational
awareness, and orchestrating synchronized response efforts while protecting the Constitutional
and privacy rights of Americans in both the cybersecurity and communications domains.72
Representatives from the military, industry, justice, and intelligence communities work alongside DHS
officials to track and mitigate threats.73 This approach is described as “centralized coordination” and
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“decentralized execution.”74 The NCCIC provides a secure, web-based, collaborative system to share
sensitive, cyber-related information and news.75 Representatives from the private sector are
“encouraged to coordinate and communicate directly” with the center. As well, they are to be
“integrated both physically and virtually into the NCCIC during steady-state operations” and “fully and
appropriately integrated into cyber incident response.”76 The NCCIC includes the Cyber Information
Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) launched by DHS in 2011.77 It permits the private sector to
share datasets directly with government.78 In Its first two years of operation, it signed almost 100
cooperative data-sharing agreements with private sector entities.79
In 2013, President Barack Obama issued PDD-21 “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,”
which gave new impetus to data sharing. It declared that a “secure, functioning, and resilient critical
infrastructure” requires “efficient exchange of information, including intelligence, between all levels of
governments and critical infrastructure owners and operators.”80 This is linked to developing “a near
real-time situational awareness capability for critical infrastructure that includes threat streams and allhazards information as well as vulnerabilities.”81 A drive toward real-time capability is further indicated
in the 2011 Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future and a DHS White Paper titled “Enabling Distributed
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Security.” The Blueprint envisions “robust information sharing mechanisms” through which “relevant
knowledge about threats, vulnerabilities, and protective capabilities will be communicated in near realtime among people and devices in both the public and private sector.”82 Moreover, it builds on models
that show how “information about wellness and disease is reported by public health officials.”83 The
White Paper likewise points to public health processes to “conduct population health surveillance and
react to threats to the overall health of communities” through collaboration.84 It is envisioned that the
cyber equivalent of a CDC might perform functions such as gathering data on threats and outbreaks.
The drive for real-time situational awareness and detection capabilities in cyberspace remains a
persistent, but thus far elusive, goal. Nevertheless, it may be getting closer to realization, in that
community resilience proponents are moving towards large-scale monitoring capabilities of social
media.
Community Resilience: Social Listening after Katrina
“If intelligence drives Homeland Security’s disaster-response planning and execution, few
calamities provide better advance intelligence than a hurricane.”85 However, the challenge posed by
Katrina in 2005 was not about anticipating it but about monitoring its impact on communities. Despite
ample forewarning, government agencies possessed poor situational awareness capability on the
ground,86 apparent incompetence about what to look for, and a baffling inability to access and verify
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information.87 The state relied largely on unsubstantiated rumours of civil disorder and violence that
then informed harsh containment responses.88 Katrina symbolizes failure of detection.
Since then, FEMA has embarked on collecting decentralized knowledge as part of a “whole
community” approach, including an operational focus on resilience.89 This effort seeks to gather
information about vulnerable communities from sources such as census data, utility providers, the
bureau of motor vehicles, disability service providers, schools, hospitals, daycares and housing
programs.90 FEMA calls this “community mapping,”91 an ongoing activity intended to understand the
dynamics of change.92 For example, Florida’s Community Resilience approach to public health and
disaster response maps information about populations including children, seniors, the extremely obese,
non-English speakers, the economically disadvantaged, the homeless, people with developmental
disabilities, and victims of domestic violence.93
The shift now underway seeks to include real-time collection of data to detect signs of social
distress and unrest. As with cyber security, leveraging relationships built through trust and engagement
exercises facilitates the gathering information during a crisis.94 Facilitated by new social media
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technologies, it resembles the systems of social listening and panic warning deployed in prior decades.
FEMA’s 2011 strategic plan notes an increase in spontaneous reporting by individuals at or near sites of
emergency, which can “enhance our collective situational awareness considerably by integrating
information provided by the public with that provided from official government and other unofficial
sources.”95 A FEMA Think Tank online forum similarly asserts that resilience requires “more engagement
among all members of society” and using digital media to “empower the public to provide instantaneous
eye-witness reports” because citizens are “the true first responders to meta-disasters and we need to
leverage their capabilities.”96 As with cyber, leveraging is a source of situational awareness.
In the same direction, the National Operations Center of DHS launched three Media Monitoring
Capability pilot projects in 2010 to monitor social media associated with specific events, including the
earthquake in Haiti, the Vancouver winter Olympics, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.97 Deeming the
pilots successful, the Department released its Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational
Awareness Initiative in 2011. It allows for collecting and disseminating personal information in specific
scenarios on people in distress, government officials who make public statements, reporters who use
social media to provide situational awareness or information, and terrorists, drug cartel leaders, and
others associated with national security interests.98 FEMA also developed a Disaster Reporter App to
crowdsource disaster-related photos,99 but it has a low user rate. Instead, the best information is
believed to come from existing social media sites. Testimony from FEMA representatives points to the
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growing use of social media to communicate with emergency responders, as in the Boston Bombing and
Hurricane Sandy cases.100 More than merely a tool for communication, social media is increasingly
employed for situational awareness.101 FEMA, the Red Cross, and Health and Social Services all monitor
social media outlets, “collating information in real time and using it to act immediately.”102
As with civil defence, state bodies also use social media as a barometer of the public mood
during a disaster.103 FEMA offers courses to train respondents to use social media “to identify warning
signs that a crisis is developing” and to “check how crisis management efforts are being received.”104 For
example, city managers of the Clark Regional Emergency Services Agency in Vancouver, Washington
monitored social media to control public response during a 2009 swine flu outbreak, demonstrating the
complementary use of real-time intelligence for identifying and containing outbreaks of disorder.105
In 2016, new guidelines allowed FEMA to
monitor, collect, and maintain information from publicly available social media sources to
provide critical situational awareness in support of FEMA’s mission to reduce the loss of life and
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property and protect the nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism,
and other man-made disasters.106
Based on lessons learned from Hurricane Sandy in 2012,107 FEMA’s monitoring of social media is
constant, enabling it to detect anomalies against a baseline picture.108 DHS calls this “enhanced
situational awareness.”109 Critically, DHS notes that while leveraging “multiple data sources” to collect
information is not new, the widespread use of mobile devices enhances its ability to “gather and share
real-time, dynamic information to enhance situational awareness and assist in decision-making.”110
FEMA’s Watch Centers now maintain situational awareness by collecting information and
communicating it to emergency management and government officials. Centers are staffed 24 hours a
day, monitoring threats ranging from severe weather to potential terrorist activity, using geospatial
information systems and real-time computer analysis.111 FEMA has also developed expertise on “social
listening” to identify needs and misinformation within communities. As described by an official, “We will
see on a street three people talk about water being out, and within 20-30 minutes we can have water on
their street.”112
However, there are caveats. While crowdsourcing addresses gaps in data, “emergency
management lacks a conceptual framework for understanding the complex coordination and interaction
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mechanisms that enable crisis crowdsourcing.”113 Tools such as FEMA’s Disaster Reporter are not widely
used. As well, emergency management gets tangled up with policing. For example, FEMA data is
increasingly used by law enforcement for forensic intelligence.114 This includes the Boston Marathon
Bombing in 2013, which pointed to a weakness in crowdsourced data, namely the “false publication of a
possible suspect.”115 Tension persists between integration and infiltration, especially in attempts to
detect signs of radicalization.
Civic Resilience: Between Integration and Infiltration
Like the unfolding disaster of Hurricane Katrina, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001
(9/11) marked a failure of intelligence. A desire to reach more deeply into society as a source of counterterrorism intelligence has stayed on the homeland security agenda ever since, through a strategy
blending integration with infiltration, which has met with resistance. After 9/11, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) established a program to interview 5,000 non-citizen Arab Muslims residing in the United
States. The goal was to piece together community information on the attackers or others planning such
action.116 Because they shared demographic characteristics with the suspects, interviewees would be
“more likely to reside in the same communities or be members of the same social groups and, therefore,
more likely to be aware of suspicious activity.”117 The proposed nationwide Operation TIPS (Terrorism
Information and Prevention System) program was intended to help “thousands of American truck
drivers, letter carriers, train conductors, ship captains, and utility workers report potential terrorist
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activity.”118 Accused by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of encouraging neighbours to spy on
neighbours, it was eventually dropped in name119 although its goals survived in subsequent programs.
As early as 2004, the ACLU had identified similar efforts such as Marine Watch, Highway Watch, the
Community Anti-Terrorism Training Institute (CAT Eyes), Real Estate Watch, state-based TIPS programs
in Florida and other states, plus the military-based Eagle Eyes and Talon.120
Fusion Centers have formalized the data collection process and have trained thousands of police
officers and personnel in public safety, fire service, public health, and the private sector to recognize and
report signs of terrorism.121 Communities are linked into this process through Terrorism Liaison Officers
(TLOs). A pilot program began in California in 2002122 and is described by the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) as “casting an ever-wider net to train more people in the city as public data
collectors.”123 TLOs have become prolific: Colorado, for instance, reached more than 500 collectors.124
The FBI maintains its own TLO program to enable communities to “discern suspicious criminal or terrorrelated activity, gather supplemental information, and report it for processing and assessment.”125
Resilience extends this data collection through a focus on mobilizing local information within
Muslim communities. In 2006, FBI Director Robert Mueller made a case for “building relationships
within the Muslim community to counter the spread of extremist ideology,” and stressed improved
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intelligence, particularly through use of local police and “outreach to the public as our eyes and ears.” 126
A 2008 report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security likewise recommended an increased
focus on intelligence, given the difficulty of identifying and monitoring the type of non-criminal
behaviours marking radicalization.127 Former police lead for Preventing Violent Extremism in the UK, Sir
Norman Bettison, describes this as sharing “unspecific and ambiguous information.”128 It aims to provide
“precisely the type of data that might help police to circumvent the intelligence gaps and blind spots
that seemingly inhere in their established methods”129 through access to communities usually closed to
intelligence agencies.130 The aim again is to leverage relationships developed through trust and
engagement.
The specifics of this approach in the US were fleshed out by the Homeland Security Advisory
Council’s Working Group on Countering Violent Extremism, tasked in 2010 to recommend “how the
Department can better support community-based efforts to combat violent extremism domestically–
focusing in particular on the issues of training, information sharing, and the adoption of communityoriented law enforcement approaches.”131 It called for combining community-based policing integrated
with intelligence-gathering. This combination has marked the American approach to resiliency.132 It
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seeks to mobilize communities, “particularly those that may feel targeted by society and police,” and to
channel police and community resources by routing “decentralized homeland security intelligence
gathering” to centralized institutions such as the FBI.133 Recognizing the need for the public’s consent
and cooperation, it aims to integrate communities into the flow of data to state-run Fusion Centers.134
Fusion Centers are designed to collect and share local threat-related information. Data fusion
involves "the exchange of information from different sources . . . to produce meaningful and actionable
intelligence and information."135 A growing theme in intelligence literature,136 fusion reflects a broad
spatial approach to surveillance and detection marked by the concepts of resilience and the immune
system. In contrast to cyber and community forms of resilience, it blurs the distinction between
integrating the public and infiltrating the public, and it starkly reveals the tension between the system
and the parts.
Resilience specifically targets the Muslim communities to detect and report signs of
radicalization. For example, the FBI’s “Don’t Be a Puppet Campaign” asserts that “as parents and
community leaders, you play an incredibly important role in keeping your children from being
radicalized and potentially recruited by violent extremists. You are the first line of defence, the ones
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who can spot any unusual or suspicious behaviour and take steps to act on it.”137 The campaign offers
instruction on warning signs and urges prompt reporting.138 Similarly, a 2016 FBI program on
“Preventing Extremism in Schools” aims to educate personnel “about at-risk behaviors and activities.”139
It builds on the concept of “leakage” and stresses the importance of signs of “radicalization or
mobilization to violence.”140 According to the FBI, “The key is communicating these observations and
information in a timely manner to the proper authorities or a trusted community partner, mitigating a
potential threat before an individual mobilizes to violence.”141 In addition, it responds to a perceived
resistance to such sharing by third-party witnesses, of whom it is estimated less than half report their
observations.142
To an extent, the various practices of enhancing resilience have been successful. Police in
Michigan have described the creation of a Muslim network and describe the community as “wired” and
“highly cooperative.”143 This sentiment echoes testimony from the LAPD and its positive relationship
with local Muslim communities (in contrast to the NYPD, which failed in its covert attempt to map and
infiltrate Muslim communities).144 The initiative nevertheless remains highly controversial. Critics accuse
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it of tasking community members to monitor and spy on one another.145 Indeed, a leaked guide to
police, teachers, medical providers, and social workers reveals a system to covertly rate individuals and
families on a list of “risk and resilience factors” as a means of alerting the government to at-risk
individuals.146 As well, participation by public institutions such as schools seems to be slipping from
voluntary to mandatory, placing them in a role of permanent surveillance.147
For their part, the Fusion Centers are accused of collecting low-quality intelligence while
simultaneously spying on lawful activities.148 Mirroring assessments from the United Kingdom, the US
resilience approach is also charged with facilitating covert spying by intelligence agencies. The updated
2016 plan for countering violent extremism declares that its activities “do not include gathering
intelligence or performing investigations for the purpose of criminal prosecution.”149 It further
emphasizes that federal law enforcement agencies “have safeguards in place to ensure there is an
appropriate separation between community outreach and intelligence gathering or criminal
investigations.”150 Nonetheless, the strategy is intended to facilitate early detection and response,
which includes police intervention. A letter from the FBI regarding Shared Responsibility Committees—
groups formed voluntarily to provide interventions short of law enforcement—states that information
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may be widely shared with policing and intelligence authorities.151 Overall, the approach aims to
complement, not replace, traditional policing and intelligence efforts (the FBI maintains widespread use
of informants). 152 Even cities touted as models of resilience, such as Los Angeles, still combine it with
infiltration methods. 153
The Bigger Picture
While distinct agencies take the lead in collaborating with, and integrating, the private sector
and civil society into detection and warning capabilities, the overarching goal is to link them into a
holistic view of the state body. An instructive example is the Homeland Security Information Network,
which in 2006 became the primary system for sharing sensitive but unclassified information in real time,
across DHS and its partners to deal with planned events and “incident management.”154 Incidents range
from active shooter situations and biological attacks to criminal activity, protests, natural disasters, and
public health outbreaks. In 2016 this network reported having more than 69,000 users, including more
than 8,900 law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, among them the National Network of Fusion
Centers.155 It was reportedly used to disseminate information during unplanned protests in Phoenix,
Arizona.156 This ability to monitor and detect a broad range of indicators fully resembles global disease
surveillance as well as the immune system. Its capability will likely become more coherent as data
sharing and detection move towards greater automation.
Automating Detection
As I have explained, surveillance and detection are at the heart of containment strategies. The
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model is rooted in clinical medicine, namely in the ability to detect signs of infection by looking and
listening for symptoms. The need to look and listen is reflected historically in efforts to detect the
invisible flow of plague by isolation of suspect bodies, inspections, and networks of surveillance and
spies. The need has remained constant, the modes of containment have evolved. Although efforts to
detect contagion have expanded to a wider array of symptoms and have pushed deeper into the body
politic, looking and listening are still required—along with the cooperation of bodies. The approach
continues to face limitations. While the number of incidents detected early and contained is uncertain,
detection can clearly fail. Recent high-profile failures include the San Bernardino terrorist attack in 2015
and the viral spread of the WannaCry ransomware computer virus in 2017. Moreover, despite ongoing
efforts to engage and integrate the private sector and civil society into centralized state processes,
cooperation remains a problem. The panoptic dream has not yet been realized, but automation may
change the present picture.
Public health initiatives in detection are a major inspiration behind cyber resilience. Such efforts
are increasingly automated, using software to troll public sources for signs of contagion. Similarly,
automating cooperation is an explicit goal of cyber resilience. A 2011 White Paper envisioned
automation as permitting continuous monitoring of devices, similar to smoke detectors, in order to
maintain a “healthy cyber ecosystem” akin to the human immune system.157
In the long term, automatic monitoring could evade the challenge of consent and cooperation.
To that end, DHS has conducted research on creating an “integrated, autonomous ecosystem” that
automatically detects and responds to threats.158 This system would not need universal participation;
perhaps only 30-35 percent of devices would have to cooperate.159 In the near term, more automation is
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being pursued through participation agreements. For example, DHS promotes its “free Automated
Indicator Sharing (AIS) capability” that allows “the exchange of cyber threat indicators between the
Federal Government and the private sector at machine speed.”160 As well, after WannaCry, there is a
push to formalize collaboration with critical private sector entities by agreements that pre-clear DHS to
monitor networks.161 This reflects FEMA’s use of social media monitoring, which circumvents direct
consent and engagement by providing broad, unlimited access to data. Not surprisingly, access to big
data is driving consideration of alternative approaches to detecting signs of radicalization and terrorism.
The Obama White House reportedly met with leaders of large social technology companies following the
San Bernardino attack to probe the possibility of using their platforms for detection.162 This is only one
instance of big data probing individual bodies.163
As noted in the previous chapter, this shift toward automating the collection of data suggests a
continued evolution in the image of body, toward one that is informational. I will come to the
implications of this shift later. For now, I want to comment on big data in this context.164 In contrast to
the drive to understand causes, big data is said to represent a revolution, offering a new type of
knowledge “akin to the translation or interpretation of signs rather than that of understanding chains of
causation.”165 This is precisely how clinical medicine works and how surveillance for detection works,
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namely by watching and listening for signs and symptoms. Big data can automate this activity. It can
expand the vision, possibly realizing the panoptic dream. It can circumvent the cooperation of bodies.
But there is resistance to reaching sight.166 Moreover, it does not represent a new mode knowledge,
particularly in the context of containment. In fact, containment has never been about knowledge of root
causes. From the plague to urban unrest, cyber viruses, and radicalization, it has always been about
translating signs of contagion—disease, disorder, and Otherness—into bodies to be controlled and
contained. Containment itself, which vacillates between hardware and hygiene, is therefore the subject
of the next chapter.

Coming of Age of Posthumanism,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43, no. 3 (June 2015): 833–51,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829815576817.
166
Larry Greenemeier, “A Quick Guide to the Cybersecurity Bill Passed by the U.S. Senate,” Scientific American,
October 28, 2018, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-quick-guide-to-the-senate-s-newly-passedcybersecurity-bill/.

114

CHAPTER FOUR— Controlling Milieu: Hygiene over Hardware
Foremost among these containment strategies, public health and hygiene seek to rectify
the irreducible gap between the individual body and the social body, between individual property
and le bonheur de tous, all in the interest of the sovereign nation itself.1
Hygiene…is made up of an accumulation of advice, precautions, recipes, opinions, statistics,
remedies, regulations, anecdotes, case studies. It is, indeed, an accumulation.2

Hygiene over Hardware
In 1967 the US Defense Science Board warned of the limited ability to impose security controls
on distributed networks of computer systems, which could not be physically protected or isolated in an
open, fluid environment.3 Defence would have to come from “hygiene” or good practices rather than
from hardware or engineering.4 In this chapter I argue that the emphasis on hygiene over hardware is
the epitome of resilience as an immune system approach to containing contagion. Like surveillance and
detection, hygiene is embedded in medical and military strategies of spatial control that I associate with
the concept of a milieu—a physical and social setting or environment. Milieu applies to the control of
social and political space, the fluid interior of the biological body, and even cybernetic space, reflecting
the overlap of modes of containment across the body. They are linked by hygiene, which seeks to
control behaviour through the circulation of information. This process is reflected in biological
understandings of the immune system, but is literally as old as the plague.
Although controlling the milieu can mean trying to impose physical changes on the environment
as a space of viral circulation – hardware – it is commonly achieved through social control by promoting
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hygiene and best practices. The two are complimentary. But hygiene steps in where hardware fails. I
contend that resilience is premised on controlling contagious disordering processes by leveraging social
relationships forged through engagement and trust-building interventions described in Chapter Two to
influence behaviour across cyber resilience, community resilience, and civic resilience. Mirroring similar
shifts in public health, hygiene practices are evolving. They are accompanied by a higher level of
intervention targeting vulnerable bodies, and the provision of greater amounts of information in what
amounts to a deluge. Like the immune system, they incorporate continuous and real-time
communication intended to automate behaviour. Yet they remain buttressed by more coercive control
measures and, in the case of cyber, a vision of a more secure architecture reminiscent of quarantine.
Milieu and Hygiene: the Field of Intervention
Containment involves maintaining control of the inner environment of the body and the body
politic. Capturing the relationship between the body as biological and as a social and political space,
milieu is “simultaneously social and natural, political and biological.”5 As a social setting, milieu is key in
Foucauldian approaches to biopolitics and the governing of populations; it is the “field of intervention.”6
Created through governance, the milieu is
a space of artificial or natural elements, a space of uncertainty, a space wherein circulation is
conducted and a space that is naturally enclosed. The milieu is the target of intervention and
reflects the margin of problems being addressed. Protection of the core or interior from the
exterior occurs through the formulation of a securitised milieu.7
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Milieu is also a biomedical concept. Claude Bernard, a French physiologist, coined the term milieu
intérieur—the environment within—to describe “the extra-cellular fluid environment,” and its
“physiological capacity to ensure protective stability for the tissues and organs of multicellular
organism.”8 Within the medical community, the concept moved the focus of disease from the body’s
external, social environment to its internal environment, defined by the circulation of blood.9 Circulation
was linked to the immune system. Bernard believed that “when the quality of the milieu intérieur is just
right the blood and lymph flow [freely] . . . of unwanted substances or toxins . . . and so too do the white
cells of the immune system, vigorous and efficient.”10 It informed the immunity paradigm of bodily
defence. Just as population governance aims to intervene in the social milieu, vaccines were a means of
changing the body’s inner environment, making it less hospitable to virulent circulation.11
The image of the flowing immune system is further reflected in contemporary views of constant
communication to detect signs of contagion and relay instructions for containment through a signaling
network.12 Although elements of the system are distributed and autonomous, they are nonetheless
connected by networks of bodily tissue, an “innervated organ” communicates with the nervous
system.13 This way of understanding control of milieu has been adopted within cybernetics to reflect
internal communication processes and Norbert Wiener’s conception of cybernetics as a central nervous
system for self-regulation.14 It is also linked to warfare. Rebecca Lemov describes military efforts at
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milieu control through information warfare, where “fine-tuned control and circulation of messages” is
embedded in “a systems approach to coercion” that sees the individual-within-the-environment as a set
of circulating messages.”15 Ben Anderson links control of information to counter-insurgency
interventions aimed at ambiguous and vulnerable populations, which he labels “environmental
warfare.”16 In turn Kevin Grove links it to resilience strategies and deployment of knowledge to
vulnerable populations aimed at avoiding maladaptive or undesirable behaviours.17 Likewise Jon Coaffee
ties resilience to “a constant stream of nationally derived guidance.”18 David Chandler connects this
practice to the “inculcation” of appropriate responses to crises as part of an inward focus on selfregulation.19 In some ways, it resembles the assertion that resilience intervenes in the name of
enhancement.20 But enhancement should be understood in terms of knowledge aimed at shaping
behaviour as directed by the state. It manages but does not ameliorate vulnerability.
Hygiene captures this approach to control through the circulation of information. Foucault
called hygiene the “medicine of the milieu of existence.”21 Although it originally meant good health,
hygiene has evolved into a “science of engineering human behavior,”22 what Stuart Elden describes as
the “political-scientific control of the environment.”23 In public health, individual hygiene is a form of
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micro-environmentalism aimed at internalizing control through “the responsibility of individuals for
their own conduct, safety, and health.”24 It controls the spread of disease by directing behaviour. This
control functions through the circulation of information. Accordingly, WHO defines hygiene as the
promotion of voluntary practices to “maintain health and prevent the spread of disease.”25 The US
pandemic plan views it as guiding the public to respond appropriately and to comply with public health
measures.26 In sum, hygiene is a form of social control.27
From a network perspective, this focus on information to direct behaviour is a protocol28
defined as a form of decentralized control, “a set of recommendations and rules that outline specific
technical standards.”29 Within computer networks, protocol directs flows of information.30 But the idea
of protocol is not new and refers to “any type of correct or proper behaviour within a specific system of
conventions.”31 In other words, protocol closely approximates hygiene. It is central to containment,
providing an essential link between the body politic and the biological body. Yet protocol also alludes to
tensions between these spaces as it spans the spatial contradiction between “radically distributed
control to autonomous locales” and “rigidly defined hierarchies.”32 Similarly, Ed Cohen asserts that
“public health and hygiene seek to rectify the irreducible gap between the individual body and the social
body, between individual property and le Bonheur de tous, all in the interest of the sovereign nation
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itself.”33 Below I will trace the role of hygiene as a means of social control to contain contagion, against
the backdrop of hardware measures.
Public Health: From Hardware to Hygiene
Hardware is the classic military mode of defence by force. An engineering approach to the
control of milieu and the circulation of disease, quarantine—particularly the cordone sanitaire—is the
epitome of hardware approaches to defence by restricting the flow of bodies from the outside-in. Like
quarantine, the concept of hygiene is as old as the plague. As early as the medieval Salernitan Regimen
of Health, guidance has been offered for living a healthy life.34 Quarantine itself was entwined with
cleanliness and hygiene. Restricting movement co-existed with fumigating ships and disinfecting
homes.35 Groups targeted for quarantine were deemed “most susceptible to lack of hygiene and
therefore needful of public health interventions . . . as sites for the breeding of disease and contagion
that continually threatened to spill out into other, respectably ‘clean’ groups in society.”36
The rise of the printing press help widen the behavioural focus by the publication and
distribution of information, as witnessed for instance in England’s Plague Orders of 1666, “An advice set
down by the best learned in physick within the kingdome of England. Containing sundry good rules and
easie medicines, without charge to the meaner sort of people, as well for their preservation from the
plague before infection, as for the curing and ordering of them after they shall bee infected.”37 Later, the
Enlightenment included an international health education movement that distributed advice literature
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and home medical guides on hygiene.38 These materials were also used to control the spread of
infectious disease. In France, instructions populaires were distributed to households during times of
cholera to, among other things, “maintain the healthfulness of both domestic and public spaces.”39 The
emphasis on personal hygiene, which was a term “used to describe the collection of practices and
knowledges which were believed to preserve health,”40 linked the behaviour of individual bodies to the
cleanliness and social order of the surrounding environment.41
Public health measures to control disease certainly employ hardware, including large projects to
provide sanitation, housing, and clean water, in addition to coercive measures such as quarantine.
Nevertheless, they rely heavily on influencing personal hygiene. Germ theory and models of immunity
further underscore the individual and the “domestic or inner environment” as sites of intervention, 42
the milieu intérieur. Particularly in the United States, the focus on sanitation was never as prevalent as
the control of bodies.43 Beyond public health, however, hygiene is also linked to national defence and
the fitness of the population.44 This blending of public health, national defence, and hygiene stands out
in a 1930s advertisement for Scot Tissue Towels, titled “Is Your Washroom Breeding Bolsheviks?,”
suggesting that poor hygiene facilities might anger and radicalize employees.45 Indeed, hygiene
measures emerged as the key form of domestic containment under the model of immunity during the
Cold War—an American interpretation of the British “keep calm and carry on” mantra.
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Keep Calm and Carry on: Civil Defence as Hygiene
The key threat to national survival during the Cold War (and arguably today) was the atomic
bomb. As discussed in Chapter One, it imposed a limit on physical defence of the nation, giving rise
instead to deterrence as the central pillar of external containment, and to civil defence as a mode of
social immunity at home. Civil defence was predicated on hygiene. The elite few had secret bunkers, the
majority were left exposed. Civil defence was used to maintain social order and control, and to inoculate
against panic. As noted in a special edition of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “A good many of the
problems of civil defence are those of predicting and influencing human behaviour in time of
emergency.”46 It was critical to ensure that the public was “neither too paralyzed nor too frenzied to
carry out the necessary activities.”47 This was achieved largely through a public education campaign,
described as “social technology for emotional control” intended to teach people how to “channel fear to
support containment.”48 It was advertised to the public in terms of learning to be “panic stoppers.”49
This “national, mass education apparatus” was designed, coordinated, and “overtly
administered” by the federal government.50 Amanda Dory refers to this as “risk education,” which she
argues is the foundation of civil security through voluntary, informed public action.51 Jackie Orr claims
that the national initiative both produced and controlled panic by collapsing the fields of mental health
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and national security.52 Organizers hoped “the right mixture of research data and marketing strategies
would yield an effective serum against panic, apathy, and outright resistance.”53
The school system was central to the messaging,54 as was the distribution of leaflets and
propaganda films. Reinforcing principles of containment, the core message was to stay calm, which the
Federal Civil Defense Agency (FCDA) saw as an aspect of “mental hygiene.”’55 Indeed, efforts to control
panic were fully entangled with hygiene in both content and method. The FCDA film The House in the
Middle stresses the importance of cleanliness and the hazards of houses in disrepair, producing “an
image of a state that treats nuclear crisis as it would an infectious disease or natural disaster.”56 Such
propaganda films mainstreamed health education as a way to mobilize citizens.57
This focus on hygiene marked its growing role as an all-hazards strategy for coping with a
“changing world,” as explained in a 1966 pamphlet distributed to schools. The publication asserted that
“despite changing forms of dangers” the “hazards of living . . . can still be modified or controlled by
action.”58 The education campaign cajoled the public to get involved in civil defence.59 As with
surveillance, control of behaviour stressed real-time communication with the public. The network of
local wardens described in the previous chapter would deliver continuous situational information to
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local communities.60 This included controlling the circulation of information and stemming rumors.61
Public education and crisis communication retain their prominence in contemporary disease control
measures today.
Resilience: Keep Calm in Real Time
Hygiene is still an integral tool of containment in both public health and national defence. In an
age of emerging and re-emerging disease, it is the primary means of controlling the circulation of viral
infections such as the flu. Indeed, the CDC’s central message is that “Good health habits can help stop
germs.”62 Content as well as form have stayed consistent: handwashing and social distancing remain
best practices. However, there is a spatial and temporal shift in delivering the message. A stronger effort
is now made to target populations perceived as vulnerable, such as children, pregnant women, seniors,
and native populations,63 and to leverage social networks to communicate the message more directly as
a way to encourage appropriate actions.64 Social media, discussed in the previous chapter, is another
tool used to “expand reach, foster engagement and increase access to credible, science-based health
messages.”65
As in surveillance and detection capabilities, there is more emphasis now on real-time
communication and control efforts. WHO refers to this as ‘risk communication:’ “the dynamic process of
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sharing and responding to information about a public health threat.”66 “A well-informed population is
more likely to cooperate with advice for reducing the spread of disease.”67 Of course, voluntary hygiene
measures are backstopped with coercive measures, such as the isolation and quarantine used to control
SARS and Ebola.68 Indeed, hygiene is used to buttress hardware. The US pandemic influenza plan asserts
that disease containment depends on a public that “understands the dangers of pandemic influenza and
accepts the potential need for control measures like self-isolation and quarantine that prevent disease
spread by reducing social contact.69
These continuities and shifts are paralleled in the approach to resilience within the Department
of Homeland Security, and are echoed in research by RAND that explicitly links national security,
resilience, and public health. RAND views education as delivering “ongoing information to the public
about preparedness, risks, and resources before, during, and after a crisis.” It is a key lever of
community resilience and has “communication information” as a core component.70 Advocates of
resilience, as we have seen, stress communication and information.71
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Hygiene over hardware remains crucial for containing viral flows, not only for the Internet but in
the context of disasters and radicalization.
Resilience as Cyber Hygiene
The Internet’s early hygiene-over-hardware design is reinforced by resilience as a mode of
containment, which stresses the distribution of information on threats and the promotion of best
practices. Communication extends to the public in the form of measures put forth in the 2003 National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which includes “awareness, education, and training” to “empower all
Americans—businesses, the general workforce, and the general population—to secure their own parts
of cyberspace” by raising awareness and offering information on threats and vulnerabilities.72 To this
end, a Cyber Security Awareness Month offers “an opportunity to further engage public and private
sector stakeholders to create a safe, secure, and resilient cyber environment.”73 The month-long
campaign issues tips for staying safe and enhancing security of cyber systems. More recently it has been
joined by an ongoing national “Stop.Think.Connect” campaign that explicitly challenges the public to be
more vigilant about practicing good “cyber hygiene.”74 Public posters proclaim “Reduce. Reuse. Recycle.
Cough into your elbow. Be a good online citizen.” Others read “Eat a balanced diet. Get enough exercise.
Keep a clean machine.” And, harking back to popular civil defence messages, another one says “Loose
lips sink ships. Keep calm, carry on. Safe for you, secure for all.”75 This approach to hygiene and good
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practice is paralleled in relationships with the private sector, including a growing capability for real-time
communication and response.
Along with calling for private sector contributions to system surveillance, the 1998 Presidential
Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) required distributing sanitized intelligence reports, threat warnings, and
information for additional protection measures to the private sector through the National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC).76 Although later disbanded, the center’s aim is elaborated in the 2006
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) calling for “multidirectional information sharing between
and across government and industry” including details of best practices.77 The flow of information from
government to industry remains the state’s primary way to influence behaviour within critical
infrastructure systems. As described in testimony on response capability, “Protecting this infrastructure
against growing and evolving cyber threats requires a layered approach. The government’s role is to
share information and encourage enhanced security and resilience, while identifying and addressing
gaps not filled by the marketplace.”78 The goal is to encourage and enable voluntary action through
knowledge interventions.
Such interventions are made through the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(US-CERT), which issues alerts about software vulnerabilities and security patches, tips for best practices
aimed at the general public, and in-depth articles on specific topics.79 Information is tailored for control
system users, government users, and home and business users. For operators of critical infrastructure,
there is a separate portal, ICS-CERT (Industrial Control Services Cyber Emergency Response Team). The
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ICS-CERT Monitor promotes “preparedness, information sharing, and collaboration with the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors.”80 Operators are invited to participate in the National Cybersecurity
Communications and Integration Center (NCCIC) described in the previous chapter. In addition to
collecting surveillance data, the NCCIC’s information sharing mechanisms comprise “websites, portals,
written reports, and meetings which are available to provide accurate and actionable threat and tactical
information.”81 The center also runs training and exercise programs.82 The NCCIC takes the lead in
coordinating responses, and may ask critical infrastructure operators to provide support.83 Generally, it
shares information with the private sector to build awareness as part of a 24/7 response center.84 DHS
created the Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) in 2011 under the NCCIC
mandate. It publishes Indicator Bulletins on new threats several times a week, an in-depth Analysis
Report with detection and remediation advice, a Priority Alert on a specific threat, and Recommended
Practices.85 In its first two years it had released more than 900 products containing approximately
18,000 cyber threat indicators.86
Despite these efforts, reports by the GAO in 2008 and 2011 identified public communication as
an ongoing weakness of US cybersecurity, noting that warnings and alerts “are not consistently
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actionable or timely”87 and that the plethora of guidance is overwhelming and not targeted to the
specific needs of individual sectors.88 The 2011 Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future envisions the
creation of a “base for distributed security” by providing “individuals with tools, tips, education, training,
awareness, and other resources appropriate to their positions that enable them to implement existing
cybersecurity features and configurations in protocols, products, and services.”89 The distribution of
information received renewed focus in the 2013 Executive Order 13636 “Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” which calls for increasing the “volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber
threat information” shared with private sector entities.90 To this end, DHS established “sharelines” in
June 2013 to “facilitate the creation and dissemination of unclassified cyber threat reports to targeted
private sector entities owned or operating within the United States, as well as Federal, State, local,
tribal, and territorial partners” in a timely manner.91
This integration of the private sector into national response capabilities indicates more than a
passive provision of information. Cyber resilience involves a higher level of intervention to promote and
direct hygienic responses to threats. Critical infrastructure operators, for example, can access a Cyber
Security Evaluation Tool (CSET®) providing “a systematic and repeatable approach for assessing the
security posture of their cyber systems and networks.”92 In 2016 it conducted 39 high-level security
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posture evaluations.93 The National Institute of Standards and Technology has also created a voluntary
Cybersecurity Framework composed of “standards, guidelines, and best practices” released in 2014.94
DHS launched a ‘C Cubed’ Voluntary Program to encourage implementation of the framework, which
operates through existing channels developed through trust and engagement initiatives such as the
Sector-Specific Agencies to deliver information for self-assessments and guidance on implementation.95
Moreover, the 2009 Cyber Policy Review called for a national education campaign to create IT skills, akin
to the global science race after the launch of Sputnik in 1957.96
Although there is certainly a robust effort to enhance the virtual security of cyber networks (the
operating milieu), the focus is more on hygiene rather than on changes to the environment itself. Thus,
a DHS White Paper on distributed cyber security touts the importance of “‘healthy’ cyber participants”
who might have continuing access to a range of education, training, and awareness opportunities.”97 In
other words, healthy people are well informed to take appropriate action to limit contagion: cyber
incidents “can result from the actions, or inactions, of a single individual. When engaged and educated,
individuals, families, and households can greatly reduce the impact, disruption, and damage caused by a
cyber event.”98
Two decades after the initial move in this direction, a 2017 report by the President’s National
Infrastructure Advisory Council cites the lack of information sharing between the government and
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private sector as the key reason limiting the ability to “move actionable information to the right people
at the speed required by cyber threats.”99 Ongoing challenges with hygiene are prompting
reconsideration of the need for a new system design—a new hardware approach—to defend critical
operating networks.
Community Resilience: Think Before You Act
The cyber analogy of healthy communities and healthy people extends to community resilience.
With the revival of civil defence came a like revival of the hygiene approach to safety, preparedness, and
protection-by-pamphlet. One of the first initiatives of DHS was the creation of the Ready.gov citizen
preparedness website in February 2003 and the national Ready Campaign.100 The information provided
is consistent with Cold War civil defence. People are told to “Be Informed; Make a Plan; Build a Kit; and
Get Involved.”101 The site provides fact sheets, planning tools, and checklists to help families, small
businesses, and children be aware of the dangers of terrorist attacks, pandemics, and natural
disasters.102 One publication, “Are You Ready? An In-Depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness,” outlines
risks, preparations, and appropriate responses to 20 different types of emergencies.103 Control of fear
and panic is a primary aim,104 and the overall message echoes Cold War hygiene: “Above all, stay calm,
be patient and think before you act.”105
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In addition, there is an emphasis on targeting vulnerable bodies for hygiene interventions—on
reaching the unreached. A number of materials target immigrants, and there are fun activities such as
colouring, games, and stories to engage children.106 Schools continue to be important. FEMA has
developed a National Strategy for Youth Preparedness Education that encourages government and nongovernment organizations to “provide comprehensive disaster education to children throughout the
nation.”107
Hurricane Katrina and the focus on community resilience amplified risk education,
resourcefulness, and appropriate reactions to crises.108 FEMA’s Whole Community approach seeks to
“fully engage our entire societal capacity” because a government-centric effort is not enough to respond
to catastrophe.109 This implies more state intervention to inculcate resilience capacities. For example,
FEMA’s strategic plan aims to “strengthen the Nation‘s resilience to disasters. FEMA must enable
individuals, families, and communities to withstand disruption, absorb or tolerate disturbance, act
effectively in a crisis, adapt to changing conditions, and grow stronger over time.”110 As well, the 2011
National Preparedness Goal invokes the idea of a “secure and resilient nation with the capabilities
required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover
from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”111 Creating these capabilities mostly involves
the promotion of hygiene.
As FEMA explains, resilience requires engaging the community in the planning process in order
to increase the understanding of threats and hazards and to communicate the actions to undertake in
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an emergency.112 Engagement increases the likelihood that people will take appropriate measures. Thus
FEMA’s national response framework stresses delivering “well-developed public information, education
strategies, and communication plans” to “diverse audiences in a consistent, accessible, and timely
manner.”113 Similarly, the Citizen Corps initiative under DHS encourages people to participate in
preparedness through its public education, training opportunities, and volunteer programs.114 Targeting
vulnerable populations, the Florida Health Department recently worked with Centers for Independent
Living and other organizations to help 3,521 vulnerable individuals complete personal emergency
preparedness plans.115
In addition, there is also a move toward polite, persistent prompting through social media.
Disaster relief organizations such as FEMA operate Facebook and Twitter accounts to relay tips and
information on hazards and best practices to the public, including five Facebook pages and 24 Twitter
accounts. 116 FEMA’s Twitter account issues preparedness reminders through #TipTuesday. More
importantly, social media communications are being employed to circulate information for directing
public responses to disasters in real time. In its 2012 progress report, FEMA emphasized the role of
“omni-directional knowledge sharing” which employs “all relevant forums, networks” so that
“information created and distributed by government remains relevant to the public in complex
information and media environments.” This requires “staying abreast of the rapidly evolving world of
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social networks and knowing how to leverage their power and influence.”117
To this end, FEMA offers training on how to “master skills to disseminate information and
monitor, track, measure, and analyze social media traffic,”118 and it is developing a rumor control
webpage to mitigate the consequences of misinformation.119 The importance of controlling rumors was
noted after Hurricane Katrina.120 Combating the flood of misinformation in the wake of Hurricane Sandy
was replicated after recent disasters in Oklahoma and Texas, with this message: “Rumors spread fast:
please tell a friend, share this page and help us provide accurate information about the types of
assistance available.”121
Beyond attention to information control and promotion of best practices, there is an effort to
build greater community capacity for response. Community Emergency Response Teams, for example,
train volunteers to organize themselves and others in the wake of a disaster, provide immediate
assistance to victims, and collect intelligence to assist first responders.122 Government agencies are also
preparing for and containing the effects on at-risk populations such as the homeless. As one emergency
manager said, “Every population that you don’t plan for before disaster is a population that will take up
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90% of your allocated resources during a disaster.”123 Similarly, a factsheet on preparedness and
response for extremely obese people published by the Florida Health department notes that particular,
pre-existing behavioural health vulnerabilities can be exacerbated during a disaster and must be part of
a plan to care for them.124
Moreover, there is growing recognition of structural impediments to disaster response and
containment. After Hurricane Sandy, FEMA’s Community Resilience Indicators project included a focus
on reducing long-term vulnerabilities.”125 However, only one of the indicators pertains to changing
design standards and it is aimed only at infrastructure.126 While the project states that there are
numerous resources to support community capacity building 127 and acknowledges poverty as “an
ongoing stress that is amplified in times of disaster,” it really falls to the poor themselves to prepare in
advance, make plans, and “act on lessons learned . . . the next time around,”128 and to join in a
“preparathon”!129 Emphasis is on limiting the systemic effects of vulnerability, not changing its internal
composition.
Hygiene-over-hardware is thus an appropriate way to characterize the resilience approach.
However, just as in the Cold War, its effectiveness is questionable. The amount of information can be
overwhelming. The majority of the population is still not “prepared” for an emergency.130 During a crisis,
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messages and best practice sometimes conflict, as in the case of evacuation orders during Hurricane
Harvey in 2017.131 Coercive containment measures—such as FEMA’s crowd control training—lurk in the
background of hygiene.132
Civic Resilience: Hygiene as Consent for Hardware
Civic resilience as a means to combat the circulation of extremist ideas and the lure of
radicalization rests on an approach similar what I described above in respect to disasters, namely
delivering hygienic messages through trust and engagement outreach. The official strategy to counter
violent extremism (CVE) is modeled largely on the FBI’s Building Communities of Trust program, which
stresses sharing information with communities so that they can help prevent crime and terrorism.133
Both the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2011 CVE strategy emphasize that “well-informed and
-equipped families, communities, and local institutions represent the best defence against terrorist
ideologies.”134 In 2010 the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) developed Community Awareness
Briefings to educate parents and community leaders about terrorist recruitment and how to combat
extremist narratives.135 The briefings seek to “catalyze community efforts on prevention.”136 They also
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stress the role of communities in containing threats. For example, a 2015 briefing declares that “there is
often a time period, before law enforcement gets involved, in which parents, friends,
community/religious leaders, and teachers see signs of someone being radicalized to violence, creating a
window of opportunity for them to act to protect their communities.”137 The FBI’s “Don’t Be a Puppet”
portal offers information on extremism and recruitment, and where to get help.138 Other community
briefings and safety tips include information on Internet safety.139
However, this hygiene approach is thoroughly integrated to support the state’s coercive or
“hard” containment measures. This relationship is evident in the revised 2016 CVE implementation plan,
which details the process to “build expertise and skills for preventing violent extremism.” It states that
Depending on the need, training and presentations may include: descriptions of the types of
violent extremism and recruitment narratives used by violent extremist groups; factors that are
often found in cases of radicalization to violent extremism; intervention methods; and ways to
prevent recruitment and build resilience. They may also include information on specific
resources, such as how to deliver the Community Awareness Briefing or facilitate a Community
Resilience Exercise, both of which are tools used to foster dialogue, address grievances, and
enhance relationships between law enforcement and local communities.”140
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As noted in my discussion of surveillance and detection, a core message about the warning signs of
radicalization is to go to police. Similarly, most of the down flow of information to communities is aimed
at building consent for counter-terrorism activities. This is clearly seen in the extensive outreach
programs run by the DHS, DOJ, and FBI, which listen to grievances while stressing civil rights.141 The
goal, to “deepen channels of communication between communities and federal officials in order to
facilitate solution of problems,”142 entails building networks of community contacts. In addition to
serving as a means of collecting intelligence, the FBI uses them to disseminate information when
requesting support for an investigation. FBI field offices “identify and develop relationships with
community leaders and other individuals who . . . may be helpful conduits of information to the
community at large.”143 This network of contacts can then be used “on short notice to deliver a message
to their community in the event there is a threat or operational activity impacting that community.” 144
The network can also assist the Bureau with an investigation, address concerns about its activities, and
provide additional details on crime statistics. This approach was used during the 2009 investigation of
Najibullah Zazi, who planned an attack against the New York subway.145 Similarly, Incident
Communication Coordination Teams used by the DHS can quickly engage with affected communities in
the aftermath of a terrorist act or “homeland security incident.”146 These varieties of communication
help build consent rather than enhance the community’s response capacity.
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Although the language of resilience may celebrate empowering the community and building its
capacity, the reality is that the actions of CVE mainly bolster the work of policing and intelligence
agencies. A 2016 survey of outreach and engagement activities coordinated under the Department of
Justice indicates that only about one-third have trained communities to prevent extremism. A similar
amount of training supports enhanced cultural awareness and engagement capabilities for law
enforcement. And only five percent of offices provided funding to community groups to counter violent
extremism.147 Most information on terrorism is shared within the government, not with the public.148
Finally, while extensive government research is being conducted on communities to gain insights into
the process of radicalization,149 the studies are “secretive and covert” and not shared with affected
communities.150
Moreover, a 2014 Congressional Research Services report observes an absence of guidance for
communities on how to intervene or even how to find grants to support community-led interventions.151
Most civil society organizations struggle to find the funds or capacity to engage in the type of prevention
and resilience activities supported by CVE policy.152 The Brennan Center for Justice concludes that while
CVE intervention programs are framed as community-led efforts, in practice they are “mostly led,
funded, and administered by law enforcement agencies,” increasing the likelihood of being used for
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policing and intelligence purposes.153 The African Immigrant Muslim Community Outreach Program
(AIMCOP) in Minnesota is a clear example. Funded in 2009, it supported police engagement with the
Somali community through, for example, the Police Athletic League, while simultaneously conducting
intelligence and enforcement activities.154
Nevertheless, there is a growing emphasis on developing community-led interventions. For
example, a recent pilot program in Minnesota used two models of intervention: one working within the
school system and one working within the community. Both “will be successful” because they are
“community-driven and community owned.”155 Likewise, the 2016 CVE implementation strategy,
stressing community-led interventions to “disrupt the radicalization process before an individual
engages in criminal activity,”156 was supported by a $15 million appropriation in the 2016 federal
budget. However, most of the funding was directed at policing institutions.157 Thus, while agreeing that
containing radicalization is best suited to local communities, resilience programming is predominantly
aimed at enhancing the ability of police and intelligence agencies to conduct counter-terrorism
operations. Moreover, while environmental and structural causes of radicalization such as poverty and
marginalization are also generally acknowledged, they are not addressed by the CVE strategy.158 Instead,
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resilience is still largely a matter of hygiene, and hygiene a matter of consent for harder containment
practices.
Beyond Hygiene? Automation and Architecture
In this chapter I have explored containing contagion through control of bodies, behaviour, and
circulation of information. The general strategy can be ascribed to long-standing medical approaches to
hygiene, and is associated with the political, biological, and cybernetic concept of milieu as an
environment of circulation. Moreover, it sees the immune system as a network of communication that
detects harmful microorganisms and sends signals to the body to direct the appropriate response. This is
the model for resilience, but as I have stressed, it is not new. Like contemporary public health
approaches to hygiene, resilience does not imply a novel mode of governing, but it does intensify
existing hygiene efforts in trying to integrate vulnerable bodies into the fold of appropriate behaviour,
and to communicate and direct responses in real time. As I have explained, it does this by leveraging
relationships established through engagement and trust. Hygiene is thus another means of closing the
gap between biological bodies and the body politic through which contagion flows.
However, the ability to contain and control behaviour, and to shape the milieu of circulation,
with strategies of information and hygiene remains limited. This is why moves are now afoot to enact
further control, especially over the cyber environment, where the vision is both to automate responses
and to build a more secure architecture. An automated, designed-in approach to system resilience is
envisioned in the Blueprint for cyber security, which anticipates that future network architects “will
understand current and emerging threats and will design information and communication systems to
cope with a range of contingencies; modeling, simulation, and exercises will enable the identification
and mitigation of cascading impacts.”159 Steps toward automation include the “cyber hygiene service”
provided by the National Cybersecurity Assessment and Technical Services (NCATS), which offers a “Risk
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and Vulnerability Assessment” and a “Cyber Hygiene” evaluation, both intended to help organizations
better understand opportunities for penetration and improve system resiliency.160 A Cyber Hygiene
evaluation, mandatory for all federal government agencies and departments, is offered free of charge to
all private entities. An authorization form indicates that the scanning is a continuous process.161 In 2015
the service reportedly worked with 53 private companies.162
More significantly, the vision of resilience in the White Paper on distributed security is to enable
automatic responses to perceived vulnerabilities across connected devices.163 Like the immune system
and the human body, cyber networks are intended to be self-healing. The first steps in this initiative are
evident in the Enterprise Automated Security Environment program for government departments.164
Thus far it is mainly a way of thinking about how to automate a self-repairing environment.165 A longerterm view includes creating a secure cyber architecture to make the system less open and fluid. Weak
boundaries that allow intrusion are the most prevalent form of cyber weakness,166 thus sparking calls to
isolate critical control systems from the circulation of threats. To this end, the 2015 national cyberspace
strategy calls for developing systems with fewer vulnerabilities.167 As well, the Department of Defense
has called for designing complexity out of government cyber systems, making them easier to secure
through creating a “joint information environment” based on “single security architecture” that would
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integrate 15,000 networks.168 More recently, the President’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council
recommends establishing a “separate, secure communications network specifically designated for the
most critical cyber networks, including ‘dark fiber’ networks for critical control.”169 This way of thinking
not only reveals the limits of hygiene; it also serves as a reminder that it is embedded in harder
containment practices invoked by images of borders and walls and reminiscent of quarantine, or what
Mark Duffield calls them “archipelagos” of elite refuge.170 Not limited to cyber, the continued relevance
of coercion and barriers is evident in the global proliferation of walls.171 Ultimately containment,
including resilience, is about geopolitical defence of the body politic—sometimes at the expense of
individual bodies.
Automating behaviour addresses the limits of community resilience. Here the concept of
“nudge” enters the picture. Popularized by Richard Thaler,172 the concept is institutionalized in the
British government’s Behavioural Insight Team, otherwise known as the Nudge Unit, which has since
evolved into a “social purpose company.”173 The goal is to use insights from behavioural science to
covertly influence public action.174 In public health, nudge strategies are credited with raising
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vaccination rates.175 Reminders such as FEMA’s persistent messages on social media are a form of
nudge.
The idea of automating responses by deploying strategic information is not new, as the history
of hygiene proves. What is new is the emphasis on subliminally influencing behaviours rather than
engaging in open education and persuasion. It points to a push to merge containment of biological
bodies with the interests of the body politic. As David Chandler argues, it raises questions about the
nature of citizenship,176 and its implications are what I must therefore discuss in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE—Recognizing and Producing Self and Citizen: From Animation to Automation
Good pandemic citizens fix their gaze on themselves as a potential vector of disease and take
steps to become guardians of population health through their individual actions.1
Illness is the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship.2

Animating Containment
Identity is at the center of strategies of containment. Not just the identity of threats, Others, or
the external environment but the identity of the Self with a capital-S. As I have been arguing, contagion
is both a spatial, biological process and a social-political process: “individuals always exist among other
individuals, each reciprocally affecting (and infecting) others politically, morally, and biologically.”3
Strategies to contain contagion are thus central to the social contract between the interests of the body
politic and individual bodies.4 The contract is predicated on control of the body as the medium of
contagion in the name of the collective (the whole, the system). It can be challenged by resistance, noncompliance, or “the quarantine evader whose personal convenience bodes collective catastrophe; the
unvaccinated who, themselves benefiting from herd immunity, refuse to contribute to it.”5
The narrative of containment that I have explored thus far focuses on interventions to maintain
command and control over contagion: to harmonize detection and response to disturbances within the
state-as-body. Recognition of this identity automates the immune system within the cellular
composition of the biological body. Within the social body, this Self identity merges the self of the
individual body with the self of the state-body, animating order and control of the body through an
identity imbued with duty and moral obligation. It’s an identity tied to citizenship—to belonging within a
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state or community and adhering to a moral-political code that underpins spaces of order.6 And it
simultaneously identifies who is not Self. It seeks to bridge but does escape the underlying strain
between geopolitical and biological bodies.
In this chapter, I will examine the role of self-identity in strategies of containment, beginning
with “subjection” as a geopolitical concept that ties the state to the bodies within. Shifting to the
biological body, Michel Foucault’s concept of self-subjection traces to moral conduct associated with
one’s duty to God. It’s an identity that animates action. Self-subjection is highly relevant to notions of
health, which have arguably replaced godliness as a moral and civic duty.7 In contrast, disease points to
both a moral failing of the individual self and the obligations of the self as citizen. This dual signaling of
identity was inculcated by civil defence, exalting the loyal citizen to stand against subversion.
Resilience replicates the production of a moral self-identity linked to civic duty. Like health,
resilience speaks to identity and value.8 To be healthy, to be resilient, bespeaks a self-identity imbued
with duty and obligation, reinforcing both the social contract and the notion of the organic body. It
animates containment by connecting individual moral value to social duties and obligations, thereby
activating and signaling selfhood. Yet both resilience and contemporary views of the healthy body imply
an inherent vulnerability associated with fluidity, an ambiguity of the self as both a vector of disease and
a container of contagion. This emphasis on self-vulnerability helps animate containment practices by
motivating corrective behaviour in line with moral and civic identity. Additionally, it makes recognizing
Self a perpetual process.
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In public health this perpetuity means nurturing the self’s identity.9 In immune system language
it is a matter of not only recognizing but also producing Self10 through an iterative process of recreating
and recognizing its boundaries.11 Reflecting concern with failing immunity and auto-immune attacks on
the body, resilience adds emphasis to this recognition, and to integrating and solidifying the body by
making Other more like Self. Like detection and response, however, it represents a shift in form and
depth rather than function. And yet, the duality of identity imbued by vulnerability remains. This dual
identity is applied across all three layers of resilience. The inherent tension is epitomized by the very
notion of “civic” resilience to radicalization and terrorism, where the stigma of vulnerability seems
inescapable and imposes “a more onerous citizenship,” as well as raising questions about the link
between identity and citizenship. Indeed, because the identity of Self involves mutual recognition of
individual biological bodies and the state body, it forms part of a “comprehensive pedagogy of
citizenship”12—not in the legal sense but in the metaphysical sense of ontology, of being.
Emphasis on individual onus resonates with the literature on resilience and citizenship,
particularly in the context of neoliberal governance and the “responsibilization” of citizens for their own
health, well-being, and protection.13 It includes Niklas Rose’s notion of “the will to health.”14 However,
my present discussion focuses mainly on the role of identity in animating self-responsibility, and in the
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connection to moral obligations, duty, and political identity. I will not offer a revised political
understanding of citizenship, or a comprehensive reflection on the relationship of citizenship and
identity. Rather, I want to raise questions about the effects on this relationship. On the one hand,
resilience as an identity linked to civic duty is intrinsically political, and in some ways, introduces a more
onerous form of citizenship arising from the constant need to recognize and reproduce the Self. On the
other, the current drive towards automated forms of containment through information exchange—the
informational immune system—seems to be pushing us into a post-political mode of defence.
Self as a Moral-Political Identity
Although identity is central to geopolitical understandings of containment, the identity of the
Self and who belongs is generally taken for granted, distinguished by its contrast with disease, disorder,
and foreignness. It seems to emerge then as a function of geography. Establishing “boundaries of
citizenship and belonging” is inherent to the geopolitical function of the state,15 which subsumes the
creation of political subjects under the control of territory.16 Indeed, citizenship is said to be an
experience of embodiment, founded on the physical presence of a body within the boundaries of a
state.17 This presence is linked to identity. David Campbell claims citizenship as the “rite of passage from
difference to identity” and the “elimination of alien and foreign.”18 Yet the presence of the internal
Other, and more recently the body as fluid, suggests that the relationship between territory, identity,
and citizenship is not seamless. Employing a biopolitical perspective does not help here, because it
regards population as only a faceless collection of biological bodies, a species and not a Self.
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Here the concept of self-subjection sheds light on the problem. In terms of the state, subjection
is distinct from control of territory and emergence of population. It refers to how diverse individuals
become a homogenous group of political subjects, taking for granted allegiance to, and preservation of,
the state.19 This process conjures notions of nationalism and Benedict Anderson’s “imagined
communities.”20 Feelings of patriotism have of course a long history in warfare and defence of the state,
and production and promotion of identity were central to the global Cold War and America’s national
security strategy of containment.21 Self-subjection, by contrast, is less about creating a national identity
and more about recognizing the individual self within it, and the associated duties and obligations. This
can be more subtle than nationalism. For Foucault, it means recognizing a moral obligation and ethic
that links self-identity to moral order and behaviour.22 While he focused on the ethics of sexuality,23 it is
equally evident in public health, for example in promoting self-care as part of an obligation not to
burden others. It is embedded in citizenship, not as a legal fact or embodied presence but as a general
understanding of what it means to be a citizen24 and to possess a subjective identity.
This self-identity animates containment by connecting the individual to the whole. In public
health literature, Alan Petersen and Deborah Lupton describe this as a link between the civil and the
civic.25 Like hygiene, the civil points to control of the individual body through knowledge of proper social
behaviour that is orderly and refined, while the civic connotes public solidarity and obligations.26 The
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idea of the healthy citizen promotes “capacities for self-regulation as part of both civic duty and duties
to themselves,” including participation in the self-surveillance and hygiene practices described earlier in
this dissertation.27 These ideas reflect what Martin O’Brien and Sue Penna refer to as a “moral-political
code” underpinning social and political order.28 Identity categories signify moral worth.29 “A dual process
of “self-subjectification and self-objectification” individualizes bodies yet ties them to all others.30 This in
turn serves a dual function, activating and signaling the individual as Self. Those who fail to enact the
standards of good citizenship, to conform to surveillance and hygiene, are singled out for additional
supervision and intervention.31 Those who don’t contain are considered contagious.
The point here is that identity and allegiance animate behaviour in tune to moral values and
indications of moral failings. They are created, produced, and signaled—and not always straightforward.
When aligned with state objectives, they reinforce strategies of containment. Yet, as we have seen,
domestic quarantine measures in response to plague in England showed that identity can be fraught and
shifting.
From Godliness to Healthiness
Infectious disease is associated with foreignness and disorder, and with a spatial violation of the
body’s boundaries and identity. It is said to be morally indifferent, striking the noble, wealthy, and godly
as well as the poor.32 But once inside, disease marks difference. Contracting the plague was believed to
be “God’s punishment,”33 a mark of non-compliance, ignorance, and apathy.34 Disease was moral failure
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of self. Historically, God and the state have often conflicted in using quarantine to contain contagion, a
conundrum that unmasks the shifting contours of self-subjection.
Quarantine was presented by the state as a measure for the public good enjoining a public duty,
and violators were punished for threatening public welfare. 35 Resistance was punished, yet resistance
was rife. The wealthy fled while those trapped inside protested. 36 On the one hand, isolating the sick
violated prevailing values rooted in “love, charity, and goodness” to others.37 On the other hand,
complying with inspection and quarantine marked everyone as either diseased or infectious by
association. While a house under quarantine, marked by a red cross, was supposed to attest to health, in
practice it produced stigma long after restrictions were lifted.38 There was a clash between godliness,
public duty, and the identity of the individual self. Instead of producing a moral-political identity,
quarantine served as punishment, and like military conscription it relied heavily on force.
Shifting forms of subjection from God to the state have facilitated disease control, especially
with the growing prominence of hygiene. The focus on hygiene links “physiology and morality” to
“bodies and actions.”39 Hygiene is associated with both individual moral identity and public duty. It is
rooted in a “bourgeois ethos and identity” linked to cleanliness and moral purity, as distinct from the
debased bodies of the poor.40 It is also intimately connected to an image of the family, thereby
heightening a sense of duty. The family becomes an “agent of medicalization”41 through which disease
containment activities such as inoculation evince the family’s moral accountability. Paul Rabinow argues
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that it involves “a private ethic of good health . . . articulated onto a collective system of hygiene”
directed by the state.42
Deborah Lupton justifiably asserts that “healthiness has replaced ‘Godliness’ as a mode of moral
regulation.”43 This notion of health as a form of self-subjection to a public moral order is in some cases
directly tied to both national defence and citizenship. For example, the US requirement that foreign
individuals submit to disease control practices such as vaccination is linked to security of the state and a
requirement of citizenship.44 It marks David Campbell’s “passage from difference to identity.”45 The
association of health, duty to self, and civic duty replicates earlier notions of civil defence.
Civil Defence and Resilience as Civic Duty
American civil defence, as it emerged during World War Two, included notions of health and
physical fitness tied to “an aggressive notion of citizenship” and American greatness.46 It explicitly linked
self-identity and civic duty. Eleanor Roosevelt asserted that civil defence meant “Building upon a sense
that life in the community [was] worthwhile” and was “part of the duty which we recognize as citizens in
a free democracy.”47 Modeled on Britain’s “Keep Calm and Carry On” mantra of resilience, it invoked a
sense of personal fortitude, moral strength, and courage.48 Scholars see a more critical vision of citizen
identity gaining ascendancy in the Cold War in Britain when civil defence moved away from public action
and duty to a narrower focus on self and family defence, exemplified in the message to “stay at
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home.”49 However, the US seemingly maintained the connection between self-identity, duty, and
citizenship, even as the focus shifted from protection to survival.
Survival is linked to duty, specifically “how to survive attack and live for your country’s
recovery.”50 Fearful messages are complemented by edifying themes of morale and greater service
while stigmatizing dependency.51 For example, the film “Our Cities Must Survive” asserted that “the city
must be kept alive, and it will take everything the city has to do it.” Shirking responsibility was akin to
“an act of desertion” in that “you failed yourself, your family, your friends, your city.”52 Reflecting public
health views of moral duty, civil defence is a “family-defense schema.”53 The family was the medium
linking national security to personal responsibility.54 The idea of responsibility was fully grounded in
moral-political identity. For example, a pamphlet titled “What You Should Know About Biological
Warfare” urged the reader to “keep yourself and your family clean” in order to prevent germs from
flourishing.55 Indeed, conceiving national security to fall under containment policy could open the way
to “discuss anything from hygiene to neighborliness.”56
The education system was paramount to creating this civic identity. Education would not only
inform the public on how to behave in the event of an attack but also create “patriotic linkage to a larger
sense of community and civic duty.”57 It emphasized containing communism while describing “the duties

49

J. Stafford, “‘Stay at Home’: The Politics of Nuclear Civil Defence, 1968-83,” Twentieth Century British History 23,
no. 3 (September 23, 2011): 383–407, https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwr034.
50
US Office of Civil Defense, Department of Defense, “Fallout Protection: What To Know And Do About Nuclear
Attack,” 1961, 5.
51
Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000), 37.
52
Melvin E. Matthews, Duck and Cover: Civil Defense Images in Film and Television from the Cold War to 9/11
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. Inc., 2012), 27.
53
McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, 3.
54
Ibid., 8.
55
Matthews, Duck and Cover, 31.
56
McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, 14.
57
Amanda J. Dory, “American Civil Security: The U.S. Public and Homeland Security,” The Washington Quarterly 27,
no. 1 (Winter 2003): 40.

153

of ideal subjects on the home front.”58 Adhering to the various duties also signaled individuals as loyal
citizens, as Self. The loyal citizen was contrasted with the subversive citizen, whom the state would take
action to contain.59 Subversives included suspected communists as well as other non-conforming bodies
such as homosexuals and resistant bodies of protest.
Civil defence thus drew on a sense of moral and civic duty to animate participation while
simultaneously signaling bodies as Self and non-Self. For Andrew Grossman, this established a wartime
standard for citizenship linked to emergency planning.60 Unlike a specific threat or disease, it was broad
and never-ending. Grossman calls it the internalization of a garrison state, but it is just as much the
internalization of quarantine.
A similar shift in emphasis from individual survival as a mode of state survival and citizenship
toward a more “uncompromising self-interest” is noted in American civil defence over time.61 The lost
sense of duty is lamented by some.62 Evidence of its recent revival is clear following 9/11 and in the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In a landmark speech on 20 September 2001
President George W. Bush called for a remaking of the character of the United States. Asserting that
“For too long our culture has said, ‘If it feels good, do it,’” Bush called on Americans to embrace a new
ethic and a new creed based on a culture of responsibility, urging citizens to “commit at least two years .
. . over the rest of your lifetime to the service of your neighbors and your nation.” He announced the
creation of USA Freedom Corps to mobilize volunteers for emergency response, rebuilding communities,
and “extending American compassion throughout the world.”63 The 2002 National Strategy for
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Homeland Security implored individual volunteers to “channel their energy and commitment in support
of the national and local strategies . . ..to help Americans achieve a shared cooperation in the area of
homeland security for years to come.”64 It included creation of the Citizen Corps which, like past civil
defence efforts, would harness the civic spirit of Americans by recruiting volunteers for homeland
defence. This emphasis on civic culture and citizenship has become more important with the rise of
resilience as a strategy for containing internal contagions. However, rather than reprising older models,
it reflects evolving views of the self as fluid (as in public health) and ambiguous: as vulnerable. Resilience
both widens and softens its embrace. On the one hand, there is an effort to integrate more bodies into
the production and defence of the Self. On the other hand, individual identity remains murky, and in
some cases, suspect, citizenship a marathon to demonstrate self-worth.
Resilience and the Pandemic Citizen: Vulnerability and the Ambiguity of Health
Philosopher Zygmunt Bauman claims that in the “liquid society” the enhancement of health and
elimination of disease is everyone’s task, if not duty.65 Health remains a moral signifier: a means of
identity, a measure of value, and a metric of citizenship. The healthy body is a sign of moral worth,
distinguishing those “who deserve to succeed from those who will fail.”66 It remains tied to the broader
social and political body by reference to community, city, or even nation, subsuming the individual
under the collective and linking civic duty to self-identity.67 While there is resonance with the notion of
individual responsibilisation for health, protection, and personal failure, there is equal emphasis on
public duty, particularly in the case of pandemic or contagious disease. This is prominent in public policy,
as seen in the assertion that
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the role of the public conceived here supersedes the notion of ‘individuals prepared to take care
of themselves’ . . . these approaches to leadership and civic duty fall short of what is needed to
handle a deliberate epidemic. Leaders must actively support and engage the public’s willing
collaboration in the societal responsibility to not infect others, to render aid to those in need
when feasible. . . .68
Laena Maunula argues that public pandemic plans and communications effectively create a model of a
“good pandemic citizen” as one who protects not only herself but others. Such citizens “fix their gaze on
themselves as a potential vector of disease and take steps to become guardians of population health
through their individual actions.”69 Moreover, they “comply with infection control directions [and] trust
in the direction of scientific and medical experts,” and they “actively embrace these strategies and goals
as their own.”70 Programs such as the Healthy Citizen Initiative further tie public education in health to
citizenship and civic engagement.71
Like the healthy body, resilience serves as a moral signifier, even as “a mark of distinction.”72
Notably, this moral distinction implies more than responsibility for oneself. It reflects a greater
culpability for others’ health and security, as well as one’s personal susceptibility to disease and
disorder—and a sense of being vulnerable and a vector of contagion. In the language of immunology, it
involves recognizing oneself as both illness and cure. Resilience thus comprises both a civic duty and
ostensibly a path to moral identity as a citizen. It animates action and identifies the individual as Self.
However, this identity is provisional. Resilience contains and mitigates but is not the opposite of
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vulnerability, as is noted in the literature.73 Like notions of health, it is no longer incongruous to be both
healthy and ill.74 Reflecting the fluidity of the body and its shifting shape, identity is measured by
degrees. Returning to the image of blood, it is possible, for example, possible to have a “little bit” of
anemia.75 Affirmation of Self thus requires repeated action and confirmation. For the most part, identity
remains suspect, plagued by a pervasive fear of auto-immunity, the capability of the body to turn
against itself. This is particularly true of Muslim communities targeted for interventions to build civic
resilience. But this case is not exceptional. And as I will discuss later, the evolution toward an
“informational immune system” envisioned for cyberspace points to efforts to automation, even at the
level of identity, raising questions about the political effects of resilience.
Ingraining a Culture of Cyber Resilience
In 1997 the US Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection recognized that the security of
cyber connections largely depends on the private sector and civil society voluntarily adopting good
behaviour or hygiene practices. Thus, it called for a sweeping cultural change to “ingrain” infrastructure
protection through education and awareness.76 This emphasis was further highlighted in a 2006 cyber
security hearing when chair George Forseman argued that “we must create a culture of preparedness,
both to prevent a cyber disaster and to mitigate damages if a widespread disruption occurs. We are
working every day to influence how individual citizens, government, and the private sector prepare for
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the security challenges of the coming decade.”77 It has since been elaborated in the Blueprint for
cybersecurity, which stresses not only leveraging the distribution of the system for its own protection
but uniting it in collective action by cultivating a sense of civic duty.78
These preparedness goals require mobilizing moral responsibility and individual culpability by
linking them to citizenship, leadership, and vulnerability. The voluntary nature of cyber resilience
mechanisms for surveillance and hygiene practices integrated with the state, and the association of
resilience with existing corporate leadership and identity, speak to the positive identity inculcated by
resilience. The duties are reinforced by a dual identity of vulnerability and the need for remedial action.
For example, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) promotes resources for
self-assessments and on-site assessments of vulnerability and resilience by “DHS cybersecurity
professionals,” including measures for improvement.79 A slew of information on potential selfvulnerabilities is also published and promoted.80 Similar service is offered for the industrial control
systems of critical industries.81 The goal is to motivate action and to contain one’s own vulnerability.
The importance of self-identity linked to collective duty shines forth in the language of
promotional materials. For example, a tip card presents cybersecurity as central to the role of industry
“leaders.”82 Participating in the voluntary program is linked to belonging, in the catch-phrase “welcome
to the community.”83 Responsibility to others is also foregrounded. The Stop.Think.Connect program, for
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one example, encourages employees to see their own vulnerability and role in promoting the broad
security of others, through admonitions such as “Often, the weakest link in network cybersecurity is the
human using a computer for work. You have a very important role to play in cybersecurity . . . Everyone
– from the entry-level employee to the CEO – has a responsibility to implement basic best practices.”84
Such promotional materials explicitly connect family obligations to citizenship. Mottos include
“securing one citizen, one family, one nation against cyber threats.” 85 Cyber hygiene is attached to the
mantra “Be a good online citizen.” 86 Invoking the original association of self-resilience and civil defence,
another reads “Loose lips sink ships. Keep calm, carry on. Safe for you, secure for all.”87 Underscoring
good citizenship, guidance on posting information online reads “I post about others only what I’d have
them post about me. Being a good online citizen is important to me.”88 As the “Blueprint for a Secure
Cyber Future” makes clear, the goal is to motivate individuals to do their part in “strengthening the
ecosystem.”89 It is about hygiene—knowing and implementing good behaviours—but also about
identity. A DHS White Paper, “Enabling Distributed Security,” explicitly ties this identity to health,
asserting that “Just as healthy individuals are essential to healthy communities, healthy participants are
essential to a healthy cyber ecosystem.”90 Also married to health is “learning about and mitigating cyber
vulnerabilities,”91 and, as will be discussed at the end, a drive toward solidifying and “authenticating”
identity in an environment that is viewed as continuously suspect.
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Community Resilience and Civic Responsibility
Like cyber vulnerability, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina strongly turned the US government’s
gaze to the role of citizens in mitigating disasters. Subsequent efforts to build community resilience have
evoked the sense of civic duty invoked by President Bush after 9/11. Speaking at a conference the
following year, then DHS Director Michael Chertoff declared that individuals have “a civic responsibility
to take some sensible steps to get ready for hurricane season, especially if they are able-bodied.”92 The
White House Report on Hurricane Katrina likewise pointed to citizen preparedness in organizations such
as the Citizen Corps.93 However, the narrative of resilience stresses both individual responsibility and
collective common defence: “doing more for themselves” as well as “helping others.”94 In his
submission to a Homeland Security Advisory Committee task force, Steven Flynn said that resilience
“would make preparedness a civic virtue by instructing civilians to refrain from requesting professional
assistance unless absolutely necessary, thus freeing up manpower for those in the greatest need.” The
Committee recommended initiating a school-based effort to “inculcate a renewed sense and mindset of
personal responsibility.”95
Just as with civil defence in the Cold War, an economic logic is at work here, namely a reduction
in demand for state resources and assistance. Yet the message is not simply that individuals are on their
own but that their actions are critical to the safety of others. In this regard, it replicates civil defence by
linking self-help to civic identity and duty. Former DHS Director Janet Napalitano saw a need to change
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the attitude of citizens who fail to prepare adequately for emergencies, claiming that “When we act
together, we contribute to our nation’s security, and that is part of good citizenship.”96 Mirroring the
role of civic education in public health, a government-sponsored literature review concludes that
schools are “an ideal setting for risk-based educational programs, and that students should ideally
receive several years’ exposure to such curricula.97 Similarly, FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative
identifies a need to “Infuse emergency management principles and life skills across the entire
educational experience to empower individuals to assume more responsibility.”98 To this end, a
catalogue of education resources has links to more than 70 programs and tools.99
Preparedness messaging is further coupled to moral duty by an emphasis on local communities
and the family. The Teen CERT (Community Emergency and Response Team) program encourages youth
to take formal preparedness and disaster training to “serve your community and help take care of your
family and school.”100 Likewise, the Citizen Corps is touted as providing “opportunities for people across
the country to participate in a range of measures to make their families, their homes, and their
communities safer.”101 Materials for the National Preparathon campaign are focused on “Family
Matters”102 and call on people to “join the movement.”103 While putting less emphasis on individual
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vulnerability assessments, these messages nonetheless mirror those that stress the healthy body: one
“can always be more prepared” and “individuals who believe that they are prepared for disaster are
often not as prepared as they think.”104 In other words, you are always vulnerable.
What is most critical to see here is that the passage from difference to identity and citizenship
through self-preparedness and civic duty is limited to those who can prepare. In contrast, through
exercises such as community mapping and planning covered in the previous chapters, the communities
considered most vulnerable don’t necessarily prepare, but instead are prepared for, and contained, in
tune with their inabilities and moral failings.
The Perpetual Vulnerability of Civic Resilience
Resilience as a path to achieving moral identity is never easy, but it is fraught most severely in
the case of civic resilience and radicalization, where the line between Self and Other, referent and threat
has most fully been erased. Actions to animate self-recognition are central to the civic resilience
approach to countering violent extremism, aiming at a perception of auto-immunity and a body turned
against itself. DHS policies consistently stress developing within target immigrant communities a sense
of civic responsibility tied to integration, community participation, and a common civic identity.105 The
2010 Quadrennial Review of Homeland Defense links activities such as “learning English” and “civic
principles” to the “foundation of responsible citizenship,”106 a message repeated in a fact sheet that
underscores building “strong and resilient communities by promoting immigration integration and civic
participation.”107 Resilience is explicitly connected to citizenship, which is thought to be deficient in
Muslim communities. Many community-level engagement and capacity-building efforts thus go toward
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bolstering Muslim-American citizenship, which is tied to supporting and participating in counterterrorism. Guidelines on Building Communities of Trust declare that Muslims have an obligation to learn
about the extremist threat and to report it to police (emphasis added). 108
Moreover, programs such as the FBI’s Adopt-A-School initiative seek to educate students about
“good citizenship,” which includes resisting bad influences.109 Similarly, the US Attorney’s Office in
Minnesota developed a Civics 101 training course for its engagement with communities, and it has
considered both producing a booklet to teach new Americans about their constitutional rights110 and
operating a Citizens Academy modeled on the FBI’s program. Likewise, the LADP Muslim Affairs Unit
aims to foster greater civic engagement by its Muslim community.111 As well, advice offered by the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is largely about good citizenship, recommending “civic
engagement initiatives; positive engagement online; building resilience within one’s circle of family and
friends; and building relationships with the government.”112
Like cyber resilience, there is a clear relationship between civic resilience and health. A
framework developed for Los Angeles asserts that its social and civic society programs “are naturally in
line with promoting the resilient and healthy communities” because they “address challenges around
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identity formation, integration, inter-group relations, political discourse and social services.”113 This
programming largely centers on engaging youth in civic participation. Resilience thus includes a mode
for developing a positive identity of self. A pilot project in Minnesota uses social media to deliver
positive messages to the Somali community.114 If a White House summit on violent extremism in 2015
reiterated that communities are the solution,115 the underlying narrative still maintains that they are
also the problem—they are not sufficient citizens, not sufficiently Self.
Muslim communities seem caught in the space between self and non-self—perpetually
vulnerable. Failure to participate in police and other programming has been used to identify individuals
as suspect, notably in a well-publicized case of the African Immigrant Muslim Community Outreach
Program (AIMCOP) in Minnesota.116 However, organizations that do participate in CVE programming
indicate that funding is attached to the stigma of terrorism, that is, to identifying the community and its
youth as vulnerable to radicalization and a possible terrorist threat. 117 There is no smooth path from
difference to identity, a situation recalling the irony of quarantine, which stigmatized both the healthy
and the sick.
Moreover, this vulnerability—the perspective of the body as fluid—and the concern with autoimmunity once again suggests “a more onerous citizenship” and the ambiguity of identity. As one
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scholar asks, how do you recognize self when the body is understood to be constantly changing?118 The
response has not been greater openness to ambiguity but a growing emphasis on authenticating
identity, associated with the move towards “authentication” in cyber security, which is part of the drive
to automate containment, a subject more than ready for discussion now.
From Animating to Automating
As we have seen, resilience is inherently political. Bound up with politics of identity, it seeks not
only to contain contagion but to produce the Self, and it is linked to the subjective identity of citizenship
and public duty tied to moral values such as health. It functions both to animate containing behaviour
and to signal Self and non-self within the political body. In civil defence, this duality distinguished the
loyal citizen from the subversive citizen. In theory, resilience can provide a path from vulnerability to
identity and citizenship. However, resilience is not an antidote to vulnerability. Indeed, an individual or a
state can be both healthy and ill. Resilience thus requires constant nurturing of self and constant
demonstration of citizenship. As I have noted before, this is what Susan Sontag means by “more onerous
citizenship.” It’s exhausting.119
As with surveillance and hygiene, the move towards an “informational immune system”
envisioned for cyberspace combines the notions of a stable, secure space and of automation. One
significant aspect of this development is the push for “authentication” of identities to facilitate “healthy
information exchange” akin to the “Cyber CDC.”120 It involves verifying identity by validating credentials.
Through the provision of select information, it removes ambiguity—a besetting problem of strategies to
control internal contagion—and solidifies individual identity as Self. The process of authenticating
identity is of course not new. We do it to access banking services, to collect a package from the post

118

Audronė Žukauskaitė, “Immunity and Contagion as Two Modes of Biopolitics,” Subjectivity 10, no. 3 (September
2017): 248, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41286-017-0028-8.
119
Evans and Reid, “Exhausted by Resilience.”
120
Philip Reitinger, “Enabling Distributed Security in Cyberspace: Building a Healthy and Resilient Cyber Ecosystem
with Automated Collective Action,” White Paper (Washington, DC: DHS, 2011), 25.

165

office, or to unlock a cellular phone with a fingerprint or retina scan. Authentication is a core component
of the automated vision of immune system defences. Formalization of identity can facilitate automatic
exchange of information. And it can contribute to the creation of exclusive, secure spaces based on
controlled access. These goals are reflected in the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace,
which imagines “an online environment where individuals and organization can trust each other
because they identify and authenticate their digital identities.”121 To advance this vision, a private sector
Trusted Identities Group was founded in 2015 to promote government and commercial adoption of
“digital identity solutions.”122
Automation—the process through which the body is self-regulated, machine-like, acting without
consciousness—is a theme running through the narrative of resilience as part of the continued evolution
of bodily defences toward a model of an “informational immune system.” Although connected to the
language of systems and cybernetics, the goal of automation is not entirely new. While the immune
system is automated, so are many other biological functions such as blinking and digesting. The focus on
automation speaks to a continuation of the drive to resolve the distance between the state-body and
biological bodies. From the perspective of containment, it brings to mind the notion of disciplined
bodies embedded in the medical-military schema of quarantine, and the concept of command and
control. It speaks to an internalization of this discipline and control. It’s a trajectory that is implied by
David Chandler’s assertion that resilience represents a move toward the “autotelic self.”’123
Autotelic is not a synonym for automatic. But it speaks to a quality of being internally driven, of
having a purpose that is not separate from itself. As a means of security, Chandler argues that the focus
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turns to internal control and change rather than change to the external environment. This of course is
the epitome of containment. Likewise, the idea of internal regulation is not unique, but it does speak to
a deepening course of containment as a form of bodily order and control—from quarantine’s external
barrier to the immune system’s constant remaking and recognizing Self. More interestingly, it recalls the
core idea within strategies of containment of the unity of the organic body, suggesting a merging of
purpose and identity.
To be sure, there is a certain amount of automation implied by animation, and the process of
self-subjection and recognizing Self. But these remain political processes. They are entwined with
questions of identity, moral obligation, and in the case of security, citizenship. Although it seems a fine
line between animating and automating functions of containment, the difference is significant.
Automation points to a mode of action that is in my view less political. From the perspective of identity,
it implies a move beyond the subjective process of identifying, and moving towards a more objective
process of being prescribed identity. It elides compliance with surveillance and hygienic response as a
political act, removes obstacles to cooperation and short-circuits modes of dissent, and has the potential
to create internal boundaries between authentic citizens and everyone else. Of course, this shift in itself
is a political act, which I identify as a mode of uncontested security. I explore this implication in the
following, concluding chapter.
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CONCLUSION—Resilience as an Uncontested Concept?
The popular desire for walling harbors a wish for the powers of protection, containment, and
integration promised by sovereignty, a wish that recalls the theological dimensions of political
sovereignty.1

This dissertation is about resilience and national security. It is also, necessarily, about the plague
and quarantine, public health and civil defence. It is also, and just as necessarily, about contagion—the
spread of disease and disorder—as a spatial and biological threat to order, control, and identity
characterized by fluidity. As well, it is about containing contagion. I argue that the effort to contain
contagion reveals an enduring strategic logic that weaves together national defence and public health.
The narrative of containment that I have presented centers on bodies: the geopolitical body of the state
and the biological bodies within the state. It follows the evolution of military and medical defence
alongside shifting images of the body and its defences, from the outer fortress of quarantine to the
molecular immunity of civil defence, and finally to resilience. I contend that resilience—the internal
ability of a system to limit damage from disruption—maintains the spatial and biological logic of
containment, now recast as an immune system. It works by integrating individual bodies into the
defence mechanisms of the state. Despite the apparent novelty in language, resilience is not new.
Instead, it represents only a shift in form, not in function. Indeed, the mechanisms of defence remain
remarkably stable over time, including a clinical focus on looking and listening to detect contagion,
controlling bodily responses by a combination of hardware and hygiene, and animating control by
producing and invoking a moral identity linked to the defence of a collective Self. Branded as defence-indepth, the layered design of resilience as understood today continues the inward trajectory of
containment and bodily control represented by the rings of quarantine.
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My analysis centers on the body as both a physical and a metaphorical representation of spatial
and biological order, control, and identity. I have argued that the body is a meeting point of geopolitical
views of containment as a mode of national defence, and of biopolitical approaches to population
health. Yet at this meeting point is a core tension between the body of the state and biological bodies,
between the system and its parts, that forms the space of contagion, “the medium through which
pathology circulates.”2 Closing this chasm through the command and control of bodies is essential to the
logic of containment. Leaks can turn into floods. My discussion has also pointed to the ongoing drive of
this effort, particularly the growing emphasis on automation, led by a cyber understanding of the
immune system not only as networked but as “informational.”3 This focus on the body, the analogy of
the immune system, and the move toward automation, provides a way to reflect on the value,
limitations, and implications of containment and, by extension, resilience as a mode of defence.
The Immune System and Its Limits
Containment endures as a logic of bodily defence because it performs a critical function. It
protects the body from viral circulation that threatens the integrity of its boundaries, identity, and
control. In many respects, it does this well. Despite challenges, quarantine in 17th-century England was
largely successful.4 The persistent popularity of the “keep calm and carry on” mantra reflects the
continued currency of self-help as an instantiation of immunity. As a mode of containment rooted in the
form and processes of the immune system, resilience has many benefits. For instance, it provides
stability for prevailing social, political, and economic systems, including the state itself. It is capable of
confining the circulation of deadly pathogens. Deadly outbreaks of SARS and Ebola have remained
isolated. Recent hurricanes in the United States, including Harvey and Irma, have claimed far fewer lives
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than did Katrina. Despite the constant flow of viruses and malicious intrusions, the Internet thus far
remains usable for most applications. Moreover, where the capability for detection and response is
lacking, contagion is rife and part of day-to-day living, as in a recent outbreak of listeria in South Africa
that killed almost 200 people in one year.5 Knowing what to do and where to go, and having access to
reliable information in an emergency, can be crucial for safety and even survival. Resilience is the
internal ability of a system to limit damage from disruption, and overall containment functions best in
the context of what I call “the politics of disturbance.”
The Politics of Disturbance
Containment takes aim at certain kinds of threats that I have linked to the behaviours of fluid
space: threats that spread through the body politic either by seeping or cascading; threats that emerge
with little warning or mutate; and threats that blend with the self. These kinds of threats are epitomized
by contagious disease. In terms common to the security field, containment is best suited to harmful
events that can be neither predicted nor prevented; in the language of complexity science, these are
events at the limits of external control. However, as a mode of bodily defence, the immune system does
not anticipate encounters with specific harmful substances, or seek to make the surrounding
environment safer for the body. Instead, it does its best to block entry to objects and microbes through
the barrier of the skin and to detect and isolate those that slip through its porous boundaries. That is,
containment is clearly not about prevention. It must accept imperfect security. External barriers in
particular are leaky. The inward trajectory of quarantine reveals the limitations of the barriers: fluid
threats trickle through them, flow around and under them, and circumvent them. In the case of Katrina,
the threats overflowed the walls. The limitations are particularly obvious today, given the sheer volume
of people, goods, and information flowing through global time and space.
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Critical security scholars thus tie resilience to “the politics of catastrophe,” a phrase that stresses
failure in the ability to prevent or control future deleterious events.6 I disagree with their assessment. As
a mode of containment, resilience instead functions as a politics of disturbance. While it cannot predict
or prevent threats from emerging, the intention is nonetheless to prevent systemic catastrophe by
intervening to stop small disturbances or intrusions that could jeopardize the body’s functions and
integrity. Generally, it works well for the subcases I have explored, which include cyber threats, natural
disasters, and violent extremism. It is also a logical approach to coping with the growing phenomena of
random, small-scale terrorist attacks on civilians. However, defences can be overwhelmed both
externally and internally, and the potential for catastrophe is a key constraint.
External Limits
The analogy of the immune system as a function of bodily defence and integrity helps us grasp
the inherent constraints of resilience. Amid the current obsession with contagion, recourse to the
immune system and faith in its ability is gaining ground in public opinion.7 Yet even with a strong
immune system, the body can still be overwhelmed. The immune system is impotent against severe
external attacks. It cannot fend off damage from a car crash or a blow to the head. Sufficient force can
generally topple a system. As a form of civil defence, internal resilience may help to contain the spread
of damage, but here too are limits. A nuclear strike is the most dramatic example. The possibility of such
a catastrophic attack made the logic of civil defence collapse under the weight of absurdity.8 Aaron
Wildavsky and Scott Sagan identify nuclear catastrophe as the limit to a resilience, or what they term a
“safety,” approach to security.9
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Anthropocentric climate change—alteration of the Earth’s natural processes by human
activity—may fit in this category too. The scale of change taking place has the potential to upend
prevailing geopolitical order. If climate changes of a suitable scale occur, they could disrupt this order
and the ability of state bodies to function. Some island states would disappear; stronger storms could
batter coastal regions into non-existence. Failure might not come in the form of a direct blow or strike
but from a persistent pressure on the capacity to contain its effects. This is another limitation of the
immune system: it is not inexhaustible, it can wear down, and it can fail. A body constantly bombarded
by infection becomes weaker. Granted, resilience valorizes to some extent the strength that comes
through exposure.10 This valorization is also evident in the public perception that an individual’s immune
potency is the outcome of contact with pathogens.11 However, the immune system has internal as well
as external limitations. Internally, the costs of climate change or other severe or chronic threats may
exceed its ability to manage the social and political consequences.
Internal Limitations
The threats posed by a weakened immune system are recognized in contemporary counterinsurgency doctrines that see it as ripe for attack and infiltration.12 Likewise, states and communities
that suffer too many disasters can have difficulty replenishing before the next event. The immune
system is also impeded by poor health. However, health—the well-being and strength of the body—is
not the concern of resilience. As a logic of containment, resilience limits itself to controlling contagion: it
is narrowly focused on capacities of the state body to detect and respond to outbreaks of disturbances
threatening its order and control. Resilience does not seek to change the internal conditions of
existence. It does not provide additional resources to the poor, for example, or enhance physical safety.

10

Brad Evans and Julian Reid, Resilient Life: The Art of Living Dangerously (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2015).
Davis et al., “Immunity, Biopolitics and Pandemics.”
12
Bell, “Hybrid Warfare and Its Metaphors.”
11

172

Likewise, resilience and the immune system analogy are largely impotent in regard to long-term
threats within the body. Cancer comes to mind here. While the immune system can contain contagion, it
is not equipped to cope with internal rot and decay. Resilience aims to maintain the system’s ability to
function, not to ensuring that the system itself is good. It can do nothing if the system itself is a source
of insecurity. In the case of climate change, resilience can enable systems that produce significant
negative externalities to persist as well as those that pose harm to domestic populations.13
Most critically, resilience is limited by the capacity for early detection and controlled response.
In most cases, this involves the ability to monitor and control biological bodies. Enhancing this ability is a
core driver of containment strategies including resilience. I mentioned earlier that the impetus for
resilience stems partly from a concern with auto-immunity and microbial resistance, the body turning
against itself. Modeled after the image of the immune system as a networked system constantly
recognizing itself and the body to be defended, resilience now reaches ever deeper into the body politic
as a site and source of detection and response to contagion. It is more inclusive than previous regimes,
and it tries to close the gap between biological bodies and the state through real-time communication
and automation. But the tensions—lags in cooperation and even resistance—remain. This is most
notable in civic resilience, where the blurring of Self and Other is greatest, and where engagement and
integration are made to blend with enforcement and isolation. Ironically, it seems to function better
with technical systems than with social systems. Hence the focus on automation, which reduces
containment to a disembodied exchange of information to detect and respond.
The chasm between the body and its parts, the state and the population of biological bodies,
suggests a further limitation, namely the application of biological analogies of defence. It also begs
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questions about the ethics of resilience and containment—questions about the values elided by its
metaphorical function and seductive promise.
The System and its Parts: Limits of Biological Analogy
Writing about the qualities of complex systems, Francis Westley and colleagues argue that
systems of nature and systems of people are different. Focusing on capacities for resilience, they
emphasize the ability of human systems to escape temporal and spatial limitations by using abstract
structures of signification, reflexivity, and forward-looking behaviour.14 Despite these differences, they
still maintain the validity of the concept of systems and the assumption of common interests and
purposes among all systems. But as we have seen, tensions and gaps restrict the applicability of nature
to society. Points of resistance and lack of cooperation limit the ability of the state body to act as a
system. Moreover, human societies face ethical and political questions that are ignored by systems
thinking, particularly about which bodies are defended and which are sacrificed.
The Law of Sacrifice
Resilience is a strategy applied to various referents within the body politic. It is presented as a
“quasi-universal answer to problems of security.”15 Yet resilience, conceived along immune system lines,
leverages the internal parts to protect the body’s macro stability, order, and identity: it privileges the
system over the parts. My analysis has disclosed the persistent tensions and gaps between these
elements. Aaron Wildavsky draws a similar conclusion in writing on resilience as an immune system.
Leveraging Burton Klein’s argument that micro and macro stability cannot co-exist, Wildavsky asserts
that “there can be no stable whole without some unstable parts,” adding that we “cannot search for
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safety without accepting the rule of sacrifice.”16 The everywhere nature of resilience may provide for
depth of security, but this depth pertains only to the stability of the whole and the maintenance of social
and political order. Resilience accepts imperfect security for some. Costs are not born equally: the parts
are used to save the system.
This inequality is clearly seen with quarantine and the cordone, which is used as much to keep
people in as it is to keep people out, which has recently been used in response to Ebola.17 Similarly,
vaccines inevitably harm a few to protect the mass. The element of sacrifice is perhaps most starkly
revealed by civil defence plans that essentially sacrificed cities to protect an American heartland.18
Sacrifice may be elided by the ubiquity of resilience but it is still present. It is not about
protection or health; it leaves individual bodies vulnerable and exposed. While contributing to national
detection and containment capabilities, private sector entities are left largely to themselves to cope
with harmful intrusions. Community resilience and disaster preparedness emphasize poor and
marginalized communities, but fail to address poverty or accessibility of resources. Civic resilience does
not bring new resources to vulnerable groups, although it does enhance cooperation with policing and
intelligence agencies. This pattern is mirrored globally in observations in respect to dealing with climate
change,19 disease surveillance and control,20 and poverty.21 Writing on pandemic influenza, Mark Davis
and colleagues argue that control measures “have a troubling hollowness that betrays an interest in the
management of populations where microbial danger is likely to be already present.”22 The conceptual
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blurring of threat and referent that is embedded in notions of fluidity further obfuscates the distinction
between bodies being protected and those being contained.
This problem is not new. Some bodies have always been used to defend other bodies.23
However, today it raises political questions that are obscured by the systemic focus on the body politic
and the assumed complementarity of geopolitical and biological bodies. Which parts are to be held
stable, and which exposed to instability? Is the system worth being saved, and if it is, at what cost? Who
is Self and who is Other, and where do their bodily boundaries lie? In nature, the answers are innate. In
technical systems, they are automated. But in human systems, they involve moral questions about
power, interests, values, and identity. The drive toward automation implies a determination to make
human systems more system-like. The questions will not go away.
The consequences of automation are political. If the aim is to make the immune system analogy
more applicable, this means not only overriding political tensions and the need to elicit cooperation but
muting resistance and dissent. Resilience involves interventions to build a capacity for detection and
response as an internal quality of the Self. However, the “building in of skill”—especially if it is
automated— implies the “building out of consent.”24 Julian Reid and Brad Evans thus assert that to be
resilient is “to forego the very power of resistance.”25 This is a strong statement, but it resonates with
the narrative of containment. Resilience is often contrasted with resistance.26 I have traced its rise as a
policy to a parallel concern with emerging disease and auto-immunity—the body turning against itself—
which from a microbial perspective is precisely about overcoming resistance.27 From the resilience
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standpoint, resistance is contagious and hence must be contained. Resilience is undeniably seductive in
its promise of universal deliverance.28 However, as I have explained, resilience and containment have
limitations. The ubiquity of resilience is problematic, primarily because it is uncontested.
Resilience as Uncontested Security
Security scholar Barry Buzan famously declared security an “essentially contested concept” at a
time when the Cold War still ran hot.29 As geopolitical confrontation cooled, its meaning was
increasingly opened up to challenge and contestation. The post-Cold War era unleashed a wave of
efforts to expand, redefine, and reclaim the concept from its roots in the state and military power. Ken
Booth described the period as an “interregnum” and called for replacing the values of power and order
with emancipation.30 Human security, marked by individual freedom from fear and want, emerged as a
new paradigm of security.31 Jessica Mathews led a call to include the environment as a referent of
security.32 Some experts resisted efforts to widen the meaning of security,33 while others were
suspicious of the value of new concepts, particularly human security.34 Keith Krause argued that it
reproduced geopolitical understandings of “us” and “them.”35 Buzan and colleagues later declared that
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despite these debates, security maintained a long-standing, core meaning rooted in state action and the
maintenance of stability.36 The rise of resilience suggests that they were right.
To be sure, resilience is critiqued within critical scholarship, with some writers even calling for
resistance to resilience.37 But its proliferation within public policy belies such criticism. Resilience has
emerged as a metaphor not only for containment but for security. Its seemingly universal applicability is
unfortunately replacing important debates about the goals, values, and referents of the concept. It
punctured the interregnum, eclipsing these debates by its ubiquity and ambiguity. As we have seen,
resilience is now applied to individuals and communities, infrastructure, and the civic spirit. Some have
even sought to extend its application to the global environment and climate.38 However, this
redefinition of the system—of the body to be defended—does nothing to rectify the shortcomings of
the concept of resilience and only reinforces its conquest.
The triumph of resilience is problematic because containment is itself a too narrow reading of
security. It ignores both the causes of external threats and the efforts to ameliorate or prevent them.39
Granted, there are limits to more ambitious approaches including protection and prevention. When
prevention fails, we are left with resilience.40 Yet the inward gaze of resilience is equally limited, focused
as it is on systemic order and stability. It abandons not only prevention but also protection of vulnerable
bodies, and it shrouds the limitations of this strategy as well as the matter of sacrifices and political
values. It is essential to question its dominance, and to think beyond containment as a strategy to cope
with global issues such as pandemic disease and climate change.
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Strategy and Global Governance
I have argued that containment as a spatial and biological strategy of defence is embedded in
both national security and public health. While this dual perspective has allowed me to draw insights
from medicine to broaden the understanding of containment as a method of security, it has more than
an instrumental value. It suggests that containment speaks not only to an enduring logic of security but
to a broader strategy of global governance.41 The idea that strategy extends across disciplines helpfully
points to an interdisciplinary way of thinking about governance. Rather than cycling through debates
such as the “securitization” of health and the “medicalization” of security,42 it is useful to identify goals
and methods that are shared. Not only does this contribute to a better understanding of how
approaches to specific problems can reinforce one another, it also helps to identify alternative
strategies. This is the point of Alison Howell’s call for an interdisciplinary Global Politics of Medicine as
“a broad disciplinary and scientific set of practices directed at the management and health of the body
and the population.”43
My analysis of containment shows that, like security, there are different strategies of medicine.
While I have suggested that resilience has largely eclipsed alternative perspectives within security, other
approaches, such as those undertaken in the public health domain, remain instructive. For example, Ed
Cohen notes that the idea of healing rather than defence used to be a central perspective on the body.44
Like Roberto Esposito, he wonders if mediation and community might replace exclusion and immunity.45
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Similarly, Andrew Lakoff contrasts global health security—the model of disease containment—with
“biomedical humanitarianism,” which treats individuals with already-existing diseases by focusing on
long-term care rather than emergency care.46 This concept clearly has applications to situations of
community and civic resilience where few resources are dedicated to attacking the structural conditions
of vulnerability. Looking to ecology, which inspired the contemporary resurgence of resilience, the idea
of transformation—of fundamental change to systems and bodies—may prove useful.47
Global challenges are broad, complex, and multifaceted. There are no panaceas,48 even though
resilience masquerades as one. I have sought to unmask its pretense of novelty and salvation by
revealing its function as a mode of containment with origins in the military-medical scheme of
quarantine. As well, I have revealed the expansion of containment as a strategy rooted in goals of both
national defence and public health to maintain the stability and integrity of the body politic, while
explaining how it works by controlling biological bodies. I do not claim that this expansion is nefarious,
but I do contend that its aims are too narrow and its defences too limited.
Writing about the interregnum in security studies, Ken Booth claimed that “Our work is our
words, but our words do not work anymore.”49 In the case of resilience, a change in words has been not
only insufficient but deceptive. Perhaps the problem is not with our vocabulary. Rather than donning a
new language, we might find camaraderie and inspiration by looking outside our discipline for
alternative values and strategies beyond defence. We might find stronger solidarity and new
perspectives to old problems through concepts such as humanitarianism, which has recently mobilized
unprecedented support for a global ban on nuclear weapons. While the path to eliminating these
weapons remains elusive, this perspective has at the very least sharpened the political calculus that
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Humanitarianism, and Development 1, no. 1 (2010): 59–79, https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2010.0001.
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Walker and Salt, Resilience Thinking, 123.
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leaves humanity dangerously exposed. At the same time, I am weary of the quest for universal solutions.
And I am wary of finding echoes of containment in disguise. Regardless the way ahead, it is critical to ask
which bodies are being protected and which are being sacrificed, and how this squares with our values;
questions that disappear under the metaphorical mask of concepts such as resilience.
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